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Abstract.
Since the late 1970s, families of microelectronic technologies that could bring the
advantages of high levels of electronic integration have been available at reasonable prices
and manageable risk to all sectors of UK industry. However, the uptake of these
technologies has been painfully slow, particularly by the small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) that make up most of the companies currently operating in the UK. It is the aim of
the research described here to assess how slow the uptake has been, the reasons for it, and
possible solutions to the problem. The problem is investigated with reference to SMEs.
In order to reach conclusions it has been necessary to ;-
• Define Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) technology and review its history
• Review that nature of the UK 5MB base and identify why they should use ASICs
• Review the UK, European and World ASIC markets
• Analyse the nature of the UK ASIC design and supply industry
• Ascertain the reasons for non-adoption and assess their validity
• Relate the findings of this research to appropriate business, organisational and system
models
• Review past and existing technology-transfer programmes operating in the area of ASIC
adoption at a UK, European and world level
• Compare the adoption of ASIC technology with the adoption of similar, wide-ranging,
new technologies
The study concludes that the technology is unique in the wide range of industries to which
it can be applied, and that although some advances in adoption have been made, there
remains a significant number of hurdles to adoption which can best be addressed by
government intervention and supporting activity from supply-companies, trade-
associations, user-groups and professional and educational institutions. Only once adoption
has reached a 'critical mass' can it be assumed that a self-sustaining market will result.
v
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Antifuse
ALU
ASIC
ASSP
CAE
CASE tools
CBIC
Chip
A structure which programs to a low resistance when a high
programming current is passed through it. Used in some
forms ofFPGA.
Arithmetic & Logic Unit: The combinatorial processing core
ofa digital processor (microprocessor, microcontroller etc.).
Application-Specific Integrated Circuit.
Application Specific Standard Part: Commodity
semiconductor chips used in general applications.
Computer-Aided Engineering: A genenc term for the
hardware and software tools used in the simulation and
layout of ASIC devices, and in other engineering disciplines.
Computer Aided Software Engineering: High-level software
tools used in software system design.
Cell-Based Integrated Circuit: A type of masked ASIC.
An integrated circuit
xiii
CMOS Complementary Metal Oxide Semiconductor: The most
common fabrication technology for ASICs.
CNC Computer Numerically Controlled: A term used to describe
the electronic control of machine tools.
CPLD Complex Programmable Logic Device: A generic term used
to describe user-programmable logic devices that are
slightly lower than FPGAs in complexity.
DNA Deoxyribonucleic Acid: The molecule of heredity. The
purine and pyrimidine bases of DNA carry genetic
information.
DRAM Dynamic Random Access Memory: A semiconductor
memory construct based on capacitance which must be
continually re-written to maintain its data.
DTI Department of Trade and Industry: A UK government
department.
EMC Electromagnetic Compatibility: The behaviour of a device in
respect of its emissions of and susceptibility to radio
frequency interference.
xiv
EPROM Erasable Programmable Read Only Memory: A type of
ROM which can have its data erased and re-written using a
programming device.
EU The European Union.
Eurocbip An EU funded programme to develop and supply prototype
ASICs for academic and industrial users.
FE! Federation of Electronic Industries: A trade association
Foundry A factory that produces integrated circuits, often on a sub-
contract basis.
FPGA Field Programmable Gate Array: A generic term covering a
range of programmable logic devices with higher
complexity than CPLDs and PLDs.
Gate The basic building block of digital circuits. A device
capable of performing a simple Boolean function (e.g. AND,
OR).
xv
Gate Array An semi-custom digital integrated circuit where
customisation is achieved by connecting an array of
uncommitted gates using etched metal tracks on the chip.
GSM A standard for digital mobile telecommunications named
after the 'Groupe Special Mobile' within ETSI that wrote
the standard.
BDL Hardware Description Language: Text languages used to
describe hardware functions (e.g. VHDL, Verilog).
BEl Higher Education Institutions: Universities and former
polytechnics and colleges involved in tertiary education.
lEE Institution of Electrical Engineers: The UK institution
regulating and representing electrical engineers.
IEEE Institution of Electrical and Electronic Engineers: The USA
equivalent of the lEE.
JEDEC Joint Electronic Device Engineering Council: An
international standards body operating within the
semiconductor industry.
xvi
MAb
MiD
Microcontroller
MPW
Netlist
NREcbarge
OTPROM
Monoclonal Antibody: An antibody that can be produced in
large amounts by fusing an antibody producing cell with a
myeloma (cancerous) cell.
Microelectronic in Business: A DTI initiative to increase the
adoption of microelectronics in the UK.
A single chip containing a microprocessor core along with
peripheral devices such as program memory (PROM) and
random access memory (RAM).
Multi Project Wafer: A method of lowering NRE charges by
sharing space on a wafer between several devices.
A text file containing information relating to the
connectivity of elements in an electronic circuit
Non-Recurring Engineering charge: A tooling charge made
by a semiconductor company for masked ASICs.
One Time Programmable Read Only Memory: A type of
ROM that may be programmed once using a programming
device, but cannot be re-written.
xvii
PAL Programmable Array Logic: A simple form of
programmable logic device.
PALASM PAL Assembler: A low-level language for describing the
function of PAL devices.
PCB Printed Circuit Board: A laminated board of copper and
insulator which forms electrical connections between
components attached to it.
PLD Programmable Logic Device: A generic term for logic
devices which can be programmed by the user (e.g. FPGA,
PAL).
PTH Plated Through Hole: A printed circuit board assembly
technique where component leads penetrate the board.
RAM Random Access Memory: A generic term for semiconductor
memory that can be accessed (written to and read from)
non-sequentially.
ROM Read Only Memory: Non-volatile semiconductor memory
which cannot be written to when in-circuit.
xviii
SBA
Scan Path
Slice
SME
SMT
SPICE
SRAM
Turn-key design
Semiconductor Businesses Association: A UK trade-
association.
A production test methodology used in many ICs in which
test patterns and their results are passed through the device
via shift registers.
See wafer
Small or Medium Enterprise: A company employing fewer
than 500 people (250 in the UK by DTI definition).
Surface Mount Technology: A printed circuit board
population technique where components do not penetrate
the board.
An analogue simulation software-tool used mainly at
component level (e.g. transistors, resistors, capacitors)
Static Random Access Memory: A semiconductor memory
which does not need to be refreshed to retain its data
A design performed entirely by a third-party.
xix
UART Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter: A function,
often incorporated in a microcontroller, to interface to an
asynchronous communications line (e.g. RS232).
ULA Uncommitted Logic Array: An early form of bipolar gate
array.
Verilog A hardware description language.
VHDL The BDL (hardware description language) developed by the
US DoD (department of defence) for the VHSIC (very high
speed integrated circuit) programme.
Wafer Also referred to as a slice. A disk of silicon containing a
number of chips which is cut into individual die and
packaged.
Yield The percentage of circuits initially fabricated on a slice that
pass post-manufacturing tests.
Yourdon A structured design methodology used in software
engineering.
1. Introduction.
1.1 Summary of Study
Since the late 1970s, families of microelectronic technologies that could bring the
advantages of high levels of electronic integration have been available at reasonable prices
and manageable risk to all sectors of UK industry. However, the uptake of these
technologies has been painfully slow, particularly by the small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) that make up most of the companies currently operating in the UK. It is the aim of
the research described here to assess how slow the uptake has been, the reasons for it, and
possible solutions to the problem. The problem is investigated with particular reference to
SMEs.
In order to achieve this result it has been necessary to perform a structured research
programme which went through the stages outlined below.
1.1.1 Stage 1.Definition of ASIC technology.
The term 'Application Specific Integrated Circuit' (ASIC) is used very loosely in the
electronics industry, so before any meaningful research could be undertaken, it was
necessary to define the scope of the technology and produce a tighter definition of the sub-
categories of ASIC. At this stage it was also useful to review the history of the technology
and to review the influence that the history of the technology might have on its adoption by
SMEs in the 1990s.
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1.1.2 Stage 2. Review of tne UKSME base.
'Small and medium enterprise' is a popularly used phrase, but its definition varies. Stage
two defines the 5MB in relation to this study, estimates the size of the UK 5MB base and
identifies why 5MBs should consider using ASIC technology by reference to marketing
models, industry structure and specific case-histories.
1.1.3 Stage 3. Market analysis.
The work of this study rests on the hypothesis that 5MBs do not use ASIC to the extent
that they might profitably do, or to the extent that their overseas competitors do. So as to
prove this hypothesis it was necessary to investigate the size and nature of the UK,
European and World ASIC markets, particularly with respect to 5MBs. A survey of ASIC
design and supply companies was undertaken to support both this stage, and stage 4.
1.1.4 Stage 4. Supply-side analysis.
In order to understand the nature of the market, it was also necessary to analyse the ASIC
supply industry. The UK is unusual in the number of small design-companies operating in
ASIC technology, so it was necessary to investigate further the nature of the supply
industry, again with particular reference to SME users.
1.1.5 Stage 5. Reasons/or non-adoption.
Having established that the level of adoption was low, the next stage was to establish the
reasons for non-adoption. This was mainly performed by surveys. Having established
perceived reasons, each of the major reasons perceived by non-users was analysed so as to
identify whether it was based in fact or whether it was a misconception. A survey of
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universities was performed at this stage to investigate the role of engineering education in
ASIC adoption.
1.1.6 Stage 6. Investigation of models.
Most of the reasons identified by users were found not to be based on fact, so the problem
of identifying the real reasons for non-adoption became more difficult. In the systems
sense, the problem became 'soft' or 'messy'. In stage six, several models were used to
attempt to rationalise the system aspects of adoption and better understand the overall
reasons for non-adoption. The models used have their roots in system, organisational and
business research.
1.1.7 Stage 7. Investigation of technology transfer schemes.
The problem of ASIC adoption has been addressed by a number of national and
international government initiatives. In stage seven, a number of such initiatives were
reviewed in relation to the models that had earlier been identified. An international survey
was performed in order to establish the extent of technology-transfer schemes outside of
the UK.
1.1.8 Stage 8. Comparison with other industries
By this stage it had been established that there were some unusual problems associated
with ASIC adoption, so a review of the Biotechnology industry was performed so as to
ascertain whether the problems encountered in ASIC technology are also encountered in
other high-technology industries.
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1.1.9 Stage 9. Conclusions and recommendations.
In stage nine, all of the previous stages are brought together to form conclusions and make
recommendations for appropriate action by industry, government and the 5MB base in
order to improve the adoption of ASIC technology and enable UK companies to derive
sustainable competitive advantage.
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2. ASIC Technology and its history.
2.1 What is ASIC technology?
Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC) technology is a family of related
technologies which enable the production of low-cost integrated circuit solutions to
electronic designs. The aim is to produce devices where the majority of the semiconductor
processing stages that are performed during the manufacture of the chip are common to all
users of the device-family, while the final few processing stages are specific to the
particular application of one user.
Several well-known ASIC families exist, each of which has a number of variants. The
basic families are shown in Figure 2-1. It is beyond the scope of this study to discuss the
variants of each major group in any detail. The descriptions below are intended as an
outline of the generic groups. Further details of the technologies involved may be found in
a number of texts (Lee, 1990~Xilinx, 1994).
2-1
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ASIC Family
Figure 2-1. ASIC/amity of devices
2.1.1 User-programmable logic devices.
These are considered, from the user viewpoint, to be the least complex of the ASIC
families. An array of logic elements is fabricated on the chip, along with a means of
connecting these elements which can be programmed by the application designer. Devices
leaving the semiconductor manufacturer, while identical to each other, do not have any
connectivity established between the logic elements. The customisation of the devices is
done by the user.
This customisation is performed in a variety of ways ranging from the blowing of fuses to
leave only desired connections, as in Programmable Array Logic (PAL) devices, to loading
a data pattern into Static Read-Only-Memory (SRAM) within the ASIC device which
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governs the connectivity and function of the elements; as in the field programmable gate
array (FPGA) devices pioneered by Xilinx.
The basic logic element varies in complexity from the AND-OR array of the simple PAL
device to the complex configurable logic element of the FPGA (Xilinx, 1994; AMD.
1990). These are illustrated in Figure 2-2.
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Figure 2-2. Programmable device building blocks
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2.1.2 MicTocontTolleTs.
Often not considered to be ASICs, microcontrollers share many of the features of other
ASIC families. In this case the common part of the chip is the microprocessor core. The
function of the device is customised by its program, which is stored in the Read Only
Memory (ROM) of the device. This programming is achieved either in the final
photolithographic stages of the chip manufacture, or by the user programming PROM,
EPROM, or flash-memory sections of the chip. Consequently, devices end up being unique
to a particular application.
These devices can have remarkably low costs. Masked devices which have a non-recurring
engineering (NRE) charge as low as £2,000 and a part cost of around 35 pence are not
uncommon. This low cost has given them great popularity in the replacement of relatively
simple logic circuits in addition to their more usual place in more sophisticated
microprocessor systems used, for example, in control or computing applications.
In addition to the microprocessor core and program memory, microcontrollers can contain
a number of on-chip peripherals including:
• Serial and parallel input/output devices
• Timers and counters
• NO and DIA converters
• Additional non-volatile memory
2.1.3 Gate-arrays.
In a gate-array, the silicon vendor produces a base device consisting of an array of
unconnected logic elements (typically 2-input NAND gates). To customise the device for
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an individual application, the gates are connected using mainly metal interconnect during
the final photolithographic stages of the manufacturing process. The devices may then be
placed in a package suitable for the particular application. Such packages come in a variety
of types and sizes with pin counts from less than 16 to over 300, and in packages suitable
for both plated-through-hole (PTH) and surface-mount (SMT) manufacturing methods.
In this way, the function and packaging of the device can be customised to meet a
particular user's application. As all of the manufacturing processes prior to the final metal
interconnect layers are common to all designs, the base-wafers of uncommitted NAND
gates are common to all designs and can consequently be manufactured in far greater
quantities, and consequently lower cost, than would be the case for a unique chip. This
architecture is shown graphically in Figure 2-3, which shows a channeled gate-array. With
this technology, gates are fabricated in vertical diffusion-columns, with most of the metal
interconnect passing over the blank wiring· channels. A more recent variant of the
technology does away with the wiring channels to produce a 'sea of gates' device in which
the space previously occupied by wiring channels is filled with additional uncommitted
gates. This allows a higher density of gates to be produced on the device, but adds to the
complexity of the interconnect routing design, as passing a metal interconnect over a gate
can render that gate unusable. Connection to the legs of the integrated circuit (le) package
are made using thin bond-wires between the I/O pad of the chip and the lead-frame of the
package.
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Cell-based devices take the degree of silicon customisation a stage further than array-
based products. In cell-based devices a set of building blocks of different types of circuit
elements are defined as cells. The cells come in a variety of types ranging from simple
gates to more complex digital functions such as memory elements and may even include
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highly complex functions such as microprocessors. These cells are then designed as
Die or Chip
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individual multi-layer entities which have individual layouts at each of the silicon
Figure 2-3. A channelled gate-array.
2.1.4 Cell-based (standard-cell) devices.
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processing stages. It is this 'cell library' produced by the silicon vendor, which is common
to all designs. A small number of silicon vendors include cells with analogue functions
such as operational amplifiers and ND converters. With these cells, designs using both
analogue and digital functions may be produced on the same chip. Such chips are generally
referred to as 'mixed signal' and form the most complex ASIC technology currently
available.
The application designer uses these cells to generate the function of his design. However,
as the chips designed by this process have layouts which differ at every stage of the
manufacturing process, common pre-processed wafers cannot be used as they are in array-
based products. This difference in every layer leads to the need to produce a complete
mask-set for the device (typically 13 masks for a CMOS process). It is also necessary to
have a complete manufacturing run common only to one application, although the
manufacturing process itself follows the same stages from design to design.
These added levels of complexity in the design and tooling processes make cell-based
devices more expensive than array-based devices at the design and prototype stages. The
finished part may however be cheaper, as the ability to use precisely the building blocks
best suited to the design generally leads to the design occupying a smaller silicon area than
an equivalent array-based product.
The general layout of a cell-based chip is shown in Figure 2-4. A number of variants of the
architecture shown in the diagram also exist, differing mainly in their ability to
accommodate differently shaped cells.
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Figure 2-4. A column based standard-cell device
2.1.5 Full-custom devices.
The devices discussed so far are collectively referred to as 'semi-custom' devices. Full-
custom devices are not generally considered as ASIC devices but are discussed here for
completeness. They can be considered to be application-specific in only a minority of
applications where very high volumes of manufacture justify the high cost of a bespoke
design for an individual application.
In full-custom devices the design is constructed without the aid of a 'cell library'.
Individual circuit elements such as transistors and resistors are used to produce the design.
In this way maximum use is made of the silicon area, and device constructs most suitable
to the application can be used rather than having to rely on those available in the cell
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library. However, as there is little in common between designs, development costs are
high, and problems associated with the unique layout of the chip may be experienced (e.g.
cross-talk and noise problems which are rarely encountered in semi-custom designs).
Full-custom design is generally used for non-specific applications (e.g. microprocessors)
and specific applications where the high production-volumes involved justify the extra risk
and expense because of the lower final production costs of an optimally sized device (e.g.
a video game). Even with such high-volume products, semi-custom processes are often
used in the early versions of the product so that the time-to-market advantages of the semi-
custom processes may be exploited. Full-custom implementations then follow when the
volume of product sales justifies the extra design expense. This family of devices will be
occasionally referred to later in this study, but is not specifically included in the research.
2.1. 6 Hybrid ASIC types.
The types of device described in this chapter illustrate the basic techniques used in the
fabrication of ASIC products. However, in order to overcome some of the inherent
disadvantages of each of the approaches, some manufacturers have developed products
which are best described as hybrids of the more normal techniques. Examples of such
approaches include:
• Hard macros: In some applications the compact and predictable nature of standard-cells
are mixed with the low design costs and versatility of gate-arrays. An example of this
was a base-device developed by LSI Logic which contained four bit-slice
microprocessor cells and an array of uncommitted gates. This allowed the bit-slice
processors to be produced with the higher performance and smaller silicon area that can
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be achieved in a standard-cell, while the additional logic could be fabricated in a gate-
array technology with its inherently lower cost.
• Soft macros: In order to overcome the need to re-invent complex cells in gate-array
designs, some manufacturers produce 'soft macros'. These are pre-designed complex
elements (for example the bit-slice microprocessor mentioned above) which are made
available to gate-array designers as net-lists or hardware design language (HDL)
representations. These are different to standard-cells in that their layout is not fixed, so
they will occupy different silicon areas to fit-in with a design each time they are used.
Figure 2-5 shows how these two approaches differ in the design of a chip containing two
bit-slice microprocessors.
2-11
Soft macros distributed over chip to suit layout
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Figure 2-5 Hard and soft macrocells
In the upper example in Figure 2-5 the desired microprocessors have been incorporated
into the design, fitting in with the rest of the design as dictated by the layout tool. In the
lower example, a base-device containing four hard-macrocell processors has been used. As
the design only requires two such devices, two remain unused. This illustrates the major
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problem with this approach; the silicon vendor has to predict the most universally useful
combinations of macrocells, and will seldom be correct in his choice. The advantage is
that the resultant cell will have a layout and hence performance which is consistent across
multiple cells. The soft-macro will not, as performance is significantly affected by layout.
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2.2 A brief history ofASIC technology.
As with most areas of technology, the history of ASIC technology has a direct influence on
the way that it is perceived and used in the present. For the purposes of this study, the
history of the ASIC device also needs to be considered in relation to a number of other
technological and business developments that occurred in the electronics industry in the
post-war period. This brief history will consider some of the principal developments
between 1960 and the present, and is summarised in Figure 2-6.
The decades shown in the diagram refer to the time at which the technologies became
widely available to the semiconductor user rather than the point at which they were
invented or developed as a number of technologies, including Complementary Metal-
Oxide-Semiconductor (CMOS), remained unexploited for a considerable length of time
after their invention.
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Figure 2-6. Technology roadmap since 1960.
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In 1952, Dummer heralded the practical use of the integrated circuit (lC) when he said, "It
seems now possible to envisage electronic equipment in a solid block with no wires" (Lee,
1990), but it was not until the 1960s that the integrated-circuit became commercially
available in any quantity. ICs were originally developed by companies such as Texas
Instruments and Fairchild to reduce the weight and increase the reliability of electronics in
spacecraft and airborne weapons systems. However, with few exceptions, general
electronics companies were restricted in their use of ICs to the standard products produced
by the semiconductor companies.
These standard products began in the 60s with small scale integration (SSI) components
(e.g. NAND gates and latches) fabricated in technologies such as Diode-Transistor Logic
(DTL). By the 1970s the number of devices that could reliably be manufactured on a single
chip had increased and medium scale integration (MSI) components (e.g. counters and
multiplexers) were available. By this time, fabrication technology had moved on to
Transistor-Transistor Logic (TTL) and 4000 series CMOS (Lavington, 1976; McLean &
Rowland, 1985;Morris, 1990). TTL had been originally developed by Sylvania in the mid
60s, but it did not increase significantly in popularity until the launch of the 74 series TTL
by Texas Instruments in the late 60s (Horowitz & Hill, 1995)
Large scale integration (LSI) began with the introduction of the microprocessor and
integrated memory devices in the early to mid-seventies. It was at about this time that
semiconductor companies began to develop devices in which an array of logic-gates were
fabricated on a chip, leaving the final layers of metal interconnect to be defined by the
user. By the late seventies a number of semiconductor companies including Plessey,
Ferranti and Fairchild had produced Uncommitted Logic Array (ULA) devices, which
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contained about 100 gates per chip, and were beginning to see applications in commercial
systems such as the ICL 2900 and mM 360 mainframe computers and other high-speed
computing systems (Gosling, Kinniment & Edwards, 1979).
Meanwhile, a revolution in the business aspects of the semiconductor industry was
occurring, predominantly in the USA. It' was becoming normal for bright groups of
engineers from the major semiconductor vendors to leave their employers to form new,
small semiconductor-companies. Silicon Valley was becoming important and the US
semiconductor industry was gaining a massive technical and commercial lead over the rest
of the world. Two such entrepreneurial engineers were Richard Peritz and Richard
Hanschan who, having been involved in the successful development of the 74 series TTL
for Texas Instruments, left to set up Mostek, a company which was to hasten the
development of Metal-oxide-semiconductor (MOS) and CosMOS (later to become CMOS)
technology. Peritz was later to be instrumental in the formation of Inmos in the UK in
conjunction with Ian Barron. The significance of this company with regard to the UK
microelectronics industry and government intervention in technology transfer will be
discussed later.
CMOS quickly became established as a major process-technology due to its small feature
size (the size of the smallest feature that could be fabricated on the silicon surface), and
low power-consumption which allowed complex devices to be fabricated without the
thermal problems previously associated with LSI devices based on other MOS or bipolar
technologies. In Silicon Valley, a small number of companies were combining the
advantages of CMOS with those of ULAs to produce families of CMOS gate-arrays. One
such company was LSI Logic, which was to grow to dominate the world ASIC market and
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remains important in that market today.
Advances in CMOS technology came to be driven by the need for ever denser memory
devices for the computer industry which was growing rapidly during the 1980s. This drove
down the geometry of the patterns etched on the silicon surface (the feature size), from the
5 microns that was common at the start of the decade to the sub-micron technologies
available today (0.5 micron is commonly available at the time of writing). As these denser
technologies became available to gate-array manufacturers, economically viable gate-array
devices progressed from having a few hundred gates available to the designer, to today's
situation, where gate-arrays containing over one million gates will soon be commonplace.
The need for lower power-consumption to meet the needs of battery-powered equipment
also led to the development of devices operating from a 3.3 Volt power supply rather than
the more traditional 5 Volts.
Programmable logic devices were also developing during this period. In the mid 70s
Monolithic Memory Inc.(MMI) launched the Programmable Array Logic (PAL) device.
Based on fuse PROM technology, these devices had a programmable AND/fixed OR
configuration (Figure 2-2). The early devices had eight 'sum of product' terms and up to
eight latches. They had a maximum of around sixteen inputs/output (10) pins. Propagation
delays through the combinatorial path were around 35ns. Early implementations required
the connectivity to be manually calculated and described in binary notation as a 'fuse
map', but a design-entry language (PALASM) was soon developed which could
automatically formulate a fuse-map and device blowing information from a set of Boolean
expressions. By the early 80s these devices were becoming commercially accepted and
used in large volumes in products such as the Honeywell DRTI real-time digital control
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system, and later in the Microdata 'Spirit l ' range of multi-user minicomputers.
During the 80s the complexity and speed of programmable logic devices developed, and a
number of new technologies emerged which came to rival the mask-programmed gate-
array in cost and performance at gate-counts of up to about 10,000 gates. The market
moved fast, along with other semiconductor technologies. Xilinx, for example, was formed
in 1984 and released the first CMOS SRAMbased FPGA a year later. In the years to 1990
they maintained a 40% per year improvement in speed, a 52% per year increase in density,
and a 46% per year decrease in silicon cost. (Xilinx,1993). In 1994, Xilinx offered, at the
top of its range, the XC4025, a 25,000 gate-equivalent device with gate delays of the order
of a few nanoseconds. By mid 1995, a number of manufacturers were claiming a 50,000
gate device, and early in 1996 some were announcing devices with 100,000 gates (Bursky,
1995). However, in all of these cases it should be remembered that the maximum
utilisation of gates in programmable devices may be as low as 40%, so reducing the
effective gate-count. Competing technologies emerged using different device-
configuration methods. One such method was the Actel 'Antifuse' system in which
internal device connections are made through antifuses which become low-impedance
when a large programming current is passed through them (so named because this is the
opposite effect to that encountered in a fuse which goes open-circuit on the application of
a high current).
Also important to the development of ASIC technology was the emergence of new and
innovative design tools. While in the days of 100 gate devices it was possible for a single
design-engineer to design a chip at transistor level using well established, paper-based
design methods, and get the design correct, this quickly became impossible as the gate-
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count rose. In order to make the higher density technology usable, computer aided design
(CAD) tools started to appear. Commercial systems were available in the late 1970s. These
were either developed by the ASIC companies (e.g. LSI Logic's 'LDS' simulation tools),
or were general purpose tools that could be easily adapted to fit many vendors' devices.
Three US companies quickly came to dominate this market (Daisy, now Veribest; Mentor;
and Valid, now merged with Cadence). The functionality of these tools has developed over
the years, with text entry of circuit netlists giving way to schematic entry where computer
based drawing tools could be used to draw circuits using the symbols familiar to engineers.
More recently, hardware description languages (HDLs) and logic synthesis have become
more widely used. Using these tools the final circuit is produced automatically by a
software system driven by a description of the behaviour of the system written by the
designer. Mixed-signal tools have also become available which allow both the analogue
and digital parts of a circuit to be simulated concurrently.
Another development, which is important when considering technology adoption, is the
migration of design tools from the mainframe and high-cost workstation platforms normal
in the 80s to the easily available Personal Computer (PC) platform. This migration has
taken place as the power of the PC has increased. At the time of writing, CAE systems
capable of developing all of the ASIC technologies discussed here, with the possible
exception of very large masked devices, are commonly available at relatively low cost on
PC platforms. This trend is discussed in more detail in Chapter 7. Another trend
influencing SME adoption is that the user-interfaces of the CAE tools became more user-
friendly as time went on, so the amount of time necessary to become familiar with the use
of the tools reduced. In the early 1980s it was not uncommon for a new user of CAE tools
to require several weeks training in their use. At the time of writing it is unusual for such
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initial training to take more than a few days.
Developments in devices based on logic elements were matched in processor-based chips.
The first commercially available microprocessor device was probably the Intel 4004 which
went on the market in 1971. Texas Instruments claim to have demonstrated a device a year
earlier, but it was not patented until 1971. These 4-bit devices (4-bit here refers to the
width of the ALD; i.e. the device would have a 4-bit adder) were microprocessors rather
than microcontrollers, because they did not have any program holding memory or any
other peripheral device incorporated in the chip. Microprocessors containing ROM to store
program information began to appear in the late 1970s and were in general use in the early
1980s. These became known as microcontrollers due to their suitability for simple control
applications. During the 1980s, the complexity of microcontrollers rose in step with
developments in the industry at large. Feature size was reducing and the adoption of
CMOS was becoming commonplace. Eight, sixteen and thirty-two bit devices appeared,
and complex peripheral devices were incorporated into the chips (e.g. DARTs, AID
converters). These developments were also supported by the emergence of design tools for
software development that enabled significant simplification of the software design task.
These tools include advanced compilers and Computer Aided Software Engineering
(CASE) tools. As with the CAE tools discussed earlier, most of these sophisticated tools
became available on low-cost PC based platforms.
It can be seen from the above that all of the ASIC families are continually increasing in
complexity. It can also be shown that such complexity is developing at an ever increasing
rate. This is common in the semiconductor industry and is best summarised by the rate of
development of the Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM). This is often regarded as
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the driving technology for the industry, as its increasing density and ever smaller feature-
size allows development of denser devices in all of the other semiconductor families. This
in itself has led to lower-cost processors becoming available in pes which has increased
the sophistication of design tool available to the SME based electronic designer. The
history of this increase in DRAM density is shown in Figure 2-7, and is clearly
logarithmic. The diagram is derived from the point in time at which the author was
designing a particular size of chip into commercial products and so represents the time at
which each device size became commercially viable.
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Figure 2-7. DRAM density over time
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2.3 Experience curves describing ASIC technology development.
The development of microelectronic technology over time can be portrayed as a set of
experience curves. The simplest indication can be derived by plotting unit cost against
time, but this is itself difficult to determine (Abell & Hammond, 1979). A useful analogy
to experience that may be used to analyse experience in ASIC developments is gate-count,
which is itself analogous to DRAM device-density as it is this process-density that is the
technology driver of gate-density and consequently unit cost of all ASIC technologies. The
derived curve for DRAM density, and by analogy ASIC device experience, is shown in
Figure 2-8.
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Figure 2-8. DRAM manufacturing experience curve
The experience effect is generally considered to stem from a number of sources (Abell &
Hammond, 1979). These sources are discussed below.
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2.3.1 New production processes and gening better petformance from production
equipment.
This is probably the most important factor in relation to microelectronic technology. New
processes and equipment are continually being developed which allow both larger wafers
to be produced, and the size of features on the chip to be reduced while maintaining
acceptable production yields. These production processes are normally introduced in
DRAM production, but quickly migrate to other technologies, including all of the ASIC
technologies. In addition to the introduction of new and better equipment, most fabrication
facilities operate continuous yield improvement programmes which enhance the yield from
existing equipment.
2.3.2 Product standardisation
Product standardisation has occurred in a number of major areas. For example, pin-out,
package type and the access algorithm for some devices have been standardised between
manufacturers. For example, The Joint Electronic Device Engineering Council (JEDEC)
has standardised a number of formats for the transfer of programming information for
programmable logic, the physical dimensions of chip packages, and the test interface for
many microelectronic circuits (the JTAG methodology). Some standardisation of
interfaces between designers and manufacturers has also taken place; for example with
Verilog or VHDL netlist standards, or GDSII as an interface standard for chip layout
information. This standardisation is helpful to the SME engineer as it reduces the amount
of training necessary before starting to design in a particular technology, and can make the
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migration of design from one technology to another more straightforward (e.g. by initially
designing in VHDL, migration to a masked technology can be simplified)
2.3.3 Product redesign
When smaller device-geometries become commercially available in a particular processing
technology, ASIC families based on that technology are soon redesigned to exploit the
additional features of the smaller geometry (e.g. higher speed, lower power). In addition,
some changes specific to ASIC technology have also occurred from time to time which
have led to radical changes in internal architecture. One example of this was the advent of
'Sea of Gates' technologies in which routing channels in gate-arrays are replaced by
additional gates allowing higher silicon utilisation but requiring more complex routing
algorithms. This results in a lower overall cost for a particular chip and so reduces the cost
of entry to the technology for the 5MB adopter. The increased complexity of routing
algorithm has little effect on the 5MB adopter, as device layout is generally performed by
the silicon vendor.
2.3.4 Labour efficiency & de-skilling
The labour content of ASIC production is small in comparison with the capital invested in
production equipment. A 'state of the art' IC production facility is generally considered to
cost in the region of a billion dollars. Consequently, labour efficiency in production can
only have a minimal effect. However, some labour efficiency savings have been made in
other areas. For example, sales and marketing of the more 'commodity' ASIC devices (e.g.
FPGAs and microcontrollers) has largely been transferred to distribution rather than direct
sales.
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2.3.5 Other implications of the experience curve. Moore's Law.
David Manners (Manners, 1996) uses market statistics from Dataquest and ICE to derive
the cost/price curve shown in Figure 2-9.
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Figure 2-9 DRAM price vs cost
The straight line represents the experience curve known to exist in the semiconductor
industry. In essence, the cost of a given area of processed silicon remains fairly constant,
while the number of components on it doubles approximately every 18 months. This has
become known as 'Moore's Law' after the founder of Intel, who first expressed it. Under
normal circumstances, the price of a given semiconductor product would be expected to
follow this experience curve.
However, market conditions also have a bearing on the price. Between 1993 and 1995, as
in 1988/89, demand for ICs exceeded supply, and a firming of price resulted. The
indication from the trends shown in Figure 2-9 is that once this supply problem has been
relieved (by the large number of new plants coming on-stream in the near future) a
dramatic price reduction will ensue. Such price reductions have previously resulted in
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booms in the sales of technology dependent products (e.g. personal computers) as their
relative prices fell. This has to be good news for the potential user of these technologies, as
such price reductions will inevitably lead to similar price reductions in ASIC devices using
the same base technology. The first signs of this price reduction were seen in mid 1996,
and continued into 1997. This is predicted to herald the introduction of digital television
which requires large quantities of memory.
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2.4 Family tree of available technologies.
As a result of these developments we come to today's position where a wide variety of
ASIC devices exist to meet the needs of all sectors of the electronics industry, from the
low-volume to the high-volume manufacturer, and from simple low added-value products
to complex state of the art computing and communication devices. The family tree of
currently available devices is shown in Figure 2-10.
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Figure 2-10 The ASIC/amity tree.
This family tree delineates ASIC families by the basic architecture of the devices and the
method used to customise them. ASIC devices are either based around processors, and
programmed using computer programming languages, or are based around logic or circuit
elements (e.g. gates, latches, amplifiers). In both cases a fairly similar set of customisation
technologies can be used, ranging from mask customisation by a silicon vendor to user
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programmability that may be performed once only or many times using reprogrammable
devices. Many similarities exist between the processor and logic-based devices which
prevent separate treatment of the two types as was the case in the past, when only masked
devices were claimed as ASIC. This strange differentiation between masked and non-
masked technologies has cost the industry dear, causing many potential ASIC users to shy
away from the technology as they considered all ASIC technologies to be difficult and
risky (McArdle, 1995). This is one of the misconceptions that must be overcome if the
adoption of these technologies is to be encouraged.
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2.5 Relationship of technology to manufacturing methods
It is interesting to relate the different ASIC technologies and customisation methods shown
above to standard methods of production flow management. Methods of production flow
management can be considered in relation to production volume as shown in Figure 2-11.
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User programmable
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Figure 2-11 Production organisation and ASIC technology related to volume.
Jobbing production involves the manufacture of single or small numbers of individual
items, and generally uses a highly skilled workforce to produce such individual items.
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Examples of products requiring jobbing manufacture in the electronics sector include
technology demonstrators (e.g. the Ionica Link Equipment discussed in Chapter 3) or
equipment where each delivered product is a variant of a basic design (e.g. HJ Weir's
laundry folding equipment discussed in Chapter 3). Clearly, in terms of ASIC technology,
low design costs, low NRE, and ease of change are important in this process.
Consequently, programmable logic and non-masked microcontrollers are the most
appropriate technologies for these applications.
Batch production is used by the majority of companies operating in the electronic sector. A
set of production machines is used in a number of different configurations to produce a
variety of different products. Examples of products produced in this way include the
TRACKER stolen vehicle recovery system and the Waterside water softener, which are
both discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The choice of ASIC technology will depend on the
economic size of the batch, and a trade-off between engineering costs, manufacturing costs
involved in customising the device, and perhaps the inventory costs involved in buying
large quantities of mask-programmed parts to meet a silicon vendors minimum order
quantity. These trade-offs are discussed in greater detail in Chapter 7.
Mass production (or flowline) techniques require dedicated production lines and
equipment to be used for the manufacture of a single product. Few electronic products can
be considered to fall into this category, particularly those of SMEs. Electronic products
that do fall into this category include radio pagers and mobile telephones. In these cases
mask-programmed technologies become most attractive. They have the lowest cost in
2-31
high-volume, and their development and NRE costs can be more easily amortised over the
higher manufactured volume.
Continuous flow, included here for completeness, is generally associated with chemical
rather than mechanical or electronic manufacture. It is difficult to conceive of any
electronic product that might be considered in this context.
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3. The structure of the UK manufacturing base.
In recent years, there has been growing interest from both academic and government
bodies in the role of the Small and Medium Enterprise (SMB) in all sectors of business.
This increased interest can only be justified if such companies can be shown to have a
significant impact on the economy.
3.1 Size of the UK manufacturing base
There is considerable difference in opinion as to what constitutes a small or medium sized
enterprise. A variety of definitions exist based on such criteria as the number of
employees, turnover, ownership and asset size. In an attempt to overcome these
difficulties, the European Commission has defined the following terms which are
becoming standard in research concerned with company size (Storey, 1994):-
Micro enterprises Those between 1and 9 employees
Small enterprises Those between 10 and 99 employees
Medium enterprises Those between 100 and 499 employees
Large enterprises Those over 500 employees
Table 3·1. Enterprise size definitions
The 5MB sector is consequently considered to be enterprises (with some exceptions such
as agriculture) that employ fewer than 500 workers. In the UK, the Department of Trade
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and Industry (DTI) generally reduces this figure to 250. Additional definitions, often based
on turn-over, are also sometimes applied.
There is no definitive data available on the size and breakdown of the SME sector in the
UK but a number of indicators can be used to estimate this breakdown, including VAT
registration (although not all SMEs are VAT registered), and company registrations
(although a large number of registered companies have ceased trading or never traded). A
translation matrix produced by Graham Bannock & Partners is then used to translate
turnover to likely employee numbers to give what the DTI believe to be the most accurate
estimate of SME breakdown for the UK (Storey, 1994). It is difficult to believe that such
vague figures are used as the basis of industrial policy which is so important both
nationally and in the context of the European Community. However, the interpolated
statistics suggest the breakdown shown in Table 3-2.
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11-19 109 84 97 6 3 4 8 6 6
20-49 46 56 65 3 2 2 7 8 9
50-99 16 16 20 1 1 1 5 6 7
100-199 15 9 10 1 - 1 10 7 8
200-499 5 5 6 - - - 8 10 9
500-999 2 2 2 - - - 8 7 6
1000+ 2 1 1 - - - 35 29 27
Total 1791 2481 2697 100 100 100 100 100 100
Table 3-2. Breakdown of UK businesses by size.
The likely inference from these statistics, which needs to be treated with some caution, is
that the number of small companies in the UK increased in the 80s and continues to
increase in the 90s, with much of the growth being in the micro-enterprise sector.
However, although SME companies account for over 90% of the UK company base, they
employ only 28% of the employee total.
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The position is not significantly different in Europe, as can be seen in Table 3-3. Here, the
breakdown shows that over 99% of manufacturing enterprises are micro or SME in size
and that manufacturing enterprises represent around 14% of the total number of companies
(Levy, 1994).
No of Number of employees
enterprises
Micro Small Medium Large
% % % %
Total 13,500,000 91.3 8.0 0.6 0.1
Manufacturing 1,900,900 82.7 15.1 1.8 0.4
Table 3-3. Employment in the EU.
If these figures are extrapolated for UK companies, it would suggest that over three
hundred thousand companies of the 2.7 million companies registered in the UK could be
considered to be manufacturing enterprises. If as little as 5% of these could use electronics
in their products, and each only produces one product, then there should be a potential for
in excess of 15,000 separate ASIC implementations.
In order to verify the validity of these figures it is useful to approach them from a different
direction. DTI figures suggest that the UK has over 9500 companies in its electronic
manufacturing sector (SBA, 1996). This does not include companies in sectors that could
use electronics but do not (e.g. electro-mechanical companies, industrial control
companies, toy companies) so it is not out of the question to suggest that at least an equal
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number of companies could use microelectronic technology. This leads to a possible
market base of around 19,000 companies; a figure not dissimilar to the 15,000 calculated
using the first method of approximation. In reality, the potential market is probably
considerably higher than this as most of these companies are likely to have more than a
single product in their portfolio.
It can be seen from this that the potential market for ASIC use by SMEs in the UK and
Europe is large. The examples discussed later in this chapter show that SMEs can make
significant and successful products using ASIC technology. It can be shown that any
product that does or could use electronics in its construction may benefit from the use of
ASIC technology. The supposition remains however that UK SMEs are not taking
advantage of this technology and may fall behind overseas competitors that do. Research
undertaken for this study has shown that perhaps as few as 20 masked ASIC and around
200 programmable ASIC based products are developed for or by SME manufacturing
companies in any single year. The question is, " Why is this the case?". This study
identifies the reasons and investigates ways in which the uptake of the technology might be
improved.
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3.2 The changing structure of manufacturing businesses.
While considering the case-studies of the successful adoption of ASIC technology that
appear later in this chapter, it is useful to review the structure of manufacturing businesses
so as to consider whether a particular organisational structure can have any effect on a
company's ability to adopt new technologies such as microelectronics.
The traditional view of a company structure is shown in Figure 3-1. Traditional, and
particularly large companies, have tended to adopt this structure and attempted to grow or
acquire all of the skills necessary to fulfill each of the functions (Richards, 1991).
Board of Directors
Admin Production Personnel Finance Marketing
I
Purchasing
I
Data processing
Security
Housekeeping
Secretarial
Design
Quality
Maintenance
Production Control
Fmployment
Training
Safety
Accounts
Wages
Credit Control
Sales Buying
Stock ControlPromotion
Transport
Figure 3-1. Traditional company structure
However, this rigid and often inflexible structure is being replaced by far more relaxed
structures where a company no-longer feels that it needs to retain all of the skills necessary
to its success in in-house teams. Initially this led to a degree of out-sourcing of some
functions (e.g. transport, cleaning) but increasingly it is leading to the establishment of
product based companies that are simply the hub of a 'skill-network' (Peters, 1992). Peters
quotes a number of large corporations who are now firmly committed to out-sourcing
major parts of the primary as well as the secondary components of their businesses. Such
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companies include General Motors, Ford, General Dynamics, McDonnell Douglas and
MCl.
In the extreme, this leads to a company at the centre of a hub which is little more than a
'brand owner'. The company is able to closely follow the needs of its customers by being
continually adaptive, and sourcing all of the components of its business from 'best in class'
suppliers. This is illustrated in Figure 3-2.
.'.'.'....
····· .'· ....'.'
·····
Figure 3-2. A networked company.
The brand-owning company (brand-owner 1) has chosen to out-source most of its
operational components with the exception of sales and marketing. In doing so it forms a
network with the supplier companies shown in the diagram. However, it does not have
exclusive use of these suppliers. In the example shown it shares a design company with
another brand-holder. These are loose relationships that can be changed to suit the
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changing needs of products and markets, and so allow a company to concentrate on a small
number of core competences, and the development and protection of its individual brand.
It is interesting to note that all of the companies discussed in the case-study section of this
chapter are network organisations of the type described here. To a greater or lesser extent,
each out-sources major parts of its primary function. In all cases both the design and the
manufacture of at least the electronic parts of their products are out-sourced. This has
allowed these companies to bring the advantages of advanced microelectronics to their
products without the expense of developing and maintaining in-house design and
manufacturing.
There are a number of generic driving forces which have been considered to promote the
formation of the networked company (Snow, Miles and Coleman, 1993) these include:
• Globalisation resulting in the existence of strong players at every stage of the value-
chain
• Increased competition resulting in reduced margins in most economic systems
• Technological change resulting is shorter product life-cycles and lower entry barriers
All of these forces can clearly be seen to be operating in many of the markets in which
microelectronics operate, and in all of the markets identified in the case studies discussed
later in this chapter.
There can however be some disadvantages in out-sourcing primary functions which should
be considered (Peters, 1992). These are said to include:
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• Suppliers that learn a company's secrets may move into their markets. However, they
would have to overcome the entry barriers placed by the brand-identity and experience
that the original company has, and may need to move away from their own core
competences so as to develop new ones in order to compete effectively.
• If multiple sub-contractors are not available then dependence is a problem. However, if
routes to multiple sources and additional sub-contractors are identified then this
dependency may be reduced.
• If sub-contractors are far away, then the learning that comes from day-to-day contact
will be lost. However, the skills that would be learned are not key to the business, and
methods of managing sub-contractors at arms-length can be developed.
So in general it is believed that the advantages of the networked organisation far outweigh
the disadvantages. This certainly seems to have been the case for the companies discussed
in the case-studies later in this chapter.
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3.3 Why should SMEs use ASICs?
3.3.1 Use of AS/Cs to gain marketing advantage.
Michael Porter (Porter, 1985) defines a number of approaches to gaining sustainable
competitive advantage. These are summarised in Figure 3-3.
Competitive Advantage
Competitive
Focus
tower Cost Differentiation
Broad
Target
Narrow
Target
Figure 3-3. Porter's marketing approaches applied to the motor industry.
Porter maintains that two basic marketing approaches can be adopted in order to produce a
successful product. These are either to produce a lower-cost version of an existing product
and so gain market share, or to produce a product which differentiates itself from its
competitors by having new or unique features. Either of these approaches can lead to a
competitive advantage. The company must then decide whether to aim its product at a
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wide, and consequently varied, market, or to focus on a narrow market with a product
aimed specifically and closely at that narrow market and so gain a large market share.
Figure 3-3 relates these approaches to the motor industry (McArdle, 1992). Nissan, and
other Far-East manufacturers gained their initial market share by producing 'copy-cat'
products at a lower cost, aiming their products at a wide mid-range market. Lada or Skoda
on the other hand, while adopting a low-cost approach, also addressed a much smaller and
focused market at the low-price end of the vehicle market. Ford, and perhaps Rover, aims
to produce a wide range of cars which should differentiate themselves with additional
features, while companies like Morgan, and Rolls Royce produce highly differentiated
products aimed at capturing a large share of their respective markets. Each of these
companies has been successful in its approach, but those approaches are significantly
different.
Some problems do arise when trying to apply the Porter model to real cases. For example,
the model discusses cost leadership in the context of manufacturing at a lower cost, but
does not discuss the effect of price. In many markets (including ASICs) selling price is
market-driven rather than being cost-driven. The model also seems to regard cost and
features as absolute entities. Inmany markets it is the perception of position rather than its
reality that is important, and those perceptions are relative. One person's perception of
high cost or price may be significantly different to that of another.
Other models suggest a more complex set of criteria for establishing competitive
advantage, and suggest that different companies can adopt different mixes of these
components. One such model is shown in Figure 3-4.
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Figure 3-4 The marketing mix.
This model considers that competitive advantage is derived from a mixture of the six
criteria shown in the diagram, and that these criteria are related to each other. For example,
a company's reputation is obviously based on the other five characteristics. However, it
must be remembered that a customer's perception of these characteristics is as important
as the reality of them. It is no use having a fast response-time if nobody knows about it, or
if response time is not important to a company's customers.
The use of ASIC technology has permitted different mixes of these marketing approaches
to be followed by a number of successful large and small enterprises. Five examples of
how SME organisations have used ASIC technologies in different ways to generate
successful products are discussed In the following section. Their approaches are
summarised in Table 3-4.
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Company & Product ASIC technologies used .Marketing approaches
Fraser-Nash Technology
Adhan alarm clock
Masked microcontroller Availability
FPGA
Masked gate- array
Features
Quality
TRACKER Networks Ltd.
Stolen vehicle tracking
system
MaskedCBIC
Masked Microcontroller
Differentiation
Availability
Ionica Ltd.
Radio local-loop
telecommunications system
Programmable logic
Masked ASIC
Masked microcontrollers
Cost leadership
Price
Differentiation
Features
Waterside Ltd.
Water softener
User programmable
microcontrollers
Features
Differentiation
Quality
HJ Weir Ltd.
Laundry equipment
User programmable
microcontrollers
Features
Quality
Response time
Table 3-4. Summary of case studies
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3.3.2 Fraser-Nash Technology: ASICs in a domestic product.
Figure 3-5. The Adhan alarm clock
Fraser-Nash Technology is a company engaged in the design and manufacture of a wide
range of products destined for both high and low-volume manufacture for domestic and
overseas markets. The product discussed here is the Adhan Alarm, which is a special
Islamic, electronic alarm-clock. The product is intended for sale to followers of the Islamic
faith. It serves to remind them of prayer times and give an indication of the direction of
Mecca, the holy city. This case study is developed from the product literature for the
alarm, a case study presented in a DTI seminar (Ivey, 1994), and a DTI leaflet (DT!,
1996:3).The product is shown in Figure 3-5.
The product has a number of unique features:
• It automatically performs the astronomical calculations necessary in order to calculate
the times of prayer
• It generates an authentic Adhan 'call to prayer' using synthesised speech at appropriate
times in addition to having sounds suitable for more usual alarm clock functions (e.g.
ringing bells)
• It has a solid state electronic compass and is able to calculate and display the bearing to
Mecca based on an internal database of the latitude, longitude and time zones over 1500
cities worldwide
• The product drives two liquid crystal displays using both Arabic and English fonts
The product clearly requires a high degree of computational power combined with light
weight and a requirement to be battery powered. Microelectronic devices were the obvious
choice of implementation technology. Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of a portable
device that could be produced without the use of microelectronics.
Price was also considered important so as to appeal to as large a market as possible, and
'time to market' was seen as critical as rumors of a number of competing products were
emerging as the design progressed.
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Itwas always envisaged that the product would use ASIC devices, and three different types
of ASIC device were used. The devices and the way in which the functions are split
between them are shown in Table 3-5. This table also introduces the design approach
adopted by Fraser-Nash Technology and their suppliers.
ASIC Tecbnology Application
Microcontroller Overall control, Astronomical calculations
FPGA Prototyping of sound and character generation
Gate Array Low-cost production part equivalent to FPGA
Table 3-5. Technologies used in Adhan alarm
The designers decided that the risks inherent in going straight to a masked ASIC device
were too great, as the product contained a number of unproven functions such as those
associated with the voice compression and decompression functions, and the driving of the
graphical displays using Arabic characters. Consequently, these functions were prototyped
using FPGA technology. The designers used an Altera MAX device to make a prototype of
these functions and later had the design converted to a gate-array using a semi-automated
process. This approach is available through a number of suppliers, and is discussed more
fully in Chapter 7. These suppliers take a net-list of the FPGA design, convert it into a net-
list for the masked ASIC family, and produce masked ASIC devices (in this case gate-
arrays) based on the FPGA design. The device is simulated before and after conversion so
as to ensure that the functionality is conserved in the conversion process.
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This design flow is often adopted in complex masked ASIC designs or those in which
some function of the circuit is untried. However, this approach needs careful consideration
compared with alternative approaches such as using simulation to prove the design prior to
production of a masked device. Simulation can often test the new function far more fully'
and over a greater spread of production tolerances, than can be achieved by prototyping
using programmable devices.
The design-flow used for the ASICs produced for this product is shown in Figure 3-6.
Gate-array design Microcontroller design
Prototype using
programmable microcontroller
I
Bench-test
programmable prototype
I
Transfer program data
to gate-array supplier
I
Supplier produces
masked microcontrollers
I
Bench-test masked
prototypes
I
Release for volume
manufacture
Figure 3-6 Parallel design flows for gate-array and microcontroller
The development route for the microcontroller is very similar to that of the gate-array in
that it is possible to use programmable parts as a precursor to committing to the costs and
production timescales inherent in producing a low-cost masked part. This is more normal
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in microcontroller design as the complexity of the software design often precludes the use
of simulation to prove the design.
The gate-array development produced a 'right-first-time' part which was ordered in high
volume at the prototype stage in order to meet tight development time constraints. This
enabled the company to quickly come to market with a product that has gained widespread
acceptance and has sold in large volumes.
The company state that the complete design up to prototype using FPGAs took four
months, and that the conversion to gate-array took only two weeks. The first production
volumes (20,000 parts) took a further 12 weeks. They also claim that different ASIC
suppliers quoted costs of between £6,000 and £25,000 to perform the translation from
FPGA to masked gate-array. It is not unusual to find different manufacturers quoting
widely differing engineering charges as they differ also in their business models. Some
suppliers aim to recover all of their engineering costs at the prototype stage, while others
are prepared to recover the costs in later production orders.
In terms of the marketing approaches discussed earlier, Fraser-Nash Technology were
using features, availability and quality to promote a totally new product that would not
have been possible without the use of microelectronics. Price is also important in a high-
volume domestic product of this type.
Fraser-Nash Technology can also be considered to be a networked organisation as although
they performed the initial design of the FPGA and microcontroller software themselves,
they used external specialist designers to perform the conversion to masked gate-array.
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This approach enabled them to achieve a fast 'time-to-market' and launch a successful
product.
However, it important to realise that single product successes do not necessarily ensure
long term business success. At the time of writing reports are starting to appear alleging
that Fraser-Nash Technology is experiencing business difficulties (BBC Radio 4, May 14th
1997). In spite of this, the product remains an excellent example of how ASIC devices can
be used by a small company to bring a new and innovative product to market in a relatively
short time.
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3.3.3 TRACKER Networks®: Mixed signal ASICs and masked microcontrollers in a
stolen vehicle tracking system.
Each year over 200,000 cars are stolen in the UK. TRACKER Networks is a UK company
established in 1993 to operate a radio-based stolen vehicle recovery system. Since its
launch, it has been responsible for the recovery of over 1000 stolen vehicles that had been
fitted with its tracking device. Police are able to track stolen vehicles using equipment
located on top of the police car dash-board as shown in Figure 3-7.
Figure 3-7. Tracker Networks stolen vehicle recovery system.
The operation of the system is shown schematically in Figure 3-8.
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Sytem Activates Car Unit~/ ----------------~
Tracker
System
Police Vehicle
Tracks Stolen Car
Figure 3-8. The TRACKER system.
If a vehicle is stolen, the owner contacts the network operator. The operator transmits a
wake-up signal to a radio transceiver hidden in the stolen vehicle, which then transmits a
homing signal which can be tracked by direction finding equipment in the police vehicle.
The device in the police car (see Figure 3-7) displays the direction to the tracked vehicle,
the approximate distance from the tracking vehicle, and the identity of the tracked vehicle.
The system has been widely reported in the UK electronics press (McArdle, 1994.
MacLeod, 1994).
The vehicle transceiver had a number of marketing and technical requirements, which
included:-
• Small Size. The unit needs to be concealed easily in a small car.
• Low Power Consumption. The unit is battery powered and must continue to transmit
for a long period until recovered.
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• Low Weight.
• Frequency Agile Radio. The product had to be secure and able to change frequency
under program control.
• Low cost. It was established by market research that the complete installation needed
to cost less than £200, and that there was a high degree of price sensitivity in the
market. Each pound off the price would significantly affect the market size.
• Robustness. The unit had to be robust enough to operate when fitted to earth-moving
and plant equipment as well as cars.
• Intelligence. The unit needed to overcome basic counter-measures (e.g. jamming).
This combination of requirements led to implementation shown in Figure 3-9.
Masked
Microcontroller
Mixed
Signal
ASIC
Figure 3-9. TRACKER vehicle transceiver, block diagram
The unit used two ASIC devices. A masked microcontroller (Motorola 68HC05) was used
to provide overall control and protocol handling. This also allowed the flexibility to
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change some features of the product at a lower cost than those involved in making design
changes to the mixed-signal ASIC, which would incur high NRE charges from the silicon
vendor. This was important if a differentiated product was to be maintained at low cost.
The mixed-signal ASIC used in this design was a GEC Plessey Semiconductors 70K series
standard-cell device. It was used to perform all of the well-defined processes that were
unlikely to change in future developments of the product. The cost of changing such a
device is high, as it involves significant re-tooling costs by the semiconductor
manufacturer. This makes it unattractive to go through changes for a minor improvement
in features. The mixed-signal ASIC performed the following functions:-
• Frequency Synthesis using a Phase Locked Loop and a Frequency Locked Loop which
could be programmed by the microcontroller so as to change local oscillator (LO)
frequency. The LO operated at around 200 MHz
• Modulation and Demodulation of the data stream. This included a fairly complex data
and clock recovery system incorporating a Viterbi Decoder fabricated by designing a
reduced instruction set DSP processor into the ASIC.
• Power Supply Control.
• Reference Oscillator and Crystal Compensator. The crystal used for the reference
oscillator is automatically adjusted to compensate for temperature and aging, allowing a
low cost crystal to be used and still maintain 2ppm accuracy in frequency.
The design, performed by Plextek Ltd., used about 13,000 gates of digital logic, which
along with the analogue components gave the ASIC a total die size of less than 50 square
millimeters. The mixed-signal ASIC had an NRE of a few tens of thousands of pounds and
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a volume part cost of a few pounds (exact figures are not given here for reasons of
confidentiality).
The final result was a successful product which sells in large quantities (tens of thousands
per annum), and has become a factory-fitted option on the vehicles produced by a number
of manufacturers. In its first year of operation the system was responsible for the recovery
of over 250 stolen vehicles, and by early 1996 the system had recovered over 1000 stolen
vehicles. Tracker Networks have succeeded in bringing an innovative product to the
market which is only made financially viable through the use of advanced mixed-signal
ASIC and microcontroller technology.
In terms of the Porter model discussed earlier, this product is clearly differentiated from
other vehicle security products (e.g. car alarms) by its features, and is able to take a cost
and price-leadership position in relation to other vehicle location systems (e.g. Securicor
Datatrac) in what has been shown to be a very price sensitive market. In terms of the
marketing-mix model (Figure 3-4), TRACKER uses price, availability to the mass market,
and features (such as the recent introduction of a data up-link) to give the product
competitive advantage. This competitive advantage is contingent on the use of two ASIC
technologies (mixed-signalASIC and masked microcontroller).
The structure of TRACKER is that of a networked company. In addition to out-sourcing
research and development, the company also sub-contracts the manufacturing of the
product to a number of overseas companies. Installation of the equipment in vehicles is
also sub-contracted to trained installation companies.
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3.3.4 Ionica Ltd: Domestic telephony using radio
The final connection between a telephone exchange and a subscriber's telephone is known
as 'the local loop' . Traditionally, this link has been provided almost exclusively by British
Telecom, mainly due to the high cost involved in road works to install cables. In 1992,
Nigel Playford had the idea of using radio to make this final connection, and formed Ionica
Ltd. to exploit the idea. The system, and its relation to the standard switched-network is
shown in Figure 3-10. Ionica is able to operate a local infrastructure using its own
equipment, and communicate with the greater telephone system at the trunk level
(generally at data rates of 2Mbits per second and greater). This trunk capacity can be
purchased from a number of suppliers (e.g. BT, Mercury, Energis and others)
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Figure 3-10 The Ionica system.
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Right from its beginning in 1992, Ionica made a policy of not creating internal research
and development groups, but instead forming close relationships with a number of design
consultancies or 'development partners' some of whom became early shareholders in the
company. This approach gave Ionica a number of distinct advantages including:
• The ability to turn design teams on and off without significant cost
• Access to a broad skill-set able to adapt to its constantly changing needs
• Access to advanced technology suppliers through the links that the established design
consultancies had already built.
As a result of these relationships, Ionica was able to grow at a remarkable rate (over 150
staff by 1995) and raise large sums of investment capital (over £1OOMby the end of 1995).
The company was also able to develop equipment at an accelerated rate. For example,
initial demonstrator equipment of the type shown in Figure 3-11 (which includes FPGAs,
microcontrollers and PLDs in addition to sophisticated radio frequency components
operating at 3.5 GHz) was developed and produced in less than seven weeks.
Figure 3-11. Ionica Link Equipment
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The entire system was developed in time for a launch in May 1996 (the final system also
made extensive use of all types of ASIC discussed in this study). The requirement for low
manufactured cost meant that ASICs were used extensively at all stages of the product.
Indeed, the whole concept would not have been feasible without the use of ASICs, and
would not have been achieved in the tight timescales without the use of third party design
skills in Ionica's 'development partners'.
In terms of its structure, Ionica is a classic example of a networked company. All of the
research and development for the system was out-sourced, and all of the equipment used in
its products is manufactured by sub-contract manufacturers. These manufacturers have
also been licensed to market the equipment in other countries.
In terms of the marketing models, Ionica has been able to use cost-leadership to launch a
UK product with call charges 15% less than those of BT. The system also has some
features that are not available from its competitors, such as a two-line system for no extra
cost. This is because the technology is designed to multiplex multiple calls over a single
radio channel, so the additional 'line' comes with little extra cost to the supplier.
In relation to the Porter model (Figure 3-3) they have used both differentiation through
additional features and cost leadership across a broad target (the domestic telephony
market). This somewhat contradicts the Porter model which suggests that cost-leadership
and differentiation are to some extent mutually exclusive. This contradiction can be seen
in other case-studies discussed in this chapter. However, the marketing mix model (Figure
3-4) better describes Ionica's approach. They have used a mixture of price and features to
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give them a marketing advantage over their major competitors. Their competitors on the
other hand have reputation and availability working in their favour, at least until the Ionica
system becomes available nationwide over the next few years, and its brand identity
becomes stronger than it is at present.
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3.3.5 Waterside Ltd: Adding intelligence with a microcontroller.
Waterside Ltd. develop water softeners for the domestic and export markets. In 1995 they
decided to develop a new, innovative valve mechanism with fewer moving parts than their
competitors' products, and using advanced plastic molding techniques to reduce costs.
Water softeners function by the process of ion-exchange. Water is passed through a resin
chamber where 'hard' calcium and magnesium ions are exchanged for 'softer' sodium
ions. However, the chamber must be periodically 'regenerated' by flushing with brine. It is
the control and efficiency of this regeneration process that governs the cost, size, and
competitive position of water softeners (Mace, 1996). The valve assembly and electronic
controller of the new range of softeners is shown in Figure 3-12.
Figure 3-12. The Waterside water softener
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Traditionally, water softeners had electro-mechanical controllers, similar to elementary
central heating controllers, but these had a number of disadvantages including:
• They needed to be reset after power-failures and on changes to/from summer time
• They initiated a regeneration at a set time interval irrespective of water usage
The new electronic controller overcomes these problems by using a microcontroller to
bring intelligence to the control mechanism. It is able to add the following features.
• Water usage is measured using a flow sensor in the output stream of the valve, and the
pattern of water usage for a particular household determined over an extended period.
This pattern is then used to predict the most likely optimum regeneration time. (i.e. at a
time of low water-usage before the ion-exchange chamber is exhausted)
• The need for a clock is removed, as absolute time of day is irrelevant to the
regeneration algorithm. The algorithm is based on a rolling two week period relative to
the current time. It calculates the best regeneration point relative to the current time, but
has no need to know what time of day this corresponds to.
• Optimum regeneration reduces the amount of salt that the unit uses, and consequently
allows the unit to be built with a smaller resin chamber and salt vessel. This results in a
smaller overall size and lower cost.
• A simple, intuitive user-interface via a liquid crystal display and a few keys was
implemented.
These new features allow the product to be differentiated from its competitors.
Additionally, the knock-on effects of using the microcontroller simplified the non-
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electronic parts of the product so that a smaller, lower-cost unit could to be launched at a
low price. This was made possible by the intelligence that a simple microcontroller can
bring to a product at very little cost. This case is also in slight contradiction to the Porter
model which suggests that cost-leadership and differentiation should be mutually
exclusive. In terms of the marketing mix model (Figure 3-4) the company uses a mix of
low price, additional features, and the company reputation as a brand leader to give them
competitive advantage.
Waterside is another example of a networked company. Although they perform final
assembly of the product, most of the major components are designed and manufactured on
a sub-contract basis.
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3.3.6 HJ Weir. Microcontrollers in bespoke laundry machines
HJ Weir Ltd. was established in the 1950s and has grown to a company with an annual
turnover of £3.5M. Itmanufactures industrial laundry handling machines which are used in
laundries in hospitals, hotels and other large linen users throughout the world. The
machines are able to line up linen for ironing machines, fold, pack in plastic bags, and
stack linen of all sizes from napkins to sheets. Each laundry installation is different,
incorporating a different mix of machines, so all of Weirs systems are effectively bespoke
one-off projects. A typical installation is shown in Figure 3-13
Figure 3-13. HJ Weir's Laundry equipment
Control of the machines requires precise speed and positioning control of the linen
handling equipment. Back in the 1960s, this was achieved using electromechanical
techniques such as switches, relays, and simple electro-mechanical timers. These
techniques were notoriously inaccurate, and machines seldom ran for a great length of time
without requiring adjustment.
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The latest Weir machines incorporate a central controller based on a Motorola
microcontroller. The microcontroller senses the position of linen using external sensors
and makes decisions regarding the position of up to 5 folds in two directions. It also drives
a liquid crystal display and keyboard which forms the user interface. Weir had the
controller module designed by external consultants, and also have the electronic module
manufactured by a subcontract organisation. The 'System 4' controller is shown in Figure
3-14.
Figure 3-14. The HJ Weir System 4 controller
Weir are now fully committed to the use of microelectronics in their products and are
considering a 'Fuzzy Logic' solution to future control challenges in co-operation with the
Microelectronics in Business Support Centre at the University of Bournemouth. The use of
microelectronics has allowed them to become a world leader, and has been cost effective
even in the 'one-off market in which they operate.
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HJ Weir operate in a small, focused market. And in terms of the Porter model have been
able to differentiate their products by using microelectronics to give them additional
features and higher reliability than those of their competitors. In terms of the marketing
mix model (Figure 3-4) they have used microelectronics to bring higher quality to their
products through less frequent break-downs. They have also decreased their response times
by being able to quickly configure new systems through the ability to program the
electronic controller.
In their use of microelectronics, HJ Weir have started to become a networked company.
All of the design and manufacture of the electronic sub-assemblies used in their equipment
is performed by sub-contractors.
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3.3.7 The casefor AS/Cs in small businesses
The case for 5MBs using ASICs to generate clear competitive advantage is shown in all of
the cases in this chapter. Five small companies have developed successful products which
rely heavily on the advantages that ASIC technology can bring. In each case, their business
aims would have been difficult if not impossible to achieve without the use of ASICs.
Fraser-Nash would have been unable to meet their cost targets, TRACKER could not have
made a unit that would appeal to the mass market, Ionica could not have competed with its
large multi-national competitors, Waterside could not have fully exploited the potential of
their new valve technology, and HJ Weir would not have been able to easily provide
flexible one-off systems in a cost-effective way.
Naturally, not every 5MB that adopts ASIC technology can automatically expect to
produce a Successful product, or to be successful in using the technology. Indeed a case
study discussed in Chapter 6 identifies some problems that a company can have in
assimilating what can be a complex technology. However, the case-studies discussed in
this chapter aim to show that small companies can be successful in adopting ASIC
technology.
These are just five examples of how ASICs can be used to provide clear competitive
advantage. If other UK companies were to adopt similar approaches, then manymore
innovative, successful products could be produced.
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3.4 Opportunities and problems in dealing with the SME base
The structure of SME manufacturing companies has some advantages in aiding their
flexibility in approach to new ideas and technology, but there are also a number of inherent
problems. Figure 3-15 summarises the results of a survey performed by the
Semiconductor Businesses Association (SBA, 1996) in which design-houses were asked to
compare their SME clients with their large company clients in a number of key areas.
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Figure 3-15. Comparison of SME and non-SME clients.
Although in many areas respondents did not see major differences between large and small
companies, there were some areas in which the differences were significant. Small
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companies were seen as much less resistant to change and less resistant to new technology.
However, a major problem with shortage of development capital was identified in small
companies, accompanied by less ability to specify or cost development programmes.
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3.5 Conclusions regarding the structure of the UK manufacturing
base.
The work of this chapter leads to a number of interim conclusions regarding the structure
of the UK manufacturing base:
• The 5MB sector represents a very significant proportion of the UK manufacturing base,
as indeed it does in all of Europe, and even using fairly conservative estimates, could
generate in excess of 15,000 individual ASIC applications. Later chapters will show that
this figure is not even remotely approached.
• The structure of small, and also large, companies in the UK and elsewhere is changing
from the traditional tightly structured organisation, to a more networked structure. This
has become evident in all industrial sectors and is set to continue.
• A wide range of companies operating in significantly different markets have been used
to illustrate that small companies can be successful in adopting microelectronic
technologies.
• The design industry perceives that 5MBs can be more flexible and adaptive than their
larger competitors, but that 5MBs are often short of development capital, and are
sometimes unrealistic in their financial appreciation of new technologies such as
ASICs.
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4. Previous work in the area of ASIC adoption
Literature searches and initial discussions with the supply-industry and the DTI produced a
number of publications with some relation to specific parts of this research. They are
referred to individually at appropriate points in this study.
Some publications of a more widely applicable nature were also identified, and these are
reviewed in this chapter.
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4.1 The 1991 MSAlDTI survey and report.
The most comprehensive analysis previously performed into the reasons for non-adoption
of ASIC technology in the UK was that undertaken by Michael Shortland Associates
(MSA) on behalf of the DTI in 1991 (Shortland, 1991). This followed a similar survey
performed by MSA in 1986 which is reviewed in the same publication. The survey was
addressed to potential users of ASICs within the electronics industry and considers the use
of programmable logic, gate-array and standard-cell devices. It did not address the use of
microcontrollers.
The main reason for the survey was to establish whether government intervention might be
useful in increasing the adoption of ASIC technology, and the results of this survey were
instrumental in the decision by DTI to launch the 'Microelectronics in Business'
programme which will be discussed in more detail later. The main findings of the research
were as follows.
In the period from 1986 to 1991, the use of all types of ASIC technology by 5MBs in the
electronics sector had grown from 32% of questionnaire respondents to 58%. The report
assumed a total electronic 5MB base of around 5000 companies, implying that around
2900 UK 5MB electronics companies were ASIC users.
When gate-array users were considered in isolation, the report suggested that 24% of
electronic 5MBs were users, which would give 1219 5MB users. This is somewhat at odds
with the current view of the supply industry (see Chapter 5) which is that only around 150-
200 masked ASIC designs of any kind are started each year by UK companies of any size,
and only a small proportion by 5MBs. In addition, respondent figures suggested that over
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400 companies used cell-based devices and over 400 had custom parts. The differences
between these responses and the present view of the supply industry should clearly be
investigated.
Later in the report, Shortland discusses a follow-up to claims of extensive use of analogue
and mixed-signal devices. The authors of the report found the reported level of use much
higher than expected and so investigated it further. Further investigation showed that
respondents had misinterpreted the questions and had classed their use of commodity and
Application Specific Standard Parts (ASSPs) as being mixed-signal ASICs. Incorrect
answering of technical questions by poorly informed users is to be expected in a survey of
this kind, and is largely unavoidable. Some degree of misinterpretation may also have
taken place in the other areas, due largely to a lack of understanding of ASIC technology
by the respondents. However this view cannot be substantiated five years after the
Shortland survey.
According to Shortland, who quotes Dataquest figures, the total UK market had grown
from $180M in 1986 to $300M in 1991; considerably less than had been predicted in 1986.
The UK had also slipped from first in the European league table of ASIC consumption to
third place, behind Germany and France. In the MSA 1991 survey, the benefits of using
ASIC devices were seen as (in order ofimportance):-
• Lower manufacturing costs.
• Smaller size.
• Lower materials cost.
• Higher performance.
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In the same survey, the barriers to entry to ASIC use were seen as (in order of
importance): -
• Entry cost
• Insufficient volumes
• No suitable devices
• No second source
In the case of both benefits and barriers, little had changed in the ranking of these factors
between 1986 and 1991.
The questioning of the ASIC supply industry showed that they saw the major obstacles in
selling ASIC to SMEs as (in order ofimportance):-
• Prices too high.
• Lack of knowledge about ASIC.
• Identification of prospects.
The report also concluded that although most ASIC suppliers expressed an interest in
working with SMEs, few marketed directly to them, and most claimed that SME customers
only accounted for a small proportion of their business. This also appears to contradict the
user responses, where many SME respondents were claiming to be ASIC users, and so
deserves further investigation in this study.
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4.2 The 1985 Policy Studies Institute (PSI) survey.
This survey, although now over 10 years old, compares the use of microelectronics in
industry in the UK, France and Germany (Northcott, 1985). Although the report is largely
concerned with the use of microelectronics in the production process, for example in
Computer Numerically Controlled (CNC) machines, some figures about the use of
microelectronics in products are given.
The PSI study stated that the position in the three countries in relation to microelectronics
was basically similar. The UK was claimed to be strongest in the use of semi-custom
chips, but marginally behind Germany in overall use of microelectronics in products. The
report is unclear about the distinction between these definitions. Figure 4-1 shows the
percentages of companies using some form of microelectronics in their products as
reported in the PSI survey.
14
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Germany Britain France
Figure 4-1 Percentage of companies using microelectronics in products in 1985
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The report explored reasons for non-adoption of microelectronic technology and although
the relative position changes from country to country, the main reasons are:-
• Lack of expertise
• Economic situation
• Development costs
• Development finance
These represent a slightly different set of reasons for non-adoption than those identified in
later investigations.
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4.3 The 1988 NEDC Report.
In 1988, the Innovation Working Party of the National Economic Development Council
(NEDC) produced a report on technology transfer mechanisms in the UK & leading
competitor nations. While not solely addressing electronic technology, it does contain a
great deal of useful information concerning technology transfer schemes operating at that
time both in the UK and overseas (NEDC, 1988).
The report concluded that the amount and level of technology transfer between academic
and industrial organisations was growing in all of the developed countries considered (UK,
USA, Japan, France, and West Germany). It was also noted that collaboration between
industrial organisations was increasing, particularly in high risklhigh investment industries
such as semiconductor manufacture. It identified a number of problems within UK firms
which prevented them from taking up technology which was external to them including:
• Inability to view technology strategically
• Inability to view technology as a long-term asset
• Inability to view technology transfer and accumulation as a long-term process.
The study attributes an additional set of problems specifically to SMEs including:
• Lack of time & resources to identify external sources
• Lack of suitably qualified technical specialists to be able to identify suitable
technologies
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The report notes that, following a 1988 government white paper on industrial policy, the
emphasis of government support was shifting toward supporting small companies, and
small high-technology companies in particular. This support was being provided by
directly sponsoring collaborative research projects, and was moving from non-competitive
to pre-competitive projects (i.e. it was moving nearer to the finally marketed product). The
report also noted the increase in industrially based projects being performed by Higher
Education Institutions (HEIs). This was being reflected in the growth of science parks,
innovation centres and university companies.
The report also concluded that all of these trends were evident, to a greater or lesser extent
in the other countries reviewed. Each of the countries was emphasising the role of the
5MB and promoting technology transfer from HEIs. The report does however conclude
that the amount of direct financial support from local and national government is higher in
USA, Japan, France and Germany than in the UK.
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4.4 Lessons from the Alvey Programme.
The UK government's Alvey Programme was launched in 1983 and had a budget of
£350M over a five year period to promote the development of advanced semiconductor
technologies by UK semiconductor companies. The success of the programme in relation
to ASIC technology is reviewed by Michael Hobday of the Science Policy Research Unit
of the University of Sussex (Hobday, 1990).
Hobday accepts that as only a small proportion of the Alvey budget was aimed at
improving industrial performance, the programme cannot be considered to be an industrial
strategy. He suggests that having decided on ASIC as a driving technology for the
programme, more emphasis should have been placed on design capability.
Hobday also states that the exploitation of ASIC by small firms will require intervention to
overcome 'information failure' in the market, and suggests that future programmes should
emphasise 'applications technology' rather than fabrication. He further states that support
for the ASIC design sector could be important in improving the rate of ASIC adoption,
particularly in smaller companies.
A more specific review of the effects of the Alvey Programme on the UK microelectronics
industry is made in Chapter 9.
4-9
4.5 Conclusions from previously published work
The conclusions that can be drawn from the publications discussed above with respect to
this study are limited, but do go some way toward proving the original hypothesis.
Indications are that the UK. has indeed been slow in adopting advanced microelectronic
technology. The level of adoption is however unclear, and worthy of further research. .
With the exception of the Shortland survey (Shortland, 1991) most researchers had
concentrated on the development of the supply industry. Indeed, even national and
international government funding initiatives had originally focused on the development
and provision of basic technologies. To this end they had directly supported the larger
companies who were able to provide such products. During the Alvey programme it
became apparent that support for end-users might be a more effective use of resources, and
a shift to this approach is evident in more recent programmes (e.g. Microelectronics in
Business and Europractice, which are reviewed in Chapter 9)
The information available on reasons for non-adoption that can be derived from the
publications suggests that a set of reasons was evident as early as the mid 80s. These
reasons included:
• Perceived cost of entry
• Perceived lack of volume
• Perceived lack of suitable devices
• Lack of knowledge of available technologies and design methods
• Lack of marketing by suppliers to small companies
• Lack of development finance
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It seemed that these reasons had changed little over a protracted period and it will be
shown that they are still prevalent in the 90s.
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5. The ASIC Market.
Following analysis of the report by DTIIMSA (Shortland, 1991) and initial discussions
with ASIC suppliers, it became clear that the nature of the ASIC market in the UK was not
clearly understood. There seemed to be large disparities in the perceived size of the
market, and some false perceptions of its nature. It was considered important that the size
and nature of this market should be identified before meaningful conclusions about
technology adoption could be drawn.
Market information in this area is relatively difficult to obtain. Some market research
organisations (e.g. Dataquest, !MS, ICE) do publish reports, but these are expensive (often
over £1000 per report) and they often conflict in their findings. Consequently, it has been
necessary to obtain published information from a number of primary and secondary
sources including trade-press articles, marketing reports, word of mouth and a survey
specifically performed for this research. It has also been possible to speak informally to
researchers from the organisations discussed above in the course of the research, and
obtain some of the more expensive reports through inter-library loans.
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5.1 A systems view of the UK market.
In order to understand the complex, overlapping groups involved in this market and the
relationships between them it is useful to use a systems approach (Open University, 1990).
One possible systems map is shown in Figure 5-1.
Figure 5-1 A systems map of the UK ASIC market.
The semiconductor manufacturers play an important role in the market, as they eventually
supply all of the ASIC devices to final users, wherever those devices are designed.
The user base splits into two distinct groups. By far the greatest use of the technology is
made by large multinational companies producing sophisticated electronic products. For
example, GEC Plessey Semiconductors claim (off the record) that 75% of their total ASIC
business is done with just two customers. This group of companies would generally
comprise of the large telecommunications, aerospace or computer companies such as GEC
Plessey Telecommunications and British Aerospace, and would be expected to perform
most of the ASIC design themselves using in-house design teams. These users are
relatively few in number, can be easily targeted with a small sales force, and form the bulk
of the market in which the major suppliers compete.
The other group is made up of SMEs, and is a much larger group of companies which
accounts for a much larger proportion of the UK's manufacturing output. It will be shown
however that they account for only a minor proportion of UK ASIC consumption. They are
less likely to have in-house ASIC design capability although they do often have design
engineering staff experienced in other forms of electronic and product design. Due to their
number, and disparate types of business, these companies are traditionally difficult to
service with the small direct salesforce that many semiconductor manufacturers have.
ASIC design in the UK is undertaken through a number of routes. Some companies
(mainly the large ones e.g. GPT, BAe) have internal teams and equipment. Their product
volumes are generally high, and so they tend to deal directly with the semiconductor
manufacturers for all of their semiconductor requirements (not just ASICs). Some
semiconductor companies have their own internal teams who are able to perform tum-key
designs for customers, although this is becoming increasingly rare (e.g. LSI Logic). Some
semiconductor distributors have set up design centres focused on the companies that they
represent (e.g. Macro for Texas Instruments). The picture is completed by a number of
independent design consultancies (e.g. Plextek, Phoenix VLSI) who are able to perform
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tum-key design on behalf of clients and perform the necessary interface to the
semiconductor manufacturer. This route is increasingly being taken by companies of all
sizes in the UK.
Also important in the market, particularly when considering the 5MB, is the government.
The DTI have long been involved in the promotion of ASIC technology, and the
'Microelectronics in Business' programme is reviewed in some detail in Chapter 9.
Increasingly, government intervention in technology is becoming international in nature,
with bodies such as the European Union (EU) providing grant support to research and
development through initiatives such as ESPRIT. This international approach is also
discussed in Chapter 9. The methodology of the government funded schemes often
includes the design centres which have been established at a number of UK universities.
The universities see their design groups as an important link with industry as well as a
useful source of funding in times of reducing education spending.However, some sections
of the independent design community see these centres as government sponsored unfair
competition although in practice this is rarely the case as the academic centres generally
perform only small developments with companies that would not usually come into
contact with the design industry for reasons that are discussed in Chapter 6.
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5.2 Methodology of investigation.
In order to investigate the nature of the market in detail. it was necessary to use a number
of market research methods. Kinnear & Taylor (1987) discuss a number of such techniques
classified by structure and directness that may be used for investigations of this type
(Figure 5-2).
Unstructured
Direct
Survey Questionnaire Focus Group Interview
Depth Interview
Performance of
Objective Task
Technique
Thematic Appreciation
Test
Role Playing
Word Association
Sentence completion
Figure 5-2. Methods of gathering market information
For the purposes of this study it was decided to use direct methods rather than the more
esoteric indirect methods as the direct methods would be likely to produce more easily
interpreted results. This approach was adopted in all of the market based research
performed for this study.
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A number of methods were used to investigate the UK ASIC market including-
• A questionnaire sent to suppliers of ASICs
• A review of available literature
• A constant review of the electronics press
• Analysis of reported accounts for ASIC supply companies held at Companies House
• Formal and informal interviews with ASIC suppliers and market researchers
• A review of requests for quotations encountered by the authors own company (a design
consultancy which designs ASICs)
• Discussions with trade associations
• Review of commercially available market information
By using a diverse range of methods it was often possible to support the findings from one
source with those derived from a completely different one.
5.2.1 The supplier questionnaire
One of the methods listed above is survey by questionnaire. It was decided that a survey of
ASIC suppliers would form a useful source of information regarding market size and
suppliers perceptions of the market. The design of the questionnaire is described below.
The same basic approach in questionnaire design was adopted in the preparation of the
other questionnaires designed during this research (i.e. The User Questionnaire, The
University Questionnaire, The Embassy Questionnaire).
Participant identification.
Itwas decided that, given the limited number of ASIC suppliers active in the UK market, a
census rather than a survey would be used (i.e. all suppliers rather than a statistical sample
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would be approached). It was therefore necessary to identify one or more named
individuals in every supply company known to be operating in the industry and send them
a copy of the questionnaire and a letter explaining the purpose of the research. In most
cases these individuals were Marketing Directors of the company concerned. They were
identified from two main sources:-
• personal contacts of the author
• named contacts in the DTI's 'Custom Circuit Handbook'
Consequently, fifty questionnaires were dispatched in June 1994 to people employed by 29
different semiconductor manufacturing companies. Those companies not replying within 2
weeks were reminded by fax. This caused a further flow of responses. Within 4 weeks of
the survey being sent out, 16 companies had replied, leaving 13 outstanding. Further
individual letters were sent to those companies during September and October 1994, and
personal visits were made to their trade stands at the UK Silicon Design Show in October
1994 and Electronica in Munich in November 1994, which caused 2 further replies. In
total 18 companies replied leaving 11 for which market-share figures had to be
extrapolated from other sources such as those discussed above (e.g. annual reports and
informal interviews).
Questionnaire design.
Questionnaires are generally considered to have five mains sections:-
• Identification Data. The title of the questionnaire.
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• Classification Data. Concerning the characteristics of the respondent.
• Request for co-operation. Designed to enlist the respondents help.
• Instructions. Comments to the respondent on how to use the questionnaire.
• Information Sought. The body of the questionnaire aimed at gathering the
required information.
Identification data.
The questionnaire was identified as, 'Questionnaire on the UK ASIC market & the use of
ASIC technology by small & medium enterprises in the UK'
Classification data.
Classification data is made up of contact details for the respondent, and question 1 which
ascertains the types of ASIC that the company supplies.
Request for co-operation.
The request for co-operation was made in the letter accompanying the questionnaire. In
addition to explaining the purposes of the research, the respondent has further encouraged
to return the questionnaire by:-
• Including a return envelope with a real stamp (in the author's experience in other
surveys people have been shown to be more likely to return these than 'business reply'
envelopes ).
• Promising a donation to a children's charity for every returned questionnaire. A
donation was made to NSPCC in consequence.
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Instructions were given with each question, and the questionnaire ends with thanks for the
respondents co-operation and instructions for its return.
Information sought.
The questionnaire (see Appendix A) was intended to ascertain information in a number of
areas including:-
• Identification of which companies were active in each of the technology areas
• Identification of the market share that each company had
• The perception of total market size held by each company
• Actions taken by each company to promote the use of ASICs by SMEs
• The perception of the respondent to SMEs in relation to ASIC technology
The first two areas were approached directly. Questions 1 and 2.1 ask the respondent to
identify the technologies which they supply and the number of designs that they have taken
to prototype in each of them in each of the previous five years for UK based companies.
They are then asked (in 2.2) to identify the proportion of those designs that were for SMEs.
SMEs are defined at this stage to prevent misunderstanding.
The next two questions, regarding total market size, elicit perceptions as well as factual
replies. This approach was taken because informal discussions with ASIC suppliers
revealed that few if any had a clear idea of total market size gained through real research.
In most cases replies were based on rough sales forecasting or previous sales. However, the
views held by people working in this area are clearly important and likely to be reasonably
accurate if a consensus is achieved.
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Question 3 asks the respondent to show which marketing techniques their company uses to
encourage SMEs to adopt ASIC technology. Both previous and planned future initiatives
are requested. The list of possible answers came from discussion with suppliers and
personal experience of the author. An open 'Other' box is given so as to elicit information
about unusual or unique techniques that might be being used.
Section 4 aims to elicit information in a number of ways. Firstly, each question addresses a
specific problem or question often associated with the adoption of ASIC technology (e.g.
ability of engineers, sales volumes, cost of entry). These statements are drawn from
discussions with semiconductor suppliers, earlier research and personal experience of the
author. Secondly, there is a balance of questions between positive and negative attitudes to
the use of ASICs by SMEs, so that they can be used to ascertain an overall attitude of the
respondent to ASIC use by SMEs without introducing bias. The answer section for these
questions is in the form of a set of Likert scales with an even number of agree and disagree
responses. This forces the respondent to give either a positive or negative answer rather
than a non-committal midpoint answer. Analysis of numeric scores can be used to assess
the degree of agreement or disagreement with the statement.
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5.3 Total semiconductor market: UK, Europe & World
Estimates of the absolute size of the semiconductor markets in the UK, Europe, and the
world vary slightly from survey to survey. Industry in the UK generally accepts the figures
from Dataquest, FEI, and some other market research organisations. An aggregation of
available data and forecasts from a number of organisations over the period of this
research is shown in Figure 5-3.
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Figure 5-3. UK and world semiconductor market.
In 1995 the world semiconductor market grew by 40% to reach $154.7bn with Europe
growing by 45% to reach $30bn. The UK market in the same year reached $7.9bn and so
accounts for 26% of the European total. This puts the UK in second place in the ranking of
European consumption, slightly behind Germany. In the last few years, growth has been
higher than the market pundits predicted, leading some to say that a slump is in prospect
and that the slump in DRAM prices being experienced in mid 1996 is the first sign of this.
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In early 1996, Electronics Times reported Dataquest figures suggesting that the ranking of
semiconductor producers servicing the European market was that shown in Table 5-1
(Walko, 1996).
1995 Company 1995
Rank European
.. sales ($bn)
1 Intel 3.48
2 Motorola 2.15
3 Siemens 2.12
4 Philips 1.69
5 Texas Instruments 1.60
6 SGS-Thomson 1.59
7 Samsung 1.56
8 NEC 1.52
9 Toshiba 1.10
10 Hitachi 1.10
All others 12.21
Total 30.08
Table 5-1 Ranking of semiconductor vendors (Europe)
This position is not as positive for the UK as it may at first seem. Bernard Courtois of the
French institution TIMA (Techniques of Informatics and Microelectronics for Computer
Architecture) points out that although the UK represents about a quarter of the European
semiconductor market by revenue, most of these parts are specified and ordered by non-
UK companies (Courtois, 1994). The implication is that although using the technology in
its factories, the UK's designers have not adopted ASIC technology to the extent that the
gross consumption figures might suggest.
Indeed, 69% of UK semiconductor consumption is specified outside of the UK (41% by
American companies, 16% by Japanese, and 12% by companies from continental Europe).
Courtois considers that the UK electronics industry is composed largely of, 'screwdriver
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factories'. (Courtois, 1994). He prefers to define the European market-split in terms of
'European deciders' (i.e. the market split by where design and purchasing decisions are
made). In this way, the influence of sales determined by overseas design groups is
eliminated, and the figures better represent the adoption of the technology by local design
teams. This leads to the distribution shown in Figure 5-4.
France
17%
Figure 5-4. European deciders semiconductor market.
Courtois supports his VIew of France as the emergmg champion of the European
electronics industry by pointing out that in 1991, the French TTL market plunged by 40%
while its ASIC market grew by 20%, suggesting a shift to higher levels of integration in the
electronic products produced in French factories. If this perception is correct, it supports
the view that the UK is falling behind its overseas competitors.
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5.4 The masked ASIC market.
5.4.1 UKMasked ASIC market
Most respondents to the supplier questionnaire considered that the total number of masked
ASIC design starts in the UK was in the range of 100-200 per year. However, when the
sum of all of the design starts claimed by each respondent were added, it came to about
400. Clearly there is some disparity here which is probably due to over-claiming by
respondents in an attempt to show their company in a good light. Itmay also mean that the
market is slightly larger. The distribution of answers to this question is shown in Figure 5-
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Figure 5-5. Perceived masked ASIC market size reported by suppliers
The proportion of that market attributable to SMEs is somewhat more difficult to
ascertain, and needs to be inferred from the questionnaire responses. Some companies
replied in percentages, while others gave actual results, but when correlated, it seems that
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SMEs accounted for around 8-10% (Figure 5-6) of the total number of design starts. In
round figures, this amounted to about 20 design starts per year in 1993. It would appear
that this percentage may be growing slightly due to the specific efforts of companies who
aim their marketing effort at small enterprises, but this effect accounts for no more than
about 5 extra designs each year. When semiconductor vendors were informally questioned
early in 1997, it appeared that the situation had not significantly altered.
1991 1992 1993
Figure 5-6. Percentage of UK masked ASIC market attributable to SMEs.
It is also evident from the results that most respondents consider that the market for
masked ASICs is growing, in spite of the increasing competition from programmable
devices. The result of this question is summarised in Figure 5-7.
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Figure 5-7. Suppliers view of trend in UKmasked ASIC market size.
5.4.2 Attitude of masked ASIC suppliers to SME customers.
Attitudes toward SMEs varied widely among the suppliers who replied to the survey.
Suppliers tended toward two distinct groups.
The first group of suppliers specifically target SMEs and rate the technical and commercial
ability of those SMEs highly. These suppliers tend to be companies that are structured to
support SMEs with, for example, multi-project wafers, and so are able to generate
sufficient revenues from low volume supply to justify their activity in the SME market.
The second group consists mainly of large, high-volume semiconductor suppliers who,
although willing to accept business capable of sustaining sales revenues in excess of £200k
per annum (off the record quote from a major semiconductor company), have neither the
equipment nor the company structure to support lower volume users.
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This view is supported if we consider the responses that companies gave when asked by
the DTI what the minimum order value that they would accept was, and what their
minimum NRE was. If these two figures are added together, the total represents the entry
hurdle that the supplier would place on a customer. These values are given in the DTI's
'Custom Circuits Handbook' (DT!, 1994) and are summarised in Figure 5-8.
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Figure 5-8. Total entry costs - Mask programmed gate arrays.
It can be seen that, for mask-programmed gate-arrays, a number of low-volume suppliers
exist who are prepared to offer total entry costs below £20,000. After this point, the
minimum entry costs rise significantly as we begin to encounter large semiconductor
companies whose high-volume fabrication facilities are not suited to low-volume
production. At the extreme end we see a number of companies who are simply saying,
'Don't come to us with anything but a very high volume design'. Clearly, new entrants and
SMEs are generally going to be put off by entry costs of over £50,000 for gate-array
products, unless they can be very sure of the potential for their proposed product. It is not
surprising, given some of these figures, that new entrants see cost of entry as a significant
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hurdle, particularly when one considers that it is the large and expensive companies that
users are more likely to come into contact with through distributors and advertisements.
The situation becomes even more polarised when the same figures are calculated for cell-
based Ies (Figure 5-9). A number of low-volume/low-cost suppliers still exist. Again these
are generally companies that take specific steps to reduce entry costs (e.g. multi-project
wafers). At the extreme end of the market we see suppliers who do not wish to consider
cell-based designs which will not generate two to three hundred thousand pounds worth of
business. Very few SMEs can be considered to have applications which fall into this
category. As is the case for gate-arrays, it is these high-cost companies that SMEs are most
likely to come into contact with as they are in general the larger companies who have
wider reaching advertising and distribution arrangements.
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Figure 5-9. Total entry costs - cell based ICs.
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5.4.3 Attitudes expressed in the supplier survey.
The attitude questions of the survey lead to a number of conclusions regarding the way
ASIC supply companies view 5MB users. The replies are again slightly contradictory in
some areas and suggest that the market is not fully understood, even by companies
operating in it.
Half of the respondents (50%) agree that, 'many of our customers are 5MBs'. However,
the distribution of responses is significant. The companies that disagree consist mainly of
the ones who are identified above as having very high entry-level costs (e.g. GPS, SGST,
NEC). Companies who claim to have a high proportion of 5MB customers seem to be the
ones who claim to have low entry-level costs and specific marketing initiatives aimed at
low-volume users (e.g. VLSI, MCE, ES2, Semefab).
The size and distribution of potential ASIC users in the 5MB sector is clearly a problem to
ASIC suppliers, with 75% agreeing that the market is too large and diverse to cover with
their direct sales force. In the case of the large suppliers, their response has been to use the
distributor network through which they promote their standard parts. All of the major
manufacturers claimed to do this, but the results do not seem to have been good, as the
companies claiming to use distributors also claim a low level of 5MB business. There are a
number of potential reasons for this which are discussed in Chapter 6. Most respondents
(73%) also use indirect methods (e.g. advertising, seminars, and shows) in an attempt to
identify 5MB clients.
Attitudes to the ability of 5MBs to successfully implement ASIC are also widely spread
but polarised, with 50% of respondents agreeing that small companies are fully capable of
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ASIC design. Again, it is the large suppliers who feel that SMEs are not fully capable of
ASIC design, while the low-volume suppliers believe that they are. In addition, suppliers
of analogue ASICs are also critical of SMEs' capability. This is probably due to the
increased complexity involved in such designs which make them inadvisable to the
inexperienced designer. When the question is phrased in terms of engineers' capability,
only 31% (again mainly the majors) feel that the inability is an engineering one.
The same polarisation appears with regard to sales volumes. Fifty percent of respondents
believed that SMEs have sales volumes that justify ASIC implementations, with most of
those disagreeing coming from the large suppliers. As some of these large suppliers also
have the highest entry and minimum order costs this is of little surprise. Clearly, volumes
have to be much higher to amortise successfully over a high NRE than they do over a low
one.
Fifty-six percent of respondents agree that NRE charges and other entry costs (e.g. design
tools) form a barrier to adoption of the technology. This group again contains most of the
majors, but some of the smaller companies also see this as a problem. It is interesting that
this is such a relatively low figure, as cost of entry is the single most important factor
identified in any surveys of the potential users. Clearly, some suppliers feel that there are
low-cost routes to silicon while users do not.
Most respondents (69%) are in agreement that many successful ASIC designs come from
small companies. Again though, these parts do not seem to be being made by companies
usually associated with high-volume manufacture in spite of the fact that many such
designs are manufactured in high volume.
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These responses suggest a two-tier supply industry. The major semiconductor companies
are disinterested in SME clients because they do not believe that they have the skills, sales-
volume or necessary capital to use ASIC devices successfully in their products. On the
other hand, the smaller suppliers and those large suppliers who specifically target SMEs
have seen some success. They believe that the SME user is fully capable of designing and
profiting from the use of ASIC technology. The reasons for this polarisation of perceptions
should be investigated.
5.4.4 The European mask-based ASIC market.
The position of the UK in ASIC consumption has changed in the last few years. According
to Dataquest (Ivey, 1994) only a few years ago the UK led Europe in its consumption of
ASIC devices, but the recent Dataquest surveys suggest that the UK has slipped into
second place behind Germany. The European ASIC market ranked by revenue is
summarised in Figure 5-10 below (Ivey, 1994). In considering the UK position, the
predominance of overseas ownership in the UK electronics industry must also be
considered. This was discussed earlier, when the total European semiconductor market
was considered.
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Scandanavia
10%
France
19%
2%
22% Rest
5%
10%
Figure 5-10. European masked ASIC market 1994.
The Dataquest survey suggests that the UK will maintain its market position in a market
that is predicted to grow by a factor of two between 1994 and 1999. This supports the
results of the survey performed for this study which suggested a growing market, but also
suggests that the UK is starting to slip behind its European competitors in the use of this
technology.
5.4.5 Masked ASIC market share in Europe.
According to Dataquest the European ASIC market in 1991 was segmented by revenue as
shown in Table 5-2.
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Supplier .Marketshare
GEC Plessey 8.9%
LSI Logic 6.7%
Mietec 6.7%
Siemens 6.7%
Texas Instruments 6.6%
SGS-Thomson 4.7%
Toshiba 4.4%
Austria Mikro Svsteme 3.9%
VLSI Technology 3.8%
Motorola 3.4%
NEC 3.4%
Advanced Micro Devices 3.2%
National Semiconductor 3.1%
Philips 2.6%
AT&T 2.0%
ES2 1.9%
Matra-MRS 1.9%
Fujitsu 1.8%
Harris 1.8%
Xilinx 1.8%
Table 5-2. European ASIC market share.
In general, these figures agree with those reported by companies in the supplier survey
when extrapolated for all of Europe and so help to confirm the validity of those figures
(e.g. GPS 9% market share would suggest a 1000-2000 design start market size in Europe,
which agrees with EU estimates).
5.4.6 Masked ASIC design-starts worldwide.
According to Dataquest (reported in Atmel News, Feb 1996), the geographical distribution
of masked ASIC design-starts in 1995 is as shown in Figure 5-11. These figures tend to
agree in broad terms with those ascertained elsewhere for the UK and European cases and
so serves to support the conclusions regarding the UK market made elsewhere in this
study. One interesting observation is the extent to which Europe is significantly' behind
both the USA and Japan in design starts.
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Figure 5-11. ASIC design starts. World map
These figures lead. one to believe that adoption in Europe bas fallen significantly behind
that of its major trading rivals (USA, Japan and the Pacific Rim), particularly as the figures
refer to design starts rather than volume consumption, and so remove the effect of
'screwdriver plants' set up simply to take advantage of low-cost local labour.
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5.5 The Programmable-logic market.
One of the most important developments to influence the ASIC market in recent years has
been the introduction of the Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). In 1984, Ross
Freeman, then employed by Zilog, left the company, patented the concept of a
reprogrammable logic element and set up Xilinx to develop and exploit the technology.
Since then the company has grown to a turnover of $256million in 1994. This represents
25% of a $1billion FPGA market which is expected to grow to $2billion by 1997.
(Manners, 1994). Similarly, Electronic Times reported in early 1994 that Actel, the
inventors of the Antifuse, saw their 1993 turnover grow by 35% to $59.6million. (Anon,
1994: 1).
It is predicted that by the year 2000, programmable logic will have risen from its current
8.3% of the CMOS logic market to 25%. This is summarised in Figure 5-12 (Manners &
Parry, 1994).
1994 1997 2000
Figure 5-12. Predictions/or programmable logic market
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This view of increased functionality and lowering cost is supported by Xilinx (Clarke,
1994: 1) who see their devices increasing in complexity and coming closer to the prices of
masked ASIC devices as the feature-size reduces. Xilinx has positioned the price of its
25,000 gate device (XC4025) at below $400 in 5000 off volumes in early 1995, with the
hardwire equivalent costing around $40 in high volume. Consequently, they predict the use
of their devices to be split across application areas as shown in Figure 5-13.
System price FPGAprice
StOOk Typical applications
Test equipment
Medical equipment
Military
Logic emulators
.........$200 .....
Graphic boards
Workstations
$tk
FDDI
PCMCIA
L__ --O Modems
Volume
Figure 5-13. FPGA Application and price predictions.
Figure 5-13 suggests that high-volume products such as PCMCIA cards and modems, with
production volumes of hundreds of thousands of units and a system cost of less than
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$1000, can tolerate FPGA prices of up to $20. Low-volume, high-value equipment with
system costs approaching $100,000 is expected to tolerate FPGA prices in excess of$200.
5.5.1 FPGA suppliers market shares.
Three main suppliers of FPGA devices (Xilinx, Actel and Altera) initially emerged with
the introduction of the technology to the market in the 1980s. A number of minor suppliers
also emerged, sometimes to be absorbed by the larger players (e.g. Quicklogic). By 1991,
the FPGA market was estimated to have been split as shown in Figure 5-14 (Courtois,
1994).
Actel
14%
56%
Figure 5-14. FPGA market share in 1991
By 1995, according to the market research company Integrated Circuit Engineering (ICE,
1994) the position had changed somewhat with a number of acquisitions, mergers and new
entrants. This is summarised in Figure 5-15.
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Lattice AT&T
AMD 4% 6% Other
Figure 5-15. High density PLD market share in 1995.
5.5.2 The European market/or programmable devices.
In 1994 it was estimated that the European market for programmable logic devices was as
shown in Figure 5-16 (Clarke, 1994:1).
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Figure 5-16. European programmable logic market by type.
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The market segmentation between the different types of programmable logic is shown in
Figure 5-17.
UVPAL
12% Other
5%Bipolar PAL
18%
FPGA
24%
EEPROM PAL
19%
CPLD
22%
Figure 5-17. European market for different programmable technologies
As most of the 'other' category above relates to development systems, it can be seen that
there is an approximately even split between FPGAlCPLD with 46% of the market and
PAL devices of varying types which have 49%. Clearly, many designs currently in
production still use the relatively low-complexity PAL devices. But the survey went on to
show that this split is set to change in the near future.
5.5.3 Future trends in requirementsfor FPGAs.
The IMS survey previously cited (Clarke, 1994:2) also reviewed the requirement for gate
density in future FPGA designs, and gives some useful evidence into the way in which this
technology will encroach onto the ground previously held by masked gate-arrays. The
findings of the survey are summarised in Figure 5-18.
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Figure 5-18. Size requirements/or FPGA 1994-97.
It follows that with 50% of users requiring gate-counts of 16,000 and above, that firstly
the FPGA manufacturers must continue to develop denser arrays, and secondly that the
lower end of the traditional gate array market (5-20k gates) will be severely eroded by
FPGA products should they become available at competitive prices.
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5.5.4 Reasons for the growth in programmable logic
The cost comparison calculations which are given in Chapter 7 will show that masked
ASIC technologies are lower cost than programmable technologies in all but fairly low
production volumes. However, the programmable logic market is expected to grow to over
25% of the CMOS logic market in the next few years, at the expense of both discrete logic
(which has virtually disappeared) and masked gate-array (which is often now only used in
very high-volume or high gate-count designs). One reason often cited for this anomaly is
'time to market'. One model that clearly shows the effect of time to market is set out in
Figure 5-19. This model, generally attributed to Logic Automation Ltd, considers the life-
cycle of a product. Although generally considered to be a normal curve, the revenue
generated by a product over time can be approximated to the triangle shown in the figure.
The outer triangle shows the maximum revenue available from a particular product, while
the inner (yellow) triangle shows the effect of delaying the product introduction by a delay
time (D).
Peak of possible revenue..........................•......
Revenue
Peak of revenue from
delayed product
,"".,~ '~I~:.~i:-I'''·••••••••••• " ••••••••••••
Product life = 2W
W W
Figure 5-19. Delayed market entry model
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Lost revenue, expressed as a percentage of total possible revenue, caused by a delayed
product introduction can thus be shown to be:
Lost Revenue = D«3W-D)/(2W2)) *100
For a selection of projects, this equates to the figures shown in Table 5-2.
Imontb 2.months 3months
300 36 months 25 48 71
300 18months 48 93 133
200 36 months 16 32 47
200 18months 32 62 89
50 36 months 4 8 19
50 18months 8 15 22
Table 5-3. Revenue loss due to late market entry
Target
revenue (£K)
Lost revenue (£K) due to delay of:Product
lifetime
While it might be possible to question some of the assumptions made in generating the
model, the fact remains that 'time to market' must be seen as a major development driver.
This becomes even more important as product lifetimes decrease. At the time of writing,
the lifetime of some products has become shorter than their development time. For
example, a mobile telephone, with a product development time of 18 months has a
realistic product lifetime of around one year before it is superseded. The same is probably
true of personal computer motherboards.
While time to market was clearly high on the list when users compared programmable and
masked technologies, a number of other considerations were also evident. From
discussions with potential users at Microelectronics in Business (MiS) seminars, and from
opinions expressed in the trade-press and published surveys (ICE, 1994) the relative
advantages of each technology are seen as those shown in Table 5-4.
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User programmable logic advantages Mask programmed logic advantages
No NRE Higher density
Easy second sourcing Higher volume at economic price
Lower volume purchase possible Higher performance (speed/power)
Redesign easy and painless Macros available
In-system reprogrammability
Table 5-4. UPD Vs Mask programmed devices
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5.6 The microcontroller market.
5.6.1 The world microcontroller market.
Early in 1994, Electronics Times reported on a survey performed by Frost and Sullivan
(Anon, 1994:3) which suggested that the trends in the world market for embedded
microcontrollers are as shown in Figure 5-20.
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Figure 5-20. World embedded controller market. 1992-2000
5.6.2 The UKmicrocontroller market.
In summer 1994, the trade magazine Components in Electronics conducted a survey into
the use of micro controllers in the UK (Anon, 1994:2) and found, perhaps surprisingly, that
while Intel held the greatest market share (19.6% by respondent), second place went
narrowly to Arizona Microchip (18.8%). Motorola came third with 16.1 % while others
including Hitachi, Philips, and NEC also featured. Sixty seven percent of respondents
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claimed to be using 8-bit devices, and 24% to be using Io-bit, It is interesting to note that
Waterside Ltd (see case studies in Chapter 3) managed to make a significant cost saving
using a small microcontroller device in a simple control application. The high uptake of
the Arizona Microchip parts suggests that a large number of other such low-complexity
applications may also exist.
Itwould appear that the uptake of microcontroller technology is far higher than the uptake
of other ASIC technologies. In the user-survey of this study, 18% of companies surveyed
claimed to be already using microcontrollers in their products, and 38% claimed that they
would be likely to use microcontrollers in the next few years. In contact with potential
users through the MiB programme it also became evident that microcontrollers provided
an ideal solution to many clients product requirements, although many users were unaware
that this was the case, and assumed that their applications would require the use of more
expensive ASIC technologies. To some extent this reflects a failure of potential users to
recognise the wide range of additional features that have become available on simple
microcontrollers in recent years, or to recognise the significant reduction in price that has
taken place in the same period.
5.6.3 The European microcontroller market.
According to Miller-Freeman (Anon, 1996) the European microcontroller market in 1997
was predicted to be as shown in Figure 5-21.
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Figure 5-21. European microcontroller market in 1997
By 1997, the total European market for microcontrollers is expected to be $3billion,
compared with $1.2billion in 1992. The predominant technology is expected to become
16/32 bit devices, as they reduce in price due to the demands of the mobile
communications market. Significantly, four-bit devices are still expected to have a major
role (25% of the market). This requirement for very simple low-cost devices will be driven
by low complexity consumer applications.
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5.7 Use of ASIC by industry sector.
Dataquest survey data (Ivey, 1994) considers the usage of ASIC technology by industry
sector to be that shown in Figure 5-22.
Industrial
15%
Military
7% Transport
6%
Consumer
9%
Communications
43%
Figure 5-22. World ASIC consumption by product area.
The worlds largest user of ASIC technology is the communications industry, where the
size, weight and power consumption requirements for portable equipment have been met
by CMOS ASIC devices. This market continues to drive ASIC technology to lower
voltage, higher complexity devices as more sophisticated digital radio telecommunications
systems such as the Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) emerge. In
contrast, consumer products account for a relatively small percentage of the total (9%),
implying that they only use ASIC devices in a very small number of possible applications
(greater adoption would swamp the statistics due to the high volumes in which consumer
products are sold). As these statistics relate to the world market, it would seem that the
UK is not alone in missing the potential of the technology.
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5.8 Conclusions on the ASIC market
The information included in this chapter leads to a number of conclusions regarding the
nature of the national and international ASIC markets:
• A diverse system of large and small companies exist in both the supply and user side of
the industry, and they form a complex systemwhich is highly interactive with a number
of other systems
• The market for microelectronic devices is large and growing at a spectacular rate. This
rate of growth is predicted to continue for the foreseeable future. The growth is evident
in all of the ASIC technologies discussed in this study
• The UK is not as prominent in its use of microelectronics as its raw consumption
figures might suggest, and appears to be falling behind its overseas competitors in some
areas. It would appear that as few as 20 masked ASIC designs may be attributed to UK
SMEs in anyone year.
• Programmable devices and microcontrollers are becoming increasingly important,
particularly to SME users, and may be starting to erode some areas traditionally
associated with masked ASIC products
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6. Analysis of the UK ASIC supply industry and its
customers.
This chapter investigates the structure of the UK ASIC supply industry in relation to the
market that it serves.
6.1 The Porter industry forces model.
In analysing the information given in Chapter 5 it is useful to consider the UK supply
industry in relation to the model developed by Michael Porter (Porter, 1979).
Porter states that an industry may be analysed by considering a number of significant
forces (such as the threats of new entrants and substitute products) and by considering the
relative strengths of suppliers and buyers operating in the industry. This is summarised in
Figure 6-1.
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Figure 6-1 How competitiveforces shape strategy.
6.1.1 Threat of new entrants.
Bargaining power
of customers
It is generally considered that there is little threat from new entrants to the semiconductor
manufacturing industry because the barriers to entry are so great. The entry costs involved
in setting up a chip fabrication plant run into hundreds of millions of pounds and have
generally only been achieved with a high degree of government support. Exceptions have
included the so called 'fab-less chip manufacturers' who have designed products which
they then have manufactured by a chip foundry (generally one of the large semiconductor
companies). This helps to overcome some of the entry barriers, although not the costs of
initial design and marketing of the new products. Some of the recent FPGA companies
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have been formed in this way and only set up their own fabrication plants after their
products were established (Xilinx falls into this category). New entrants also suffer from
the lack of 'economy of scale' in sales and distribution, and the lack of a recognised 'brand
identity'.
When considering the design industry, the barriers to entry have dropped considerably in
the last few years as CAE tools have moved from being high-value software running on
expensive UNIX workstations, to low cost packages running on PC platforms under
WINDOWS. This has resulted in an increase in the number of small (one and two person)
design consultancies entering the market, particularly in the digital technology areas.
However, such new entrants have found a difficult market, particularly if their skills were
mainly in the design of digital masked ASICs where the growth in the use of FPGAs has
led many companies to return to in-house design. This has resulted in a number of
company closures. Such closures cannot be considered to be simply a reflection of a
general economic downturn as other design companies, offering a wider range of more
specialised services (e.g. analogue or RF. design), have flourished during the same period.
This would tend to support Porter's view that lowering entry barriers allow additional
companies to enter the market and compete, but the consequent increase in price
competition results in a volatile market with frequent company failures.
6.1.2 Powerful suppliers and buyers.
Suppliers can be considered to be powerful in an industry if they are few and more
concentrated than the industry itself, or if they provide unique or highly differentiated
materials. This was seen to be the case in the microelectronics industry when the Japanese
plant which produces much of the world's plastic chip encapsulation material burned
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down. The resultant lack of material caused a shortage of semiconductors for a short
period of time, and a consequent increase in price.
Although some buyers of semiconductors may be considered to be powerful due to the
large volumes that they purchase (e.g. major computer suppliers buying DRAM), this
cannot be said to be the case with SMEs buying ASICs. In general, some 'shopping
around' may be done before the design is begun, and consequently NREs may be driven
down but, once the chip is designed, the high cost and subsequent risk of moving
production to another supplier means that it is rarely (if ever) done. In consequence, the
SME may see itself as being at the mercy of the semiconductor vendor. The lack of a
second source was seen as a major barrier to entry by respondents to the DTI survey of
1991 (Shortland, 1991) but was not specifically identified in the survey performed for this
study in 1994/95.
6.1.3 Substitute products.
The threat of substitute products have had a considerable effect on the ASIC supply
industry. The perceptions of high cost, risk and other factors have long led potential users
to stick with proven, non-integrated solutions. In more recent times, the higher complexity
available in FPGA products has significantly eroded the market for low-end masked digital
ASICs. This has led to a number of established ASIC design and supply companies closing
or drastically reducing their gate-array support activities (e.g. LSI Logic reduced the size of
its UK support centre, Texas Instruments closed its UK facility at Bedford, centralising
ASIC support for Europe in France, and a number of design consultancies set up solely to
do ASIC design have been forced to close (e.g. Array Consultants)). In ASIC design,
individual subcontractors, brought onto a company's internal design-team specifically for
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an individual ASIC design have become more attractive than using an external consultancy
as the cost of design tools has fallen. The role of design consultancies and sub-contractors
is discussed in more detail later in this chapter.
6.1.4 Internaljockeying/or position.
Product differentiation and a drive to reduce prices are often seen as major forces involved
in internal industry competition. A lack of product differentiation has led to considerable
changes in the masked ASIC industry. In the mid 80s, when a large number of applications
could be found for the largest ASICs available (around 5000 gates) the company that had
the largest devices could differentiate their product and charge premium prices. However,
in the late 80s, as gate counts reached 100,000 and above, fewer and fewer applications
requiring such complexity could be identified. Even today, most applications remain below
50,000 gates. As most suppliers can now produce these devices, price becomes the major
difference between suppliers. Unfortunately, the companies that previously enjoyed
premium pricing were not structured for price competition, having large support and sales
organisations. Such companies have suffered severely.
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6.2 Market maturity.
When one considers the results of the initial DTI survey (Shortland, 1991) and the results
of the supplier questionnaire performed for this research it is possible to draw some
conclusions regarding the maturity of the UK ASIC market.
6.2.1 A model of market maturity.
Market maturity can be expressed in terms of the type of user that has already adopted a
new product (Spence, 1994). The number of users adopting a product over time can be
assumed to show a normal distribution, and by segmenting the distribution it is possible to
categorise the type of adopter most likely to be active at any point in the adoption life-
cycle. These categories of adopter are classified as Innovators, Early Adopters, Early
Majority, Late Majority and Laggards. This model is shown in Figure 6-2.
Number
adopting
13.5% 34% 34%
Early Adopters Early Majority Late majority
16%
Laggards
K-2s K-s K+s Time of Adoption
Figure 6-2. A model for adoption
Spence maintains that adoption characteristics of the groups can be described as:-
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Innovators. The first people to adopt a new process. These people are generally more
venturesome than the norm and need little persuasion to adopt. The most effective means
of marketing therefore is simply awareness raising. This might typically be done by
advertising or mail-shots.
Early Adopters. These people are marginally more cautious than innovators, though still
significantly ahead of the average. This group often act as 'legitimators' to the larger
group, convincing them that adoption is worthwhile because they are seen as more
cautious than the innovators. Awareness raising activities such as advertising and mail-
shots would typically be augmented with activities such as seminars and product trials.
Early Majority. This group, not being noted as innovators, are exceedingly deliberative in
adopting a new technology. Simply informing them of a new product is not enough.
Adopters in this category need constant exposure, convincing and reinforcement before
adoption. The awareness raising activities discussed above need to be used repeatedly on
this group, along with additional encouragement, perhaps from membership of user-groups
or clubs. Knowledge that peers or competitors have already adopted a product is
considered a powerful marketing approach with this class of adopter.
Late Majority. Adopters in this group require overwhelming pressure from their peers
before adopting a new product, and even then are likely to be ponderous in their approach.
In addition to all of the approaches discussed above, exposure to specific examples of
competitors successfully using a technology can be a powerful tool in persuading this
group to adopt a new product or technology.
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Laggards. This group is generally openly hostile to change and includes the 'rejecters'
group which will never adopt a new product, but which forms part of the potential market.
This model is useful in considering the adoption of ASIC in the UK but does have some
drawbacks. Primarily, it makes the assumption that there is one 'market' and one
'product'. In the case of this research, we are considering a range of products (from
programmable logic to masked ASIC) and a market that can be segmented in a number of
different ways (e.g. by industry sector or by company size). Consequently, to say, for
example, that the UK ASIC market is in the 'Early Adopter' phase would be an
oversimplification. It is clear that some market segments are more advanced than others.
For example, telecommunications companies, whether large or small, have been using
ASICs for a number of years and can be considered to show most of the characteristics of a
market with new adopters falling in the 'Late Majority' phase. A subjective classification
of some other market segments is given in Table 6-J.
Innovator Early Early Majority Late Majority Laggards
Phase Adopter Phase Phase Phase
Phase
Hydraulic Control Domestic heating Automotive Telecom switches Computers
Medical imaging Domestic security Mobile phones
Drug delivery
Table 6-1. Adoption phase examples
These conclusions would suggest that the UK ASIC market has a number of segments.
Some segments, particularly those consisting of larger companies are well down the
adoption road and account for the majority of ASIC design-starts each year. The
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implication is that marketing to the segments that have yet to adopt ASIC technology will
be increasingly difficult. However, it also suggests that a large potential market remains
untapped.
Small companies are in general considerably behind the larger ones operating in a
particular segment. Clearly, some small companies are using ASICs to produce sustainable
competitive advantage (e.g. TRACKER, Waterside and HJ Weir mentioned in Chapter 3).
But the rate of design-starts compared with the potential market size suggests that most
small companies are in the earlier phases of adoption. This has a number of implications
both for the ASIC supply industry and for government organisations such as the DTI who
are attempting to increase the adoption of the technology through government intervention
programmes such as 'Microelectronics in Business'
The implication is that a number of different approaches will need to be applied to address
the users at different stages in the adoption process. If all adopters could be assumed to be
at the innovator stage, then simple awareness raising activities (such as seminars) might be
sufficient to cause adoption, but in the later categories this will not be sufficient. Later
adopters will need considerably more exposure and encouragement. The expense of this
activity has led some suppliers to concentrate on the innovators, actively avoiding the other
groups (off record discussion with major semiconductor company director). While this
makes sound business sense for the semiconductor manufacturer concerned, it does little to
increase the overall rate of technology adoption.
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6.3 The role of distributors and independent. design
consultancies.
One clear indication from the supplier survey performed for this study was that the large
semiconductor manufacturers found it difficult to address a large, disparate market such as
the UK manufacturing base using their relatively small direct salesforces. While the major
users of ASICs are few and easily identified, potential SME users are difficult to identify
and may not initially justify the effort. A number of routes to solve this problem have been
investigated.
6.3.1 Distributors design centres.
The first route adopted by some semiconductor vendors was to use the distributors that
they use for distribution of their standard parts either simply to identify potential users or
to establish design centres to handle turn-key designs which could then be passed to the
semiconductor manufacturers for production. On the face of it, this solution appears
attractive, but it has been largely unsuccessful for a number of reasons.
Firstly, the salespeople from the distributors generally have little technical training. This is
acceptable when selling standard components and dealing mainly with buyers who are
interested largely in cost and delivery timescales, but leads to a lack of confidence when
the discussion is with engineers who need to feel that their problem is understood by
somebody capable of providing a solution. In addition, the time taken to make an ASIC
sale is considerably longer than that for standard components, so has a much higher cost
associated with it than more lucrative, immediate business.
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Secondly, the distribution companies underestimated the technical complexity and
investment necessary to provide a high-quality design service, believing the design simply
to be a part of a sales process that would quickly bring revenue through supply of the
finished component. They severely underestimated both the selling cycle time (from initial
contact to design start) and the design and product introduction time that could elapse
before a revenue stream from ASIC sales began. These problems are exemplified in the
short case study below. It is useful to note that in response to a question in the supplier
survey, although 47% of the semiconductor companies claimed to have used distributors in
the past, none claimed to have plans to extend this activity in the future.
6.3.2 The XXX Ltd. ASIC disaster.
:xxx Ltd. (the company name has been changed for reasons of confidentiality) is a
supplier of medium volume products (around 10,000 units per annum) to an industrial
market. In their particular market, price is extremely important as product differentiation is
difficult. It was an attempt to reduce the cost of the product while also incorporating some
new features, that led :xxx to consider the use of ASICs.
The company's design team had a great deal of experience of design for their particular
market, which was a technically complex one using radio-frequency technology, but they
had no experience of ASIC design. They were convinced by a distributor that a mixed-
signal, CMOS, standard-cell device met their requirements and that the design of such a
chip could be easily performed by the distributor's design centre with little intervention
from the company. The company accepted this and ordered the design.
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After the company received the fifth iteration of the chip, which still did not work, and the
design was running two years behind schedule, it became clear to them that they had
chosen the wrong route. At this stage, the author was commissioned to 'trouble shoot' the
design and get the product ready for production in as short a time as possible.
There were found to be a number of problems with the circuit-design, the development
system, and the project management of the development that could be directly attributed to
the choice to use a distributor design centre rather than using internal expertise or a design
consultancy.
Firstly, distributors are generally sales based companies, and to be successful in this have a
culture based on fast turnover and minimal customer contact (..pile 'em high sell 'em
cheap ..). This culture does not transfer well to a design environment. A company is far
more likely to provide quality of design if design is its major source of revenue. In this
case the distributor eventually lost interest in the design and left it to the silicon vendor and
XXX Ltd. to sort out the mess generated by their design team.
Secondly, the distributor design centre had chosen to use a design system which was
incompatible with that of the silicon vendor who was performing the layout. As a result,
layout changes made by the vendor were not fed back to the initial design database which
was held by the design centre and in consequence simple connectivity errors were
introduced into the design. XXX Ltd would not have taken such a lax approach in its own
design work, but assumed that the ASIC 'experts' that they had commissioned knew what
they were doing.
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Thirdly, an inappropriate silicon vendor was proposed by the distributor. This was because
that distributor only represented a single silicon vendor and so proposed them for the
development rather than choosing the best supplier for the application. As has been shown
by the survey results, two basic groups of vendor exist. The first is only interested in high-
volume low-risk business, so is generally the wrong type for a new user who requires
engineering assistance and may not have high-volume demands. That assistance is far
better given by low-volume suppliers and those who generate revenue through the design
process. In this case a supplier from the first group was chosen when one from the second
group would have formed a much better fit with :xxx Ltd.
In summary, it is useful to review the different roles of the three parties involved in ASIC
design (McArdle & Woodley, 1992). This is shown in Figure 6-3.
Final ASIC user Silicon Vendor
Product &
System
Requi rernents
Silicon
Manufacturing
Technology
Design Team
ASIC design experience
Figure 6-3. Knowledge overlap in the ASIC design process.
6-13
The final users of the ASIC need fully to understand and specify the system requirements
of the product. They, more than anybody, will know the details of the system in which the
device will operate, and the constraints that these place on the operation of the device.
This knowledge must either already exist in the design team, or be clearly imparted to
them. In discussions with potential users of design services, it became apparent that the
failure of consultants to admit that they know less about a client's design requirement than
the client himself, which is often seen as arrogance, has led to a client losing confidence in
particular consultants. The relationship between the three parties identified in Figure 6-3
needs to be one of mutual respect and trust.
The design team must be fully conversant with the ASIC design process, and the limits of
the particular technology being used in the design. In the case of an external design house,
it is this knowledge more than anything else that is being purchased. In order to achieve a
successful implementation of the design, the team must have some understanding of the
semiconductor process being used and its limitations. They do not need to be
semiconductor process engineers, as they will seldom need to be involved in process
development or the design of a chip at lower than cell or gate level.
In contrast, the role of the silicon vendor is in the design and manufacture of ever smaller-
featured, lower-cost technologies and in the consistent and reliable manufacture of devices
in those technologies. They do not in general need to understand the final application in
any greater depth than, for example, the need for approved production flows for military
devices, or any requirement for unusual environmental requirements (e.g. high temperature
operation).
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It is essential for the skills of these three groups to overlap if the design is to be successful,
but this overlap can be fairly small. In the case of:XXX Ltd., the user poorly specified the
device to the distributor's design team. The design team was inexperienced in the
particular technology chosen, and the semiconductor manufacturer, misunderstanding the
requirements of the device, proposed an inappropriate technology on the grounds of low
cost. It is useful to note that once an experienced ASIC designer was brought on board the
major problems were easily identified as the design system interfaces, some minor design
problems, and the testing procedure. A route to a successful product was swiftly identified.
None of these problems required a specific in-depth analysis of any area, merely the ability
to apply normal development control processes to a new technology.
The sixth iteration of the chip was successful, and entered volume manufacture. However,
due to its late arrival in the market, the product is unlikely to reach its predicted volume of
sales. In the longer term, the distributor closed its ASIC design facility and formed a link
to a third party design house.
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6.4 Independent design consultancies.
The last ten years have seen a rapid growth in the number and size of independent design
consultancies in the UK. In relation to the UK ASIC market they fall into two groups.
Consultancies falling into the first group exist purely to service the semiconductor market
and perform solely ASIC and standard microelectronic product design. Companies such as
Phoenix VLSI, Silicon Microsystems International and Swindon Silicon Systems fall into
this category. Members of the second group perform complete electronic system design, of
which ASIC design forms a part. Plextek, Symbionics and The Technology Partnership are
examples of such companies.
The advantage that these companies have over distributors is that they are clearly focused
on design. That is, after all, where they make their money. Investment in these companies
is in design related equipment, and their staff are recruited with the necessary technical
and systems knowledge to perform ASIC design. Economies of scale also allow such
companies to perform designs quickly and cheaply as their staff can be kept fully utilised
in designing for a number of clients. Increasingly, UK and overseas companies are using
such external resources rather than building internal teams.
Examples of successful products developed using this route include the TRACKER system
discussed earlier, and more recently, the Ionica radio telecommunications system which
was developed by a number of consultancies in collaboration with each other. These
developments are discussed in some depth in the case studies section of Chapter 3.
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6.4.1 Value chain analysis of distribution and design eonsultancies:
In comparing the approaches to design adopted by distributors and design consultancies, it
is useful to consider the value chains of the two types of design organisations (Porter,
1985).
Primary Inbound
functions logistics and
arketing
Service
Figure 6-4. Value chain.
The value chain (Figure 6-4) can be used to visualise the areas in which a company adds
value in producing its products. These areas can be split into primary functions (i.e. those
functions which directly add value) and support functions (i.e. those functions which are
necessary to support the primary functions). Clearly, different types of company
emphasise, and so add greater value in, different areas to others. Consider the value chains
of the two types of organisations under discussion. The areas emphasised by each type of
organisation are shaded in Figure 6-5.
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Figure 6-5. Value chains of distributors and design consultancies.
The semiconductor distributor has a value chain optimised for the sale and supply of large
volumes of product. Particular emphasis is given to delivery logistics and the sales and
marketing function. The whole infrastructure of such companies is optimised to reduce the
cost of core functions by employing people of the lowest possible technical ability
consistent with being able to take sales orders.
Design consultancies on the other hand have a single product; the service of producing
high-quality designs. Their ability to survive depends on their success in producing high
quality designs in a cost-effective manner. This generally leads to the recruitment of
experienced design staff, investment in equipment and training, and the development of
the control systems necessary to manage efficient, accurate product designs.
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This view of the technical level of distribution is not confined to the author. In a report on
this subject in Electronics Weekly (Parry, 1995) one disgruntled Technical Director, when
asked about the technical support available from distributors, is quoted as saying, 'Frankly,
my seven year old daughter knows more about digital signal processing than some of the
jokers we have come across'. The view is supported by the Director of Engineering of the
computer manufacturer Tadpole. The report concludes that many UK distributors, when
faced with a technical question, can claim to do little other than supply the telephone
number of the semiconductor suppliers technical staff.
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6.4.2 The structure and history of the independent design industry.
According to Michael Hobday (Hobday, 1991) the independent Ie design sector has its
roots in the mid 1980s. He claims that in 1985 it was estimated that 45 of the 236 ASIC
design- centres operating in the USA were independent of semiconductor or IT systems
manufacturers. The same paper claims that approximately 27 independent design centers
were operating in Europe by 1986.
A survey performed by the Semiconductor Businesses Association in 1996 (SBA, 1996)
established that the number of design companies had grown significantly since Hobday's
survey. The SBA survey identified over 90 UK based design companies claiming to
operate in microelectronic design, with a further 120 in mainland Europe. Over 80% of
responding companies claimed to be independent of any particular semiconductor vendor.
Of the UK companies, 39% were less than five years old, and 71% less than 10 years old.
Turnover of the companies varied, with an average turnover of around £2Million in a
range of £30,000 to £14Million. The majority of design companies could claim to be
SMEs according to the definitions given in Chapter 3. This clearly identifies a young and
fast growing industry.
The design companies surveyed expressed a number of interesting attitudes regarding the
skills of their SME clients when compared with those of their larger clients. These views
are summarised in Figure 6~6.
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Figure 6-6. Abilities of SME clients
It can be seen from Figure 6-6 that in some notable areas, small clients are not seen as
significantly different in skill levels to larger companies. However, there are some areas of
difference. Probably the most important difference is in the lack of development capital
evident in SMEs. This can lead to long selling cycles ending in the cancellation of a
proposed project due to lack of funding. Small companies are also seen to be less realistic
about the cost of product developments, and behind larger companies in their use of
structured design methods.
On the more positive side, small companies are seen as less resistant to change, and more
open to the suggestion of new technologies than their larger counterparts. In essence, this
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bodes well for the adoption of ASICs by these companies. The general view of the
companies surveyed regarding the UK SME user-base was that although it is not as
advanced in its use of microelectronics as it might be, it consists of flexible, innovative
companies who would be prepared to adopt microelectronics if the benefits could be
clearly explained to them in relation to their own product needs.
Hobday (Hobday, 1991) compares the growth of independent ASIC design companies with
the growth of software design companies, and indeed there are some similarities. It was
when the major IT companies allowed externally produced software to be run on their
machines (notably mM in 1969), that a sector of small companies evolved, performing
tasks traditionally performed by the IT company. Many such companies thrived under
these circumstances; Microsoft to name but one. This can be seen as similar to the large
semiconductor manufacturers releasing design information to enable third parties to design
ASICs that could be manufactured using their processes.
However, there are some significant differences between the development of third-party
software design and third party ASIC design. Software is generally a business tool for a
manufacturing company rather than part of its final product. ASICs are clearly different in
this respect. The development of ASIC technologies, and the removal of cost entry-barriers
that low-cost CAE has brought has enabled an independent design industry to evolve, but
the view that companies have of involving third parties in their most guarded area (new
product design) is significantly different to their views on say, a new accounts package.
This structure of small, young innovative companies is typical of industries emerging to
exploit a new technology. Traditionally, such an early flush of small enthusiastic
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companies would quickly reduce in number as early profits due to differentiation give way
to the price competition of more mature markets. This has to some extent already occurred
in the independent design sector. The period from 1995-96 saw a number of mergers,
takeovers and company closures. Examples include the purchase of Mosaic Microsystems
by Analog Devices, the purchase of Systolic and 3soft by Mentor Graphics, the purchase of
Basics by Semefab, and the demise of such companies as Array Consultants and ASIC
Advantage.
One suggested role for the independent design houses is in the introduction of ASIC
technology to the small or inexperienced user (Hobday, 1991) and to some extent this does
occur. However, it is incorrect to assume that this role lies easily with the independent
design sector. The main reason for this is discussed below.
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6.4.3 High cost of 'new-name' SME business
One frequent explanation from the supply industry for their reluctance to market directly to
the majority of SME companies is the expense of such marketing compared to its reward.
A major concern with ASIC marketing is that the selling process is a long and highly
technical one, even if dealing with potential customers who are aware of the basic
principals of the technology. The buyers are engineering staff, often at a senior level, who
expect to discuss their proposed application in some depth with technically competent
sales staff before committing themselves. The high cost of such sales should not be
underestimated. The lack of success of distributors in selling ASICs supports this.
A generalised view of the selling process for a new-name SME client is shown in Figure
6-7. Typical figures for the drop-out of prospective clients at each stage are shown in the
diagram (McArdle, 1996:3).
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Figure 6-7. The selling triangle.
The process begins with a targeted mail-out to a large number of potential clients who
must each later be contacted by telephone so as to produce a relatively small number of
initial meetings. A calls-to-meetings ratio of 100:1 is not uncommon either in the
experience of the author, or of professional mailing companies such as Morgan-Grampian
(Anon, 1994). The initial meetings should result in the client inviting the supplier to
prepare a proposal. Proposals are often modified as additional specifications emerge and
final negotiations follow which eventually end in sales. This process is an involved one
which can often take in excess of a year to come to fruition.
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The approximate costs of making an ASIC design sale of the type shown in Figure 6-7 are
summarised in Table 6-2. This table shows the cost of a successful sale, which must also
bear the amortised cost of the unsuccessful ones that fell away during a particular sales
period.
Item Cost Notes
(£)
Initial mailshot (say 500 mailed) 625
Mailshot follow-up by phone (500 calls) 10500 2
Initial meetings (1 person for 1 day for 5 meetings) 2500 1
Proposal writing (3 person-days each, 3 proposals) 4500
Proposal presentation (2 people for 1 day, 3 proposals) 3000
Follow-up activities & proposal modifications (2 proposals) 1000
Final sales meeting (2 people for 1 day, 2 proposals) 2000
Expenses (travel, entertaining, subsistence) 500
Total 24625
Table 6-2. Cost of a 'new-name' sale
Notes.'
1. Staff costs are assumed at £500 per man day. This is an average figure that a designer
could be charging if doing fee earning work in place of selling. The senior staff involved in
the sales process are generally even more expensive than this.
2. Assumes 25 calls per day (fairly conservative) and a telecom charge of £1 per call
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So the cost of selling what might be a fairly small initial design job to an SME client is
probably in excess of £20,000. It may well be in excess of this if the client requires
additional visits to discuss the project, as is often the case, particularly with reluctant
technology adopters.
This compares badly with the effort involved in selling to an informed buyer from a large
company, particularly in the early stages because the size of the target is much smaller. In
addition, while the SME may well only produce new products on an infrequent basis, the
large company will often place frequent repeat business with the design company. Such
business is much less expensive to sell than 'new-name' business, and consequently more
profitable. It must always be the aim of any company to score repeat business with its
existing customer base for just these reasons.
For these reasons, given a restricted marketing budget, an ASIC design or supply company
will start by addressing the large, easily identified companies, and will only move towards
addressing the more reluctant SME companies if they cannot sell all of their available
resource in the former area. Alternatively, a lower cost, more focused strategy for
identifying new-name business can be adopted. Such strategies include:-
• Niche marketing to a targeted subset of the SME market where specific competence can
be demonstrated, or where penetration is low .
• Waiting for prospective SME new names to make contact themselves rather than being
approached
• Targeting only obviously entrepreneurial, fast-growing companies
• Using new technologies for making initial contact (e.g. the Internet).
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While each of these approaches has the advantage of being lower cost than the approach
calculated in Table 6-2, they also have disadvantages. Waiting to be contacted does
nothing to stimulate a market, and is unlikely to cause an increase in adoption in less
entrepreneurial companies. Any sort of targeting requires specific research so as to identify
targets, and any such research may be incorrect in its assumptions. Techniques such as
Internet marketing are still in their infancy, and remain unproven.
The conclusion from this cost model is that potential 5MB users are unlikely to be
encouraged by suppliers and in consequence are more likely than large companies to be
badly informed about ASIC technology. This is a major reason why government
intervention can be useful in encouraging technology adoption.
If a government believes that technology adoption is beneficial to the industrial base, they
can effectively perform the early marketing activities (awareness, information, training,
encouragement) and then present the supply industry with pre-qualified sales leads. In
essence, this is the approach that has been adopted by the main government initiatives
discussed in Chapter 9.
It would then seem that marketing to 5MB users is not economically viable if the only
source of revenue for the design-house is that generated in the design. This has led a
number of design companies to adopt a different strategy with their 5MB clients. That
strategy is to offer both a design service, and subsequently a supply service. This is
discussed in more detail in the next section.
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6.4.4 Beyond third party design - Design and supply.
In discussions with potential users of ASIC technology in association with the MiB
programme, an important facet of the market became evident. There seemed to exist a
significant number of potentially large-volume ASIC users who were using alternative
technologies (e.g. electromechanics, hydraulics) because they had no concept of where to
start to incorporate electronics, let alone ASICs, into their products. These companies were
faced with a step that seemed so huge (new design techniques, new design tools, new
design staff, new production techniques, new suppliers, new inter-company relationships,
new logistics, new marketing techniques, new markets) that they were simply unable to
make the change. For many such companies it would have been foolhardy to attempt such
a massive step. In order to meet the needs of this market it is necessary to attempt to
supply a complete solution. The requirement is not only for the design and supply of
ASICs, but of complete application specific electronic units.
For example, washing machine manufacturers may not want to design or even purchase
ASICs to go into an electronic controller. They may want to buy complete designed, built
and tested controllers. Some small companies do exist to service these 'design and supply'
needs in specific niche markets, but in 1995, most of these companies operating in the UK
were using outdated technology, and few if any were able to perform ASIC design. There
were also a number of sub-contract assembly companies who could build electronic sub-
assemblies once they had been designed, but had no advanced design facilities. There was
clearly a market need to provide cost effective, high-technology design and supply in high
volumes to a number of users.
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These market needs have been met by the emergence of a number of product supply
companies from the design-houses. Some are supplying ASIC devices to the more
sophisticated user (e.g. Swindon Silicon Systems) while others have gone as far as forming
joint-venture companies with high-volume electronic manufacturing companies so as to be
able to supply complete electronic sub-assemblies (e.g. the Unico Communications
alliance between Plextek and Unico Technology).
By using this strategy, these companies have been able to offset the high costs of initial
marketing not only through sales related to the design process, but subsequently through
sales of finished products.
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6.5 Conclusions on the UK ASIC supply industry and its
customers
The analysis of the industry and its customers performed in this chapter leads to a number
of conclusions of particular relevance to the adoption of ASICs by UK industry.
The first major conclusion is that there is no single 'market' involved, but a wide range of
market segments that often have little in common other than the possibility of using
electronics in their products. Within each of these segments, users may be at a different
stage in the adoption process. This presents a very difficult marketing problem.
There is a young and volatile design and supply industry serving these markets. This
industry is undergoing constant radical change, and is likely to continue to do so for the
foreseeable future.
The economics of marketing suggest that companies offering design services are unlikely
to market to SME clients, preferring to concentrate on the more lucrative clients in larger
companies. However, for SME users with higher product volumes, 'design and supply'
companies might offer an alternative.
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7. Reasons for non-adoption given by potential
users.
Previous chapters have shown that ASICs can bring competitive advantage to SMEs and
that a design and supply industry exists that is capable of meeting their needs. Some
barriers to successful marketing have been identified, but it remains that UK companies
are failing to take advantage of a technology that could bring then considerable rewards.
In this context, it is important to analyse of the views of the potential ASIC users regarding
the use of microelectronics in their products and an analyse the reasons that they give for
not taking advantage of the technology.
This chapter aims to identify the reasons given by potential users for not adopting ASIC
technology, and to investigate whether those perceptions are based in fact.
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7.1 Methods of investigation.
To investigate the reasons why companies do not adopt ASIC technology, a number of
methods were employed including:-
• A questionnaire to companies who do or might use microelectronics in their products
• Discussions with potential and current users
• A literature search
• Discussions within the design industry's trade associations
7.1.1 Questionnaire.
A questionnaire was mailed to potential and current users of microelectronic technology.
The majority of those questioned were delegates of the DTI Microelectronics in Business
seminars, but a set of non-attendees was also surveyed to check that MiB attendees did not
represent a skewed sample. The reason for using the former group was mainly because
other questionnaires had indicated some very anomalous results, perhaps suggesting that
those questioned did not fully understand the questions. After attending one of the MiB
seminars, people might at least be expected to understand more of the terminology used in
the questionnaire than those with no prior knowledge.
The questionnaire was piloted in 1994, some modifications made, and the main survey
performed during the remainder of the research period so that possible trends could be
investigated. The format of the questionnaire is shown in Appendix B. Its basic design
follows the guidelines discussed in Chapter 5.
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7.1.2 Discussions with users.
During 1994, 1995 and 1996, the author was a presenter of the two series of management
seminars that formed part of the DTI 'Microelectronics in Business' initiative. This
initiative is discussed in detail later, but presented the author with the opportunity to
discuss in detail the reasons and trends identified in the questionnaire with several hundred
seminar delegates. Also, in over 30 seminars, the same questions were asked by delegates
time and time again, giving additional indications of major concerns. In addition, the
author's work as a design consultant brought him into contact with a wide variety of
electronic equipment companies with whom discussions were held to develop ideas
relating to the reasons identified from other sources (e.g. the user survey).
7.1.3 Literature search.
The most relevant previous research published regarding reasons for non-adoption of
ASICs was that of by Michael Shortland Associates in the late 80s (Shortland, 1991). This
study is discussed at length in Chapter 4, but it seems that perceptions have changed little
between the time of that survey and the one performed for this study. Shortland found that
the main reasons given for non-adoption were:-
• Cost of entry
• Lack of a second source
• Lack of skilled designers
• Risk of failure
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7.1.4 Discussions with Trade-Associations.
The two UK trade associations most active in the area of this study are The Semiconductor
Businesses Association (SBA) and the Federation of the Electronics Industry (FEI). Both of
these organisations made a significant contribution to the discussions involved in the
construction of the DT!' s Microelectronics in Business programme, and this study draws
on some of the discussions held in association with that activity and some subsequent
correspondence with the FEI (Whittaker, 1994)
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7.2 Questionnaire results.
The user-questionnaire described earlier contained a number of questions regarding the
reasons that respondents had for not adopting ASIC technology. These were contained in
section 8 of the questionnaire as a series of Likert scales.
A summary of the responses given by users in that section is presented in Table 7-1.
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Statement. Percentage
agreeine;
1 ASICs can increase our products unique features. 79%
2 Small companies don't do ASICs. 26%
3 Ifwe wanted to use ASICs We'd know where to go. 56%
4 ASIC suppliers ignore our company. 44%
5 ASICs can lower our products raw materials costs. 62%
6 Only large companies have engineers capable of ASIC 24%
design.
7 ASICs cost less to design than alternative technologies. 15%
8 The risks involved in using ASICs are higher than with other 50%
technologies.
9 ASICs can lower our manufacturing costs. 62%
10 NRE charges for ASICs are too high for us to use them. 56%
11 ASICs can lower our test costs. 56%
12 ASICs take too long to design & prototype. 53%
13 ASICs can reduce the size of our product. 76%
14 The cost of entry to ASIC use is high compared to other 79%
technologies.
15 If we don't use ASICs our products will be left behind. 44%
16 Our volumes are too low to justify the use of ASICs. 56%
17 Our designers have no experience of ASIC design. 82%
18 My competitors are using ASICs. 41%
19 Small companies are fully capable of ASIC designs. 79%
20 Many successful ASIC designs come from small companies. 85%
21 The DTI promotes the use of ASICs in a positive way. 94%
22 The DTI 'Microelectronics in Business' initiative will 88%
increase the uptake of ASICs in the UK by smaller
companies.
23 We cant predict the sales volume of our product in advance, 35%
so don't know if ASICs are justified.
Table 7-1Attitude question responses.
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These results are summarised graphically in Figure 7-1 .
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Figure 7-1 Attitude question responses
Clearly, cost is still the major issue, with most respondents (79%) feeling that entry costs
are higher than comparable technologies and that ASICs cost more to design than other
technologies (85%). A number of responses suggest that people believe that small
companies are fully capable of ASIC design, but only 18% of respondents feel that their
own engineers have experience of the technology. The proportion of companies believing
that economic volumes are a problem (56%) is less than Shortland found, but nonetheless
still significant.
Companies are coming around to the idea that ASICs could do some good for their
products, believing that they could add unique features (79%), reduce raw materials costs
(62%), reduce manufacturing costs (62%), and reduce product size (76%).
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There also seems to be a high level of support for government intervention with 88% of
respondents believing that the DTI technology transfer scheme (MiB) would increase
technology adoption.
The results of this survey were published and discussed in a number of papers during 1995
and 1996 (McArdle, 1995. McArdle, 1996:1. McArdle 1996:2. McArdle 1996:3).
In conclusion, the major reasons for non adoption can be summarised as:-
• Cost of entry.
• Risk of failure.
• Single sourcing.
• Lack of trained staff.
• Insufficient production volumes.
These major concerns are believed by the author to be incorrect perceptions rather than
real reasons. In order to investigate this, each of these reasons is now investigated. The
remainder of this chapter takes these perceived reasons one-by-one and investigates
whether they are based in fact.
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7.3 Cost of entry.
Cost of entry is repeatedly given as the primary reason for non-adoption by potential ASIC
users. If it can be demonstrated that this is an incorrect perception rather than a fact, we
can go some way towards eliminating a major hurdle to ASIC adoption.
7.3.1 ASIC designflow
Each of the ASIC technologies discussed goes through a similar design route. However,
the emphasis on each stage may vary according to the technology being used. The outline
design process is shown in Figure 7-2. It is important to understand this process, as many
of the cost and risk implications of the use of these technologies stem from it.
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Figure 7-2. ASIC designflow
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System-level design is generally performed poor to the choice of implementation
technology. A number of tools exist to help in system-level design and technology choice
(e.g. behavioral level languages and CASE tools), but in practice it has been shown that
few companies use such formal methods (SBA, 1996).
This lack of understanding and adoption of system-level design methodologies such as
behavioral-level VHDL and structured software methodologies such as Yourdon was
identified as a weakness within users of the DTI MiB programme during 1996.
Consequently, work to increase adoption was proposed as an extension to the MiB
programme. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether this extension to the programme
will be made.
7.3.2 Design entry.
The most often used methods for design entry in each of the ASIC technologies are shown
in Table 7-2.
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Technology Design.EntryMethod •
. .:
Programmable Logic Devices Text Entry & Synthesis or
Schematic Capture
Microcontrollers (masked and user- High & Low Level Programming
programmable) Languages
Gate Array (all digital) Text Entry (HDLs) & Synthesis or
Schematic Capture
Cell Based Devices (digital, analogue and Text Entry (HDLs) & Synthesis or
mixed-signal) Schematic Capture
Table 7-2. Design entry methods
Microcontrollers stand alone because, being software driven, the tools available for
programming them are software development tools. The sophistication of the tools varies
with the family of microcontrollers chosen. It ranges from simple assemblers for the
microcontroller's native code (e.g. 8051 machine code), to high-level language compilers
for a range of high-level languages (e.g. C).
All of the other devices, being hardware devices by nature, are designed using techniques
which have become normal for contemporary hardware engineers. The sophistication of
these tools varies from schematic capture, where the designers use a drawing package to
draw a circuit diagram using the basic building blocks available to them (e.g. gates,
latches) through simple textual entry and synthesis tools such as PALASM, through to
complex behavioral languages which can be used to describe functions at a high level of
abstraction. These descriptions are then used in conjunction with sophisticated hardware
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synthesis tools to produce gate-level implementations of the design. However, current
implementations of synthesis tools will require an intermediate level of abstraction such as
register transfer level (RTL) VHDL to be derived from the abstract behaviour as they are
not yet capable of translating behavioral descriptions directly into gates. The relative
merits and basic costs of these tools are summarised in Table 7-3. The costs relate to the
cost of the software tools rather than to those of the platforms on which the tools run.
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Type of Example Features ·.nl~"~. Cost of ...CUUIUUU
software tool •• _A ~1Il~'VUI.· .
-": ... ...
Assembler Keil51 Low level language PC £300
translation
Schematic ORCAD Simple schematic PC £200
Capture capture
Intergraph Complex schematic Workstation £5000
AcePlus capture
Hardware VHDL, High level of Workstation £15000
Description Verilog abstraction. (some lower
Languages Complete system cost PC
modeling versions are
available)
Hardware PALASM, Simple synthesis PC £200
Synthesis ABEL aimed at specific
programmable
devices
Advanced, Workstation £20,000
Synopsys technology
independent
synthesisers
Table 7-3. Design entry tool costs.
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It can be seen from Figure 7-3 that low-cost systems, attractive to small and new users of
ASIC technology are readily available, although the functionality of the low-end products
is considerably less than that of their more expensive counterparts. For example, while a
£200 design-synthesis tool such as PALASM is capable of translating Boolean equations to
compile the fuse-map of a PAL it can not be used for other technologies. At the time of
writing, some very low cost VHDL and synthesis tools are beginning to appear on the
market. These tools are aimed at specific low-end devices and normally support only a
subset of the VHDL language, but with prices as low as £79 will undoubtedly have an
effect on the uptake of VHDL.
7.3.3 Design proving & simulation.
In this area, the techniques vary according to the technology, its complexity, and the risks
and costs associated with incorrect designs. The major design proving tools are shown in
Table 7-4.
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Technology
User-programmable logic devices Simulation
Emulation
Trial and error
and user-programmable In-circuit emulatorsMasked
microcontrollers EPROM & OTP devices
Gate-arrays (all digital) Simulation
Emulation using programmable logic
Cell-based devices (digital, analogue and Simulation
mixed-signal)
Table 7-4. Design proving methods.
Emulation using programmable logic
Microcontrollers are generally proven prior to final fabrication by using an in-circuit
emulator. This is a device which connects to the product in the place of the
microcontroller and emulates the behaviour of the microcontroller and its software, often
under the control of a PC. The emulator is able to run the microcontroller code written for
the application. Emulation systems have the advantage of software debugging and tracing
tools to help the programmer debug the code. Another method used to check a
microcontroller design is to program the target code into a low-cost programmable version
of the final part. Many microcontrollers have an Erasable Programmable Read Only
Memory (EPROM) version, which can be repeatedly reprogrammed, or a One Time
Programmable (OTP) version which can be programmed once in the laboratory. Although
considerably more expensive than a masked part (often a factor of ten times more
expensive), these devices are frequently used in early production runs of products so as to
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verify the correctness of the program prior to releasing program information for a masked
version of the chip for use in higher-volume manufacture.
For the other devices, simulation remains the most effective method of ensuring that the
devices meet their specification prior to prototype fabrication. A variety of simulation tools
exist ranging from simple logical state simulators such as that found in PALASM, through
complex digital timing simulators to component-level analogue simulators.
The most commonly used simulators for digital ASIC design are the digital timing
simulators which combine the prediction of logical states with calculation of the timing of
state transitions. Device-level analogue simulators, which are mainly based on SPICE are
generally only used to characterise an ASIC family, defining its characteristics for
simulators which require less processing power to operate. The less complex simulation
methods can then be used by the application designer (e.g. digital models or analogue
behavioral models). Indeed, the amount of computational power that would be required to
simulate a large gate-array through a design proving set of test patterns at the transistor
level is not practically achievable.
For masked ASICs, emulation using programmable logic is often cited as an acceptable
route to design proving, with many programmable-logic vendors claiming that the
migration from a programmable device to a masked ASIC is then a simple, automated
translation exercise. The author disagrees with this approach for a number of reasons:-
• The size of available programmable devices means that complete ASIC designs can
rarely be incorporated in a single programmable device. The resultant partitioning is
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then unrepresentative of the final device. This is however becoming less of an issue as
programmable devices with over 50,000 gates become commonplace.
• The basic building blocks of programmable devices are different to those used in
masked technologies, often leading to an emulator design that diverges significantly
from the ASIC being emulated.
• Device timings are radically different between programmable and masked
technologies, causing major differences in function, even in highly synchronous
designs.
• Direct translation from one family to another rarely makes optimal use of the target
family's capabilities and results in unnecessarily large ASIC devices.
As a result of these differences, examples of ASIC emulation using these methods that the
author has experienced have normally ended up with two divergent developments; one of
the masked ASIC, and one of the programmable emulator. While this may be desirable if
some form of hardware is required early in the development to prove other parts of the
system, it can not be regarded as anything but a very rudimentary check of the final ASIC.
Far better results can be obtained more cost effectively by using simulation.
The range and relative costs of these design proving methods are summarised in Table 7-5
below. The costs discussed here do not include the cost of the hardware platform on which
software tools run, but do include the cost of specific hardware (e.g. the in-circuit
emulation hardware)
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Method Example Platfol'lD Cost ....
...
In Circuit NEC 17k Hardware Emulation PC £600
Emulator Emulator Software Debug Tools (includes
emulator
hardware)
Digital PALASM State Only PC £200
Simulators Device Specific
Intergraph Full 16 state Digital Workstation £10,000
Advansim Timing Simulator.
Logic Analyser
Features.
Extensive user
interface.
Analogue SPICE Basic analogue PC £500
Simulators simulation
Intergraph Advanced features such Workstation £15,000
APEX as component spread
Table 7-5. Design proving methods - costs.
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7.3.4 Information transfer to the silicon vendor.
This process does not normally take place for user-programmable devices of either the
logic or processor based types. For these devices, prototype manufacture is invariably an
in-house process performed on a simple device programmer (a PROM programmer). Some
processes do exist to transfer the design of a programmable logic-based device to a masked
equivalent (e.g. the Xilinx 'Hardwire' array) but this route is seldom taken as the resulting
chip often fails to gain the advantages of a masked solution as the die-size and hence cost
of the resultant part remains too close to that of the programmable part to make the
engineering effort involved cost-effective.
For masked microcontrollers the program information is transferred as a file of the
compiled program, often in an EPROM or on a floppy disc. There is little opportunity for
error in this process, but the code delivered to the silicon vendor is normally
reprogrammed into another EPROM and returned to the user for verification. Once
verified there is no further interface between the silicon vendor and user until the device is
produced in prototype quantities.
For masked logic or circuit-based devices, the process is more involved. The layout of the
device is normally performed by the silicon vendor, although some exceptions do exist in
very experienced users who prefer to perform the layout of their own devices in order to
maximise performance, or in security sensitive users who do not wish to let design
information leave them.
In order to perform the layout a silicon vendor requires a list of component-to-component
connections (a netlist) and a set of stimuli and responses describing the behaviour of the
7-20
circuit that can be applied by production test equipment to test manufactured parts (test
vectors). The layout, and its subsequent simulation using the test vectors, will often be
performed on a different software system from that used for initial designs, so this stage of
the process may involve a translation and transfer of the netlist and test vectors in a
machine readable form understood by both systems. Tools to perform these tasks are
generally integral parts of the more expensive computer aided engineering (CAE)
packages. In order to check that this process has been successful, post-layout simulation is
usually performed. This is discussed later in this chapter.
7.3.5 Silicon device layout.
The design provided by the user is taken by the silicon vendor and converted to a layout
and eventually a photolithographic mask or reticle set. In the case of gate-arrays and
standard-cell products (and some programmable-logic families), this layout can affect the
behaviour of the circuit, as the metal interconnect introduces parasitic components
(resistance, inductance, capacitance) which can change the timing and performance
parameters of the circuit. These effects are checked in post-layout simulation.
It is opportune to discuss relative Non-Recurring Engineering (NRE) charges at this stage
as the silicon vendors often claim that these are levied mainly to cover the costs that they
incur in layout and mask tooling. Typical NRE charges for the various technologies are
shown in Table 7-6 below.
Programmable logic devices also go through a layout stage, which is performed by the user
using the tools supplied by the vendor. The result is a fuse pattern to be used on a prom
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blower (e.g. in a PAL), or a connectivity pattern to be downloaded to a device on
initialisation (e.g. in a Xilinx FPGA)
Technology NRE (£) Includes
User-programmable zero Program is loaded into on-chip
microcontroller memory
Masked microcontroller 2000 -5000 Mask for program metalisation,
automatically generated.
Programmable logic device zero Layout is performed on vendor
supplied design software
Gate array 5000 - 100,000 Engineering support.
Test vector simulation.
Layout.
Mask set for interconnect layers.
Cell-based device 30,000 - 200,000 Engineering support.
Test vector simulation.
Layout.
Complete mask set for all layers.
Table 7-6. ASIC NRE charges.
7-22
7.3.6 Post layout verification
For both masked and user-programmable microcontrollers, post-layout verification prior to
fabrication is rarely performed. It is assumed that no errors can be introduced in the layout
process.
With some types of programmable-logic devices, parasitic components of the type
discussed earlier can be introduced in layout, and post-layout tools are available to
simulate the behaviour of the device including the parasitic effects introduced in the layout
process. However, post-layout simulation is often omitted by the user, who may prefer to
fabricate a device and try it 'in-circuit' due to the low cost and short time penalties of
reiteration with this type of device.
In contrast, for devices involving the production of a mask set, the cost of reiteration is
relatively high. In the UK, silicon vendors generally charge about £2000 per mask, and a
full mask-set may typically be as many as thirteen separate masks. Additionally, reiteration
will involve considerable engineering effort in redesign and layout. Consequently a high
degree of post-layout verification is generally performed to ensure that parasitic
components added during circuit layout are not significantly different to those assumed by
the designer before the layout was performed. This will often involve a further translation
stage so that values for post-layout parameters can be transferred back to the CAE system
on which the chip was initially designed.
It is not the object of this study to cover the design process in great detail, but the author's
experience of investigating the reasons for failed designs on behalf of clients has shown
that designs which are unsuccessful often result from a failure to close the loop between
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pre-layout and post-layout simulations. Proper post-layout simulation can catch a wide
range of errors from subtle timing errors introduced in layout to gross connectivity errors
introduced in netlist translation or layout tools, and can often be performed using
automated methods over the course of a few days following the layout of the device. ASIC
designers skimp on this stage at their peril. It is important in choosing suitable vendors and
tools to check that this loop can be closed. This is a relatively subtle consideration which is
often overlooked by less experienced designers.
7.3.7 Prototype devicefabrication.
For user-programmable devices of all types this stage is performed using a device
programmer costing a few hundred pounds. For masked devices it is performed at a silicon
foundry. While programmable devices can be fabricated in a few minutes, masked devices
generally take 4 to 6 weeks for gate-arrays, 12 weeks for microcontrollers, and up to 16
weeks for cell-based products. However, it should be noted by potential users that the
actual processing time for a complete mask-based product is only a few hours. Most of the
weeks of waiting is taken up in queuing time through the various stages of the silicon
foundry.
7.3.8 Comparative cost totals/or the new entrant.
One of the most important questions posed by the potential new user of ASIC technologies
is, 'What will it cost?'. A summary of typical hardware, software & NRE charges that
might be expected by a new user wishing to do his own designs is shown in Table 7-7
,
below. The costs are those which would result in a small number of prototype devices.
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The gate-array and cell-based costings are based on a 10,000 gate digital design which
although considerably below the 40,000 gate average for current designs might well be the
sort of size that a new SME user might try as a first design. It should be stressed that these
are typical list prices. Methods of reducing these costs are discussed later in this chapter.
0 .... .... 0 i ~.......0 0 -0 00..0:::: ....... ~.~- gju
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Hardware
PC System 2,000 2,000 2,000
Workstation 10,000 10,000
Software
CAE software for
design entry & 200 200 500 20,000 20,000
simulation
Emulation 600 600
NRE charges 3,000 30,000 70,000
Prototype devices 100 100
PROM blower 500 500
TOTAL £3,400 £5,800 £3,100 £60,000 £100,000
Table 7-7. Typical direct entry costs/or ASIC technologies.
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Indirect costs.
The only costs involved in the introduction of ASIC technology which are not covered in
Figure 7-7 are the less tangible, indirect costs. The most significant of these are those
concerned with people. They are:
• Recruitment of experienced ASIC designers
• Training of existing staff in ASIC technology
• Continued training as new technologies emerge
All of these areas may represent major investments for a new user of ASIC technology, but
it is unlikely that a user would expect to recover such investment in the development of an
individual product. Training and recruitment are strategic investments and need to be
considered as part of the overall strategic plan of the company (Ivey, 1994). If that plan
includes the use of microelectronic technology to achieve competitive advantage, then
these costs must be met. The level of such costs can range from quite low (e.g. for training
an existing engineer in the use of programmable technologies) to relatively high (e.g.
recruiting and maintaining a team of masked ASIC designers).
7.3.9 Methods/or reducing cost 0/ entry.
The figures given above should be regarded as typical rather than minimum, and a number
of commercial and technical approaches exist which can be used to reduce or eliminate the
costs shown in Figure 7-7.
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Reducing cost of entry for masked and user-programmable microcontrollers.
It is possible that the sort of PC system necessary to run the software development tools
needed to develop code for a microcontroller already exists in the company, so negating
the need to buy one. In addition, design-entry software and emulators may be rented at low
cost or even borrowed free of charge from a distributor or manufacturer who feels that the
design might result in the purchase of large volumes of the microcontroller chips. When a
masked microcontroller is used, the user also has the option of using EPROM or OTP
versions of the device in early production runs so as to defer the point at which the NRE
charge needs to be spent to produce a lower-cost part in higher volume.
Reducing cost of entry for programmable logic devices.
The entry-costs for programmable logic devices can be reduced in much the same way as
those of microcontrollers. Existing PC hardware can be used to run the design tools, and
the tools themselves can often be loaned free of charge or hired from device manufacturers
and distributors. This approach was taken by Wicks and Wilson Ltd. (Ivey, 1994). They
designed and manufactured a microfilm enhancement tool using Actel FPGAs and were
able to hire the development system for £300 per month until they decided that the
technology was an appropriate one.
Reducing the entry cost of mask programmed devices.
A number of methods also exist which will allow the £60,000-100,000 quoted earlier to be
reduced. The CAE hardware and software discussed is generic software capable of
designing ASICs for fabrication by a number of manufacturers. If the user is designing
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small ASICs (i.e. a few thousand gates) then simple PC based tools may be sufficient.
Alternatively, if the user is prepared to tie himself in to a single manufacturer then that
manufacturer might be willing to provide tools specific to their products at a lower cost or
even on a free loan.
NRE charges can also be reduced by a number of methods. The first method is to negotiate
with the manufacturer to amortise the charges over the first few thousand production
devices. In this way a £30,000 NRE might become an additional £30 on each of the first
1000 production chips. However, in order to do this a manufacturer will generally require a
minimum order for the necessary number of production parts to be placed before
prototypes are delivered. This is simply a way of postponing the payment, rather than
eliminating it, and the total financial risk is increased as a minimum number of production
chips will now have to be bought irrespective of the success of the product.
Another method of reducing NRE charges is by participation in multi-project wafer
(MPW) developments. In this case the area of a prototype wafer is split between a number
of designs. In this way some of the prototype costs can be split among participants. This
can significantly reduce NRE charges. For example, in an interview in Electronics Weekly
(Anon, 1995:3) Thesys Microelectronics claimed NRE charges as low as £2,300 including
the delivery of 5 prototype parts. This method is often used by academic institutions, or
commercial organisations where production volumes are known to be low, or the
development known to have a high technical risk. It has a number of disadvantages
including having to wait for all of the other designs being fabricated on the wafer to finish
before prototypes can be made, and the problems of having either to re-engineer the mask-
set or waste significant amounts of silicon area (other people's chips) if higher volumes
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require additional wafers to be manufactured. Proponents of this approach operating in the
UK include Micro Circuit Engineering (MCE) and Austria Micro Systeme (AMS). An
MPW service is also available as a Europractice basic service. This European initiative is
discussed in greater detail later in Chapter 9.
The use of such MPW services is common throughout the rest of the world, and some of
the services available are detailed in Table 7-8. The table details those providers working
mainly with industrial rather than academic users. (Courtois, 1995).
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Country ... . ': ..,. '!Ca -- ..... .... .:..•.. ."",c· --;~;,. .....r 1UVIUII:;,. ••......i:7el'V~e8 ....
Australia Joint Micro-electronic research Active In 80's, now
centre (JMRC) believed extinct.
Belgium IMECIINVOMEC MietecCMOS
Became part ofEurochip
Brazil Project Multi User (PMU) VTICMOS
ES2CMOS
SiD-Microelectronica
bipolar
Canada Canadian Microelectronics NT CMOS
Corporation (CMC) Gennum Corp Bipolar
Mitel CMOS
(micromachines)
France CMP ES2 -CMOS
SGS-Thomson - CMOS
Germany Fraunhofer Institute for Integrated AMS-CMOS
Circuits (FhG-IIS) ES2-CMOS
Mietec-Alcatel BiCMOS
India Government Department of None yet
Electronics (DOE)
Ireland National microelectronic research In-house CMOS
centre (NMRC)
Italy Microelectronics development ES2-CMOS
association (MIDA) AMS-CMOS
LSI LOGIC - CMOS
Japan Advanced software technology ES2-CMOS
and mechatronics research FED (under development)
institute (ASTEM)
Korea Inter-university semiconductor Orbit-CMOS
research centre (ISRC)
Malaysia Malaysian institute of NORCHIP - CMOS
microelectronic systems (MIMOS) (see below)
Scandinavia Norchip AMS-CMOS
Switzerland Swiss federal institute of SGS-Thomson - CMOS
technology (EPFL) ASCOM - Bipolar
Republic of China Chip implementation centre (CIe) CMOS
Table 7-8. Multi-project wafer services worldwide.
Reducing all direct and indirect costs.
For some companies, addressing the direct and indirect costs discussed in this chapter by
recruiting and equipping an ASIC design team does not represent the best business model
for their organisation. Many large and small companies prefer to use the services of an
external design-house to perform the technology-specific parts of the design process while
7-30
concentrating their internal skills at the system level. Ionica, TRACKER, and Waterside,
discussed in Chapter 3 are all examples of companies who adopted this approach. The use
of third-party design and the growth of the 'network company' was discussed in some
detail in Chapters 3 and 6.
7.3.10 Conclusions on cost of entry.
Given the analysis presented in this chapter, it can be shown that cost of entry to the use of
ASIC technology can be very low. For some technologies it is virtually zero, and in most
cases it is lower than the costs that many companies routinely face (for example in the
purchase of a company car). The fact that potential users perceive high costs to be
associated with the adoption of ASIC technology must be considered as a real problem, but
the actual cost should not be a barrier to even the smallest companies.
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7.4 Lack of skilled designers.
Lack of skilled engineers is another major reason cited by potential ASIC users as a reason
for non-adoption. According to DTI figures, the UK has approximately 27,000 electronic
design engineers, excluding managers, with over 7,500 working for SMEs. It is possible
that many of these engineers (particularly the younger ones) will have encountered ASIC
technology during undergraduate or postgraduate education. However, their senior
managers do not consider them sufficiently skilled to use ASIC technology.
It is a hypothesis of this study that the skills necessary to adopt ASIC technology include
not only technical, but business and commercial skills, so it was necessary to investigate
the extent of these skills in UK industry, and the validity of the senior managers perception
that such skills do not exist within their organisations.
7.4.1 Method o/investigat;on.
In order to ascertain the level of training in ASIC design available within companies
electronic design departments, and the level of ASIC specific education in UK universities,
a survey of the heads of department of all UK universities with an electronics department
listed in The Commonwealth Universities Yearbook (Association of Commonwealth
Universities, 1994) was performed. A total of 49 institutions were included in the survey.
The layout of the questionnaire, which can be seen in Appendix C, follows the design rules
for questionnaires discussed in Chapter 6, and was intended to ascertain the level of
edUcation in technical, business and commercial skills related to ASIC technology that was
being included in undergraduate and postgraduate courses.
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After 4 weeks. 20 questionnaires had been returned. A reminder was sent to non-
respondents. This resulted in a total of 25 responses. The results are summarised below
7.4.2 Results of the university survey.
The first section of the questionnaire aimed to ascertain the level of technical education
relevant to ASIC design that is available to first and higher-degree students. The
questionnaire asked whether particular skills were included in the degree course. The
number of institutions answering 'yes' to particular skills is summarised in Table 7-9
below.
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Skill First Degree Bigberdegree
PLD design 89% 42%
FPGA design 68% 37%
Masked gate array design 47% 16%
Standard cell IC design 42% 26%
Full custom IC design 37% 26%
Schematic capture 89% 42%
HDL design entry (e.g. VHDL) 42% 26%
Logic synthesis 47% 42%
Design for test (e.g. scan path) 63% 26%
IC layout techniques & tools 53% 47%
Digital simulation 95% 47%
Analogue simulation 95% 47%
Behavioral simulation 37% 32%
Analogue IC design 32% 26%
Table 7-9. University responses regarding technical skills.
Clearly, most universities have a significant amount of material on ASIC related technical
skills included in both undergraduate and postgraduate courses. It would follow that
graduates should at least be able to begin to tackle the technical aspects of an ASIC design.
Business skills also figure significantly in the content of degrees, as can be seen from
Table 7-10.
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Skill Firstl)egree lIigb~rdegre¢
..
Break-even analysis 42% 11%
Net present value analysis 26% 5%
~
Presentation skills 84% 21%
'-
Project planning (e.g. Pert, 89% 26%
Gannt)
Critical path analysis 79% 26%
I..-
Product lifecycle planning 53% 11%
L..-.
Table 7-10. University responses regarding business skills.
The inclusion of business skills in university courses is partly due to the efforts of the
Institution of Electrical Engineers. Degree syllabuses need to be approved by the IEE if the
qualification is to exempt the graduate from examinations for corporate membership, and
although chartered status is not held to be as valuable in electronic engineering as it is in
say mechanical or civil engineering, most courses aim to be approved, and most students
would think twice before joining a course which is not.
However, when asked questions on purely commercial rather than business topics, the
response is not as positive. Few universities produce graduates who could answer even
basic commercial questions about the technologies which they have been taught to use. In
the third section of the questionnaire, institutions were asked whether their graduates
would be able to correctly answer certain commercial questions. The percentage
responding 'yes' to particular questions is summarised in Table 7-11 below.
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Question First Degree Higber.degree
Can you name 3 manufacturers of 32% 37%
FPGA
Can you name 3 manufacturers of 16% 26%
masked gate-arrays
Can you name 2 manufacturers of 21% 26%
mixed-signal standard-cell ICs
What is the likely NRE charge for 21% 11%
a 50,000 gate gate-array
What is the likely part cost for the 16% 11%
above gate-array in 10K
quantities
What is the part cost of a 2000 26% 16%
gate FPGA in 100 off volumes
What IS the cost of a 4 bit 16% 5%
microcontroller In lOOK
quantities
Table 7-11. University responses regarding commercial skills.
There seems to be a wide range of opinion on the inclusion of business and commercial
skills in degree courses, with this section of the questionnaire generating the highest
number of additional comments.
One university (Manchester Metropolitan) clearly think commercial skills important and
have their students consider a product development for which they calculate the cost of
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using two alternative technologies (masked ASIC and microcontroller). The cost of both
development and production are considered. In contrast, another university (Bristol)
responded by commenting, " Why do students need to know these things - surely they just
pick up a telephone to find out. These questions are pointless". As the same respondent
replied that their students would not be able to name three manufacturers of gate-arrays, or
two of standard-cell, it is unlikely that they would be able to ascertain this price
information without further training.
7.4.3 The role of the lEE in shaping graduate skills
In discussions with the academic community it became clear that even those resistant to
introducing, 'ephemeral' topics such as the costs of the various technologies felt that they
were being forced to include such topics in order to qualify as an accredited course with
the Institution of Electrical Engineers. This subject was raised in correspondence with the
IEE. The influence of the IEE on the training of engineering graduates is summarised in
their 'Guidelines on Accreditation' (IEE, 1991:1).
Since 1979 the IEE has used its accreditation scheme to approve specific degree courses
and exempt graduates of them from the institution's entrance examinations (IEE, 1991:2).
Accreditation reviews are performed by panels which are made up of academic and
industrial members who as far as practicable follow the structure established by the
Finiston Report, 'Engineering our future' (Finniston, 1980). The report calls for a four-
phase approach to engineering training (EAl - EA4). The basic structure of each of the
four phases shown in Figure 7-12.
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Phase
EAl An introduction to the fabrication and use of materials
EA2 Application of engineering principles to the solution of
practical problems based upon engineering systems and
processes
EA3 A structured introduction to industry under supervision and
involving a range of practical assignments.
EA4 Specific preparation for a first responsible post and a period
carrying responsibility for that post under decreasingly close
supervision.
Table 7-12. Engineering application definitions from the Finniston report.
Finniston recommended that EAt and EA2 should take place at the undergraduate level,
and specifically that EA2 might include a section on Business and Finance covering,
'Background to engineering as a business and its economics. Introduction to balance
sheets, costing and budgeting, marketing, selling and contracts, the value added concept
and product life cycles.'. While claiming not to be prescriptive about course content, lEE
accreditation procedures clearly point the universities in a direction that encourages the
teaching of business awareness. However, judging by the responses to the academic
questionnaire, these recommendations have not yet been adopted by many of the HEIs
questioned.
Ensuring that the EAt and EA2 skills are taught, by applying pressure to HEIs using the
accreditation process, is far simpler than ensuring that recently graduated engineers follow
EA3 and 4 to become ready for corporate membership. In recent times this has been
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encouraged by approval of company training schemes to give a fast route to chartered
status and by the introduction of 'Continual Professional Development' (CPD)
Using CPD, members of the lEE registered on the scheme can build up points for
particular training and development activities, and so are able to certify that their training
is progressing year by year (lEE, 1995).
7.4.4 The role of the 'Technology Champion'
The aim of the university questionnaire and the research into the role of the lEE was to
ascertain the degree to which graduates could take the role of 'technology champion'.
A technology champion is somebody who is able to recognise the potential of an emerging
technology and champion its adoption within an organisation. The champion must not only
be able to consider technical aspects, but must be able to present the costs and benefits of
adoption of a technology to his peers and to the senior management of an organisation.
Senior management will often be involved in the approval process for the capital spending
and product development spending necessary in adopting a new technology such as ASICs.
The skills necessary to be a successful technology champion are summarised in Figure 7-
3. These skills include:
• The technical skills (e.g. design skills) necessary to evaluate and work with the
technology and communicate with technical peers
• The business skills (e.g. business planning) to be able to analyse the technology in
relation to the company's strategic goals and communicate this to senior management
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• The commercial skills (e.g. price negotiation) to be able to bring a new technology into
a company from different suppliers who may use different business models to those
normally used by the company's suppliers
Figure 7-3. The 'Technology Champion'
The role of technology champion is a difficult one to fill. Clearly, technical, business and
commercial skills will all be important in order to communicate and negotiate with other
interested parties, but equally important will be the individual's political and
communication skills. The adoption of a new technology can have far-reaching
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implications for a company, and may meet with political opposition from those with a
vested interest in the status-quo.
For example, an older engineer with outdated skills but a wide network of contacts within
an organisation might try to resist the introduction of a new technology in order to
maintain his position within the organisation, or to avoid redundancy. Another example
might be a purchasing department, which is used to buying a wide variety of parts from a
range of suppliers, being told by the engineering department that they would from now on
be buying a single part from a single supplier. In such circumstances, purchasing
departments have been known to place obstacles in the path of engineers who are
attempting to introduce new suppliers so as to resist the introduction of the new technology
and so preserve their traditional position.
However, once a technology champion exists, the force for change can become strong. In
the experience of the author, and a number of other people questioned regarding this
approach, examples of change agents had been seen causing adoption of ASIC technology
in a number of companies including McDonnell Douglas Computer Systems, BICC Data
Networks, and Neeve Electronics.
7.4.5 The 'Technology Champion' as a 'Change Agent'.
This role of Technology Champion discussed above is similar to that of 'Change Agent'
discussed in a number of texts on change management (Spence, 1994). Spence considers
that the change agent has a changing role over time which is shown in Figure 7-4.
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Roles
Stimulator
Time
Figure 7-4. Roles of a change agent over time
Although Spence considers that a change agent is normally somebody from outside an
organisation, the roles outlined apply equally to somebody within an organisation seeking
to make a significant change (such as the adoption of a new technology).
The role begins as observer, during which time the change agent needs to analyse a current
situation before being able to propose any changes. They must then become diagnosticians,
able to understand a position and suggest changes that are likely to be practically
implemented. The next role is that of strategist, which consists mainly of planning and
policy making. The successful strategist must be able to identify a number of available
routes to a goal, and propose the most likely to succeed. Finally, as stimulator, the change
agent must motivate those around him to want to make a change, and to carry that change
through to a successful conclusion.
As discussed elsewhere, the role of change agent is a particularly difficult one to fill, as it
requires a high degree of technical, commercial and political skill to be successful.
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7.4.6 Conclusions on the skill-base.
The main conclusion to be drawn from this section is that while technical skills should be
available within most electronic engineering departments at a sufficient level to enable
initial ASIC design to be performed, some of the commercial and political skills which
engineering staff need to encourage technology adoption may be less evident in UK
companies, and are not being included in engineering degree courses in spite of pressure
from industry through the lEE.
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7.5 Insufficient Production volumes.
The lack of sufficient production volume is often cited as a major reason for non-adoption
of ASIC technology, and although this may be true for some of the technologies with
higher NRE charges (e.g. cell-based ASICs), it is not considered to be true of the lower
entry-cost technologies (e.g. programmable technologies such as FPGAs). In order to
ascertain the break-even volumes for particular technologies it is useful to take a sample
design and calculate the cost its development using a number of alternative technologies.
7.5.1 Cost analysis of a sample design.
In order to understand all of the cost implications of using ASIC technology it is necessary
to consider more than the component cost of the ASIC and the alternate solutions. Many of
the cost benefits of using these technologies come from the knock-on effects such as.-
• Lower manufacturing costs.
• Lower test costs.
• Smaller power supplies.
• Fewer or smaller PCBs.
• Fewer connectors.
For the sake of illustration a sample design will be used. This is identical to that used in
the DTI's 'Custom Circuits Seminar' (Ivey, 1994) extended to compare additional
technologies, and to consider a new product rather than the re-design of an existing one. If
implemented in discrete components, the sample design is a four PCB sub-system which
contains around 200 discrete logic chips (e.g. 74xx series TTL). It is assumed that 180 of
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the devices can be integrated into an ASIC and that this leads to the four PCBs becoming a
single PCB implementation. A production volume of 10,000 is also assumed.
When applied to the sample design the respective costs are shown in Table 7-13.
Discrete FPGA Gate-array Cell-based
Logic devices 36.00 45.00 12.00 8.00
PCBs & 80.00 27.00 27.00 27.00
connectors
Assembly 3.75 0.06 0.04 0.04
Test 3.33 1.67 1.67 1.67
Total cost 123.08 73.73 40.71 36.71
Board level 0 49.35 82.37 86.37
savings
Other savings (e.g. 0 13.00 15.00 15.00
psu ete.)
... ..
Total system 0 62.35 97.37 101.37
savings
.:"
... -.
Table 7-13. Example product costing.
However, in order to generate break-even figures, the relative cost of implementing these
technologies must be taken into account. In general, the major costs are those of suppliers
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NREs and any additional engineering time required over and above that used in the
discrete design, for example in higher levels of simulation.
For the sake of this calculation, engineering time has been assumed to have a cost of
£60,000 per man year including overheads (IEE, 1994). Other secondary costs such as
reduction in PCB layout time could be taken into account, as could the whole-life cost
reductions due to increased reliability, but these are more difficult to quantify. The total
cost of the development is then amortised over the expected production run with the
results shown in Table 7-14.
o
o 20,000 40,000Suppliers NRE o
Other expenses o 15,000 25,000
Total expenses o o 35,000 65,000
Total gain (loss) 0 6,235 (25,263) (54,863)
100 off
Total gain (loss) 0 31,175 13,685 (14,315)
500 off
Total gain lk off 0 62,350 62,379 36,370
Total gain 10k off 0 623,500 938,700 948,700
Total gain lOOk off 0 6,235,000 9,702,000 10,072,000
Table 7-14. Amortisation of development costs over volume manufacture.
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The conclusion from these figures, for this design example, are clear. The use of a simple
ASIC technology such as FPGA gives immediate savings over a discrete implementation
even at volumes of less than 100 pieces. At around 1000 pieces it becomes more economic
to use gate-array, and at around 10,000 pieces the lower cost of a cell-based part makes it
more economic. This is summarised in Figure 7-5 below:-
1000000
800000
600000
400000
200000
-200000
saving
--FPGA
--Array
Cell
productionvolume
Figure 7-5. Savings/or ASIC types with volume.
7.5.2 Generalised break-even volumes.
The above indication is specific to a particular design, and the break-even volumes would
vary for different chip sizes and design types, but this approach can be used to produce
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generalised figures for the different technologies. If this costing approach is applied across
the range of technologies the diagram below (Figure 7-6) results (Ivey, 1994).
Complexity
(gates)
50,000
20,000
Gate Array
10,000
Volume per design
Figure 7-6. Generalised break even volumes.
It should be stressed however that although drawn as distinct boundaries, the boundaries
are in fact 'fuzzy'. In some applications it may be cost effective to consider high levels of
integration for low product-volumes when the complete product is considered (e.g. flight
hardware for satellites where final equipment weight is all-important).
This fuzziness is compounded by the emergence of some intermediate technologies such as
the Xilinx 'Hardwire array'. This is a masked technology which is simply a copy of the
Xilinx SRAM based FPGA technology with the SRAM cells replaced by masked
connections. In this way users can migrate quickly from an FPGA prototype to a masked
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device which, although not as effective in its use of silicon area as a gate-array, is
considerably smaller, and hence cheaper than the FPGA that it replaces.
It is necessary to take each application in isolation and produce a cost model appropriate to
it. The technologies are after all 'application specific'.
For microcontroller technologies, similar cost-analysis techniques can be used. A typical
small microcontroller might have a price of around £4 in its OTP form and a price of
around 50p in its masked form. This part would have a masking charge of about £2,000
making the break-even point for the masked part over the OTP less than 600 pieces. If the
cost of programming the OTP part is taken into account the break-even level drops even
lower.
So it can be clearly demonstrated that ASIC technologies can be cost effective at very low
volumes, and certainly at the volumes produced by many SMEs. It is concluded therefore
that when SMEs claim that insufficient production volumes are a reason for non-adoption,
they are mistaken in their assumptions. Interestingly, in the survey discussed in Chapter 4
(Shortland, 1991) there is an example of a company claiming that their volume (over
30,000 pieces per year) was insufficient to consider using an ASIC.
7.5.3 Restrictions on minimum quantity in masked devices.
The break-even figures shown in this chapter for masked devices suggest that they can be
cost-effective at fairly low quantities. However, this makes the assumption that such
quantities will be delivered by semiconductor suppliers. While multi-project wafers and
other similar techniques go some way to make this possible, the attitude of semiconductor
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vendors to low-volume orders is also critical. At various times during the course of this
study, the world's semiconductor fabrication plants were working at close to their
maximum throughput, and as a consequence, semiconductor manufacturers were 'cherry
picking' the more lucrative contracts. This led to significant difficulties in finding sources
of masked devices except in large quantities, particularly for mixed-signal devices. This
concern was reflected in the survey of design-houses performed by the Semiconductor
Businesses Association in 1996 (SBA, 1996). In this survey over 40% of respondents
claimed that minimum order quantities were causing a problem to potential clients.
Limited foundry capacity, particularly within the UK, was also identified as a significant
concern.
7.5.4 Conclusions on volume requirements.
It can therefore be illustrated that insufficient production volume does not represent a real
barrier to entry to all but the most expensive ASIC technologies (e.g. masked cell-based
devices). Technologies exist with very low entry and design costs which can be easily
recovered over relatively modest production runs.
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7.6 Risk offai/ure.
Risk of failure is a little more difficult to quantify than the other reasons for non-adoption.
Risks increase with the complexity of the technology adopted. For well established
technologies (e.g. digital ASIC) most designs can be shown to be 'right first time' (Ivey,
1994). This is certainly borne out in the author's experience. But with the more complex
technologies the risks are higher. The XXX Ltd. case study discussed in Chapter 6 shows
that a risk of failure still exists, but these risks can be reduced or eliminated.
The major factor aiding the engineer in producing 'right first time' designs is the large
number of CAE software tools that are available to simulate and verify the design prior to
its fabrication. It was the failure to use a consistent set of tools that was a major
contributory factor in the case of XXX Ltd discussed above. If used correctly, these tools
can provide a high level of confidence that the ASIC will function as specified. The
behaviour of the ASIC, or the complete product, can be simulated across the complete
spread of production variations and environmental conditions that the product will
encounter. This is a far more rigorous approach than producing a laboratory prototype
using typical components, and can in consequence reduce the occurrence of problems
throughout the product's lifetime.
An interesting view on the perceived nature of the risks in using ASICs came in discussing
potential uses of ASIC technology to replace electromechanical controllers with a white
goods manufacturer. Their Chief Engineer commented, "With our usual electromechanical
approach, at least if it doesn't work we can bend the metal a bit and make it usable. You
can't do that with an ASIC can you". In other words, he was concerned about the costs,
timescales and levels of scrap that would result from a faulty prototype or early production
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run. But even here, the conceptions are incorrect. It is usual in applications where there is a
degree of uncertainty to make parts of even masked ASICs programmable. For example, in
the TRACKER device discussed in Chapter 3, many of the parameters used in the
demodulation scheme are loaded from a microcontroller into registers within the cell-
I
based ASIC. This allows exactly the sort of 'metal bending' required by the Chief
Engineer above. Had any problems with the modulation scheme been identified in testing,
various parameters of the algorithm could have been 'tweaked' in much the same way as
minor changes to metalwork are made in a mechanical prototype.
7.6.1 Conclusions on risk offailure.
So in consequence, if correct design approaches and simulation methods are used, the
rigorous design proving performed on ASIC devices prior to fabrication can in fact reduce
the risk in a design rather than increase it. It is also possible to reduce the risk of unknown
systemic effects causing problems by making critical parts of masked devices
programmable. Once again, the perceptions held by many potential users regarding the risk
of failure when using ASIC devices are incorrect.
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7.7 Lack ofsecond source ..
The significance of this problem seemed to have diminished between earlier surveys and
the user-survey performed for this study, but it did still appear as a reason in some
responses. This section aims to ascertain whether lack of a second source for a particular
ASIC device is still a problem that might prevent adoption of the technology.
7.7.1 Muld-sourcing an ASIC
In the early days of ASIC technology, a user was faced with considerable pressure to
decide on a particular ASIC technology and supply company and to continue to use that
company to supply the ASIC for the remainder of the life of the product. This was due to a
number of major reasons:
• ASIC technologies were unique to a particular silicon-vendor, so transfer of a design
involved redesigning the circuit to use the building-blocks available in the new
technology with all of the inherent risks of what is essentially a new design.
• Design tools were sometimes unique to a particular vendor, so design transfer would
involve learning how to use a new tool-set, and might include the purchase of a new
tool-set.
• The design of the new chip would require the payment of a new NRE charge, and NRE
charges were relatively higher than they are today.
• Chips sometimes contained large functional blocks designed by the silicon vendors (e.g.
processor cores). As the silicon vendor owned the Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) of
these blocks, it was not possible to transfer them to the second-source supplier.
The problems inherent in single sourcing have diminished in recent years. This is due
mainly to the factors discussed below.
7.7.2 Second source agreements between vendors.
With standard IC parts, the volumes produced often warrant a vendor producing an
equivalent part to that of a competitor, either with or without their consent. This was
generally not the case with ASIC technologies. However, as ASICs became accepted in
military products, their designers began to insist on second sources either to guarantee
local supply or to guarantee supply in a disaster recovery situation. This led to a number of
agreements which, although poorly publicised, allowed direct mask-transfer between
vendors and so gave vendors the ability to manufacture each others ASICs. There was
often a commercial barrier placed in the way of a user wishing to take this route, but
nevertheless the routes existed. The situation developed further in the 1980s as the cost of
developing new silicon technologies became prohibitive even to the largest silicon
vendors. This led to a number of joint technology development programmes, and
consequently to an obvious route to second sources. Examples of this include
developments between LSI Logic and Toshiba, and between LSI Logic and AMD.
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7.7.3 Demise of vendor specific design tools, or vendor specific libraries on standard
tools.
Early ASIC families relied heavily on design tools produced by the eventual silicon vendor
(e.g. LSI Logic's LDS, Fujitsu's FAME). These tools were specific to the design of one
vendor's products, and transfer to another vendor involved installation, learning and
redesign using a completely new toolset. Even as new, generic CAE platforms emerged
(e.g. Daisy, Mentor, Valid) the cost of developing different libraries for each systemmeant
that silicon vendors generally picked one or two CAE suppliers and concentrated their
library development effort on those platforms. This problem has been alleviated in recent
years by the emergence of two 'standard' library languages; Verilog, using XL as its
description language, and the formation of the VITAL group, who are attempting to use
VHDL as a standard for developing ASIC libraries.
This will mean that libraries and simulation results are transportable across a wide variety
of target CAE systems, so that users will not be restricted to libraries developed for a
particular toolset. As the sophistication and cost of developing CAE software increases,
silicon vendors have withdrawn from the CAE market, leaving even final sign-off
simulation to be done on generic platforms (most usually Cadence).
7. 7.4 Emergence of synthesis tools.
The emergence of synthesis as a design methodology has enabled simple and speedy re-
targeting of ASIC designs between families to be realisable. In very recent years high-cost
synthesis tools such as Synopsis (the industry standard) have been joined by a number of
lower-cost tools (such as Transgate - from transEDA). In consequence, the cost of re-
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targeting has been significantly reduced, and the threat of it is often sufficient to prevent a
silicon supplier from trying to exert the price pressure often associated with single sourced
devices.
These advanced design-tools are now becoming widely used, at least in design-houses. The
SBA survey discussed earlier (SBA, 1996) established that the use of HDL and synthesis
tools was fast approaching the level of use of schematic capture tools as the favoured
design-entry technique in the UK, and that it had overtaken schematic entry in the design
houses of mainland Europe. Similar surveys undertaken in the more general design
community (Joselyn, 1996) suggest that around 40% of designers are using HDLs and logic
synthesis in the design of programmable logic. Using these tools to transfer an ASIC
device from one supplier to another can have very low costs. In an interview with
Electronics Weekly, Orbit Semiconductors claimed that their NRE charges for re-targeting
an existing device were in the range of zero to $10,000 (Anon, 1995:2).
The emergence of high-level design languages and synthesis tools has also led to the
establishment of the so-called 'chipless chip companies'. These are companies who design
chips or functional blocks in a HDL format and then sell those functional blocks to users
for incorporation in larger designs. Such companies include Advanced RISC Machines
(ARM), and 3Soft and Systolic Technology, who have recently been acquired by the CAE
company Mentor Graphics. Interestingly, Mentor Graphics see the sale of intellectual
property as key to their future business success (Mentor, 1996). A knock-on effect of this
approach is that large functional blocks are available which are independent of silicon
vendors, and can easily be re-targeted to a new technology.
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7.7.5 Conclusions regarding second sourcing.
So, it can be shown that the second sourcing of ASIC devices no longer presents the level
of cost and risk that it once did. Routes to second sources exist at a relatively low cost, and
the inherent risks are no greater than companies routinely face with other technologies
(e.g. plastic molding tools). The emergence of more sophisticated CAE tools has had a
great influence in making these changes. Again, it would appear that the problem
perceived by potential users of ASIC technology has its roots mainly in history and myth.
7-57
7.8 General conclusions on user reasons for non-adoption.
At the beginning of this section, a number of user perceptions regarding ASIC technology
were identified by the use of a specific questionnaire and reference to previous work. Each
of the major reasons cited by potential users of ASIC technology has been analysed, and it
has been shown that many of these perceptions are misconceived.
However, this does not make the reasons for non-adoption any less real in the minds of the
potential user, or any less powerful in preventing them from adopting ASIC technology. It
has long been understood that a user's perception of the features of a product are as highly
influential in their buying decisions as the reality of the features (Skinner, 1990). Indeed it
is this that sustains the advertising industry. For example, at the time of writing, there was
a perception that British beef was prone to carrying a disease (BSE), and although little
scientific evidence suggested that such a perception was well-founded, the market for beef
was severely reduced. Clearly, perception is as important as fact in influencing a market.
If we assume that respondents to the user questionnaire were replying truthfully, and
adoption is to be increased, ways must be identified to overcome these incorrect
perceptions before adoption will even be considered.
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8. Models for evaluating the causes of adoption
and non-adoption.
It can be seen from the research detailed in earlier chapters, that the reasons most often
cited by potential users for non-adoption bear little basis in fact. However, unless non-
users are being deliberately misleading, which we must assume they are not, those
perceptions are inhibiting the uptake of the technology.
In deciding on the most appropriate models to use for the analysis of the situation, it is
useful to review two major types of situation or problem and to classify the adoption of
ASICs as one or the other. An Open University course on change management (Open
University, 1986) defines these two classes of problem as 'hard' and 'soft'. The
characteristics of the two types are shown in Table 8- J.
Hard Problems Soft Problems
One clear solution No one clear solution
Solution can only be one thing Resolution can be one of many things
Know what the problem is Not sure what the problem is
Know what needs to be known Not sure what needs to be known
Clear method of working it out No obvious method of working it out
Structured Unstructured
Clear-cut Messy
Table 8-1. Characteristics of 'Hard' and 'Soft' problems
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As examples, it can be seen that a mathematical problem and improving the operation of a
production line might be classified as 'hard' problems. Such problems are clearly defined
and have a single correct solution. There then follows a whole spectrum of situations
ranging from the purely 'hard' to the purely 'soft' (e.g. the introduction of a new political
system).
One problem with this method of classification is that very few problems can be
considered to be completely 'hard'. Almost any problem that one might consider will have
some human element to it which is likely to give it some characteristics of the soft type.
Even the example used above (changing a production line) would normally have some
human implications and so would start to become 'messy'.
In general, it may be assumed that most problems involving diverse sets of people are to
some extent 'soft'. The diverse sets of opinion and interest inherent in such situations
means that there is rarely a single clear solution, and even if one should exist it would be
unlikely that all those involved would accept it.
The wide range of reasons and perceptions described earlier in this study suggest that
ASIC adoption is not a hard problem and so should be regarded as soft. This difficult and
often subjective mixture of fact and perception lends itself to analysis using system based
methodologies. A number of such models are used in this chapter.
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8.1 Defining the system.
In order to use system methodologies it is useful to first define the boundaries of the
system being considered. This system has already been identified and described in Chapter
5, and is repeated in Figure 8-1.
Figure 8-1. A systems map of the UK ASIC market.
This systems map shows the major groups that will be considered in this analysis. Further
details of each group is given in Chapter 5. As with most analyses using this method, the
major problem is one of deciding which areas lie within the system boundary and which
outside. Once that decision is made, the situation becomes more bounded rather than being
completely open-ended.
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8.2 Multiple-cause diagram of retarding forces
In an attempt to resolve the systemic problems identified earlier in this study, the following
multiple cause diagrams are presented as an initial summary of the forces at work in the
system. Figure 8-2 summarises forces retarding adoption, while Figure 8-3 summarises
forces supporting adoption.
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Each of the contributory areas shown in Figure 8-2 will now be considered.
8.2.1 Educational issues.
These issues are highlighted in red in Figure 8-2. Lack of skilled designers is an often
cited reason for non-adoption, and was identified in the user questionnaire as a reason for
non-adoption. However, the questionnaire of HEIs showed that a large number of UK
graduates do have ASIC design experience of at least the level necessary to start
companies along the road to ASIC adoption. However, in order to convince a company's
senior management that the adoption of the technology is worthwhile, the engineers must
be able to make a business case. The questionnaire of HEIs also showed that little effective
training in the skills necessary to do this is being given either on undergraduate or
postgraduate courses. As a consequence of this lack of skill in the engineering community,
the 'decision makers' in a company may not be being brought to appreciate the likely
advantages of using ASIC technology either from the technical, or from the business point
of view.
8.2.2 R&D spending in UK companies.
The second major area, highlighted in blue-green in the diagram is a circular, self
reinforcing set of steps concerning the attitude of UK companies to research and
development (R&D) investment. It has been shown (Kenward,1994) that the spending of
UK companies on R&D is significantly less than that of companies in some of its
competitor nations. For example Kenward states that of the top 41 companies in the
electronic and electrical equipment sector worldwide (ranked by total investment in R&D)
only one (GEC) is based in the. UK. GEC spends some 7% of its turnover on R&D
compared with the 12 to 20 percent spent by companies such as Fujitsu (Japan), Ericsson
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(Sweden), and Amdahl (USA). Kenward does however concede that his results are based
on the reported results of large companies rather than those of unlisted organisations where
pressure to meet the short-term needs of the stock-market might not be as strong. However,
a survey performed by the Semiconductor Businesses Association (SBA, 1996) suggests
that a low level of R&D spending is also evident in the SME sector.
This reluctance to spend on R&D is echoed in a reluctance of R&D departments to spend
money on training their staff in emerging new technologies, and even greater reluctance to
spend money on business skills training. Training in R&D departments is often perceived
as a cost rather than an investment, and is one of the first areas to be cut in times of
recession.
As a result of this tight financial control on R&D, companies are pressured into staying
with what they perceive to be low-cost, low-risk technologies. As this study has
demonstrated from the user questionnaire, ASIC technology is seen as both high-cost and
high-risk. As a result of the lack of adoption of new technology, many of the products
produced by UK companies are mediocre when compared to those of their more
adventurous competitors. The inevitable result is mediocre sales, and a consequent lack of
earnings which might be retained in order to fund further R&D. In addition, it is widely
accepted that the UK stock-market takes a very short-term view of its investments,
requiring the payment of dividends and generation of profit in the short-term to take a
higher priority than long-term investments, so further reducing a company's ability to
invest in its future products.
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The multiple cause diagram shows the relationship as a self perpetuating loop. Clearly this
loop needs to be broken if progress is to be made towards adoption of ASIC technology.
8.2.3 Manufacturers marketing issues.
The third major area identified (highlighted in black on the diagram) relates to the
relationship between the major semiconductor manufacturers and the 5MB user. The
major semiconductor companies generally have fairly small direct salesforces who
concentrate on major accounts. For example, in 1994 LSI Logic employed about 5 direct
sales people to cover the whole of the UK, and NEC employed just one.
The interface between the large semiconductor manufacturers and 5MBs is traditionally
covered by their appointing distributors who then interface with the 5MBs. This approach
is generally acceptable in the promotion of standard products, where the semiconductor
manufacturer can write highly informative data books and maintain an arms-length contact
with 5MBs. The distributor has simply to take and process orders. For some more
technically advanced products, distributors appoint Applications Engineers (AEs), but this
position has rarely attracted high caliber engineers, and UK AEs have gained a poor
technical reputation, acting often as simply a conduit for passing problems back to the
manufacturer. This process is discussed in some detail in Chapter 6.
When initially considering the promotion of ASICs to 5MBs, many manufacturers
assumed that their normal distribution route could be adopted, and so distribution channels
were established. However, the situation is considerably different to that for standard
products. The buyer is generally an engineer rather than a purchasing department, and they
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must be confident that their technical problems are understood. Application Engineers
proved unable to do this. In addition, the selling cycle for an ASIC design is much longer
than for standard parts. In the author's experience it generally takes over a year from first
meeting to development order, and the chip is unlikely to be in volume manufacture (and
hence earning commission for a distributor) for at least a further year following
development and product launch. Distributors are simply not able to support this lengthy
and highly technical process. Some have tried to set up design groups to perform ASIC
designs and so decrease the time to generating revenue, but the results were often
disastrous for reasons of culture and management (this was discussed more fully in
Chapter 6 with the XXX Ltd. Case study). Most design groups set up in this manner have
since closed.
The result of this approach is that ASICs are not effectively marketed to SMEs by the
major semiconductor companies. This reinforces the position that decision makers are not
made aware of the benefits of ASIC technology, and so are not inclined to adopt it.
8.1.4 Risk issues
Issues concerning the risk involved in using ASIC technologies (highlighted in green) have
a large part to play in the adoption process. At the time when today's senior engineering
managers were practising engineers, ASIC technology carried significantly higher risks
than it does today. Horror stories of failed ASIC developments abounded, the design-tools
were unreliable, and a number of innovative companies failed to successfully adopt ASIC
technology. Even today, some ASIC technologies can be risky (e.g. mixed-signal
technologies). The upshot of this is that decision makers still regard the technology as
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risky. In any business, risk is seen as something to be avoided if possible, and consequently
the technology is not adopted.
8.2.5 Government intervention issues.
The last major area in the diagram is that of government intervention (highlighted in blue).
In Chapter 5 the history of the Alvey Programme was discussed. This programme is typical
of microelectronics programmes undertaken by governments prior to recent programmes
such as Microelectronics in Business and Europractice. The older programmes, and much
of the UK and European grant support (e.g. The ESPRIT programme) were aimed at
increasing the availability of technology through funding technology providers (chip
fabrication plants and the like). In consequence, much of the available finance was used to
subsidise the development of new, 'state of the art' technologies rather than the promotion
of existing technologies to potential users. This approach does not in itself constitute an
industrial policy capable of increasing adoption among SMEs. In addition, the highly
bureaucratic nature of the application process, the need to secure multiple (often overseas
in the case of ED schemes) partners, the likelihood of failure to gain funding, and the
reluctance of schemes to support other than pre-competitive developments made the effort
involved in applying for support unattractive to all but a few brave SMEs.
One example of large-scale intervention which failed, and was to make successive UK
governments more reluctant to become involved in microelectronics was the establishment
of Inmos (McLean & Rowland, 1985). This company was established with a high degree
of government support under the leadership of Baron and Peritz in 1978, shortly before the
demise of the then Labour government. While responsible for a number of significant
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developments in microprocessor technology (e.g. the Transputer) and high-speed static and
dynamic memory devices, Inmos was unable to maintain sufficient investment in
fabrication equipment or a high enough standard of production quality to remain viable.
The company went through a protracted period of uncertainty before eventually being sold
to SGS-Thomson who closed the manufacturing facility and eventually abandoned the
technology.
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8.3 Multiple-cause diagram of supporting forces
However, the forces at work within the system are not all negative ones. A number of
recent developments have taken place which stand to support the adoption of ASIC
technology, particularly by SMEs. These forces are summarised in the multiple cause
diagram shown in Figure 8-3.
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8.3.1 Educational issues.
Although the survey of HEIs showed that the amount of business and commercial
education given on degree courses is low, this is still higher than would have been the case
prior to the Finniston report. In addition, the level of in-service business and commercial
training is increasing, as evidenced by the significant increase in the number of business
diploma and MBA courses available in the UK. However, it is questionable whether this
change in attitude to commercial training is permeating to smaller companies. A review of
the Open Business School's Alumni Membership Directory (Open University, 1996)
suggests that the majority of graduates of the OU MBA course (arguably the most
accessible to SMEs) are from large organisations.
The lEE Continuous Professional Development scheme, and a realisation amongst
engineers of the importance of continued development is leading to an acceptance within
the engineering community of the need for continuous training in both technical and
business disciplines. This is evident in the increased level of post-appointment training
shown on Curriculum Vitae reviewed by the author. These trends can only help to increase
adoption as engineers learn to be able to present business cases to the decision makers in
their organisations, and as these engineers grow to become decision makers within their
own organisations.
8.3.1 Manufacturers marketing issues.
Another major factor in favour of ASIC adoption has been the emergence of
programmable technologies in both logic and processor-based ASICs. The main marketing
advantage inherent in these technologies is that they bear a high degree of similarity to the
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standard parts that are easily sold through distribution. The entry-cost to using the
technology is low, the level of technical support required is lower than for masked devices,
and the perceived level of risk amongst informed users is also less than for more complex
ASIC technologies. Consequently, traditional semiconductor marketing methods using
distributors and application engineers are more suited than they were to masked ASIC
marketing. As a result, more companies are getting onto the lower rungs of the ASIC
ladder, and so starting to see the benefits of using ASICs in their products. This is
evidenced by the continuing worldwide growth in programmable logic sales which are
predicted to grow to over $2Billion in 1997 (Parry, 1996).
Providing support for this process is adequate, the increase in use of programmable devices
is likely to lead to successful products which can only act to reinforce the use of the simple
devices and lead companies to consider more complex ASIC technologies. Such
companies need to consider the more complex technologies to be simply a further step in
ASIC adoption. This is being aided by the emergence of re-targeting tools which enable
programmable solutions to be easily re-targeted to masked devices.
8.3.3 Government intervention issues.
In spite of inevitable criticisms, government schemes, in both the UK and Europe, are
coming closer to the needs of the SME than they ever have before. Support grants have
moved from solely supporting long-term and pre-competitive research, to supporting
technology transfer and initial projects. MiB, SPUR, SMART, and EUROPRACTICE,
discussed elsewhere, are all examples of this. All of these schemes concentrate on the
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needs of small companies, as government has come to realise that such companies form a
major source of employment, and the major source of growth in employment.
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8.4 The nature of innovative developments.
In considering the perceptions of potential users it is important to realise that there is not
one single overwhelming reason for non-adoption, but a whole range of smaller reasons
which may be either real or imagined. This should be considered in relation to the types of
innovative development that may be encountered in companies. These developments range
from small incremental developments to major step-changes. (Gardiner and Rothwell,
1989). This is illustrated in Figure 8-4.
Degree of
innovation
Number of innovations
Figure 8-4. The nature of innovative developments.
Most innovative changes (over 90%) fall into the category of small innovative changes.
They normally involve a minor change to a process, method or technology. Examples of
this might be a migration from one plastic material to another for a molded part, or the
adoption of a change to the setup procedure for a machine tool. The important thing to
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note is that while they may be significant in a single area, they do not generally have major
knock-on effects in other areas of the company.
Once a change, no matter how small in nature, starts to have knock-on effects, it should be
considered as a major step change. If one considers the introduction of even a low-cost
ASIC technology to a company that previously had no electronics in its products, the
knock-on effects are significant. They can include:-
• New design tools to be identified, purchased and assimilated
• New or retrained engineering staff to be formed into a cohesive design team
• New design methods to be adopted
• New suppliers to be identified and qualified
• Old suppliers to be dropped
• New manufacturing methods to be introduced, or new subcontract manufacturers to be
identified, qualified and assimilated
• New logistics methods to be adopted to fit with new suppliers
• New marketing methods to be adopted to support new products
Consequently, it is of little surprise that the adoption of microelectronic technology is
treated with trepidation by new users. If adoption is to be encouraged, a means should be
identified that allows the adoption to take place as a series of small incremental steps.
Methods of achieving this are discussed in Chapter 9.
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8.5 Factors relating to innovation.
Spence (Spence, 1994) refers to a number of factors which may affect the likelihood of an
innovation being introduced. These factors are illustrated in Figure 8-5.
Figure 8-5. Factors relating to innovation
These factors may be summarised as:-
• Cost - A new product or process IS more likely to be adopted if it IS low cost
irrespective of the size of the potential return
• Complexity - Ideas and practices that are relatively simple to understand are more
likely to be adopted than those of greater complexity
• Visibility - An innovation is more likely to be adopted if it can be seen to work (for
example, post-emergence weed killers are commercially more successful than the more
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effective pre-emergence varieties because, by the time they are needed, the problem has
become clearly visible, as has the effectiveness of the solution.)
• Divisibility - An innovation is more likely to be successful if it can be tried in part
before complete adoption (putting a toe in the water)
• Compatibility - The view a person holds regarding an innovation is coloured by their
experience of similar innovations in the past. For example, peoples view of the failure
of the Sinclair C5 are often cited when electric vehicles are discussed.
• Utility - Innovations which have an immediate and obvious use will be more likely to
succeed than those of less immediate application. (e.g. instant coffee was quick to catch
on while electronic organisers have been slow to demonstrate their advantages over
paper diaries.)
• Collective action - Peer pressure is vital in the adoption of innovation. When a
company sees that their competitors are successfully using a technology, they are more
likely to adopt it.
When these criteria are applied to ASIC technologies we can derive a number of additional
reasons to explain the slowness of adoption.
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Criterion Statnsin relatiollto ASICteehnologies
Cost ASICs are perceived as having a high cost
Complexity ASICs are perceived as a technically complex technology
Visibility Success should be fairly visible, although perhaps not in
product areas which traditionally don't use microelectronics
Divisibility Traditionally ASIC adoption was all or nothing, but
programmable technologies are changing this
Compatibility Horror stories of failed ASIC developments are still prevalent
in poorly informed sectors
Utility This will be very application specific
Collective action No peer pressure will be evident in sectors which have not
begun adoption.
Table 8-2. Factors affecting innovation
It is clear that a number of reasons for non-adoption of ASIC technology can be identified
using this adoption model. The model may also be used to check the validity of approaches
used to increase adoption. This is pursued further in Chapter 9.
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8.6 Adoption and communication
Spence (Spence, 1994) describes a route between initial need recognition and the adoption
of a new situation which has become widely used in the discussion of innovation and
adoption. This route is summarised in Figure 8-6.
Situation B
Information
(1) seeking.5
~
................. ~
Dissonance
reduction
Confirmation
Exposure
to
information
Situation A
Figure 8-6. Adoption sequence
Spence considers that the adoption process begins with the emergence of a need in a user,
either through a realisation of the need, or by a chance encounter. The adopter then passes
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through a number of distinct stages (Awareness, Interest, Investigation and Action) before
the initial need is satisfied or reduced. At each stage of this process, the adopter's
requirements are different, and different approaches are needed to meet those changing
requirements. These requirements change from the need for initial exposure to information
in the early stages of the process through to final reduction in dissonance before adoption
is complete.
This model clearly has parallels in the adoption cycle for new technologies such as ASICs.
It is clear from this model that Spence views the adoption process as a multi-stage one,
with the needs of the potential adopter changing with each stage.
This changing need is one which must be borne in mind when considering the design of a
technology-transfer scheme such as those discussed in Chapter 9. Such schemes, if they
are to be successful, must be able to meet the changing needs of the adopter, and provide
different levels and types of support mechanism to aid the potential adopter at each stage.
For example, a scheme which simply concentrated on awareness raising would meet the
early needs of the adopter, but none of the later needs.
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8.7 Collaboration and innovation.
One model which discusses the need for industrial collaboration in the innovation process
is that produced by Rothwell and Zegveld (Rothwell & Zegveld,1985) and shown in
Figure 8-7.
Figure 8-7. Collaboration and innovation
Rothwell and Zegveld regard the innovation process as being a sequential process that can
be divided into a number of distinct stages from idea generation through to the marketing
and sales effort necessary to tum an innovation into a successful product. They consider
that the innovation process is dependent on a set of communication paths (shown as arrows
in Figure 8-7) between the stages that can take place either within or outside an
organisation. The innovation process itself is seen as the result of technological advances
and market needs meeting in the innovative company. This model fits particularly well
with the networked organisations discussed in Chapter 3, as the formation of
communications paths between the core companies and the skills inherent in their
suppliers is key in their success.
f 8-24
One problem with attempting to apply this model stems from its esoteric nature. For
somebody attempting to be prescriptive in generating a solution to a specific problem
rather than simply analytical, the model has no answers. It simply implies that putting the
right sort of communications channels in place will eventually succeed, and assumes that
say, excellence in manufacturing for your specific product is available somewhere. In
some cases this may not be the case.
To some extent this forms the other end of the spectrum to the proposals of the so called
'management Gurus' such as Tom Peters who in his 'Excellence' series of books
attempted to identify 'excellent' companies and hold them up as an example of how
companies should be managed. The main problem with this was that on revisiting these
organisations some years later, Peters found that some had failed. The trend since this time
has been for academics to be far less prescriptive in their approaches, but this leaves those
trying to apply management theory to real-life situations with a much harder task.
In terms of microelectronic adoption, this model also has some lessons for the designers of
technology transfer programmes such as those discussed in Chapter 9. A technology
transfer programme can be viewed as an enabling mechanism for the communication paths
identified in the model. The role of such a programme would be to bring the innovative
company into contact with those able to fulfill the roles which they cannot. This role could
extend beyond initial technology, and into the manufacturing or marketing skills necessary
to take a complete product to the marketplace.
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8.8 Changes within an organisation
The models discussed earlier in this chapter relate mainly to the forces occurring around
an organisation rather than to those occurring within it. The model discussed in this section
relates more to the factors within an organisation that might advance or retard the adoption
of a new technology.
Derek Pugh (Pugh, 1978) discusses four principals in relation to the acceptance of change
within an organisation. Those principals are:-
1. Organisations are organisms. Pugh considers that organisations are not mechanisms
that may be simply taken apart and reassembled in a new way. The implication is that
changes in one area of an organisation must be considered in relation to the knock-on
effects in other areas of the organisation.
2. Organisations are occupational and political systems. The implication here is that
changes must be reviewed not only from the point of view of operational efficiency, but
from the way in which they will affect ways of working, career prospects, and the
power, status and prestige of those involved in the change.
3. All members of an organisation operate simultaneously in all three systems
(Resource-allocation, Occupational and Political). This suggests that individuals will
not be purely opposing or supporting a change from the point of view of one of the
systems, and that opposition to a change may be more complex that simply a play for
power or a move to career enhancement.
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4. Change is more likely to be accepted by those basically successful in their tasks.
The suggestion here is that a change can be more readily accepted by a successful group
who are simply experiencing some problem or difficulty than by those in unsuccessful
groups who are likely to adopt a rigid approach in order to protect their position. The
successful group is also likely to have confidence in its ability and a high degree of
motivation to continue to be successful.
The implications of these principals for the adoption of microelectronics lie mainly in
considering the likely reaction within an organisation when the new technology is
introduced, perhaps by a small group, or in conjunction with a new and unfamiliar external
organisation such as an external design-house.
Overcoming resistance within an organisation was discussed when identifying the role of
the 'technology champion' in Chapter 7. The role of any technology transfer scheme can
only be to provide the change agent with as much ammunition as possible in order to
present logical arguments to the disparate groups within the organisation. The overcoming
of political and other pressures encountered in introducing a new technology will be a
major problem to be addressed by the individual organisation.
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8.9 Conclusions from the adoption models.
The major conclusion to be drawn from these models is that the situation is not a 'black
and white' one. While it is relatively simple to take each objection to adoption in isolation
and show that the objection is unlikely to be based in fact, or only minor in direct
consequence, the cumulative effect of all of these perceptions and facts on the overall
system is a significant one.
The various models suggest a number of different approaches to increasing adoption, with
different approaches being appropriate to different stages of the adoption process and to
different people and groups involved in the process. As a result, it is unlikely that any
short-sighted approach to a single problem will have more than a fleeting influence on the
level of adoption.
Any route which aims to overcome objections and work towards greater adoption, whether
originating in government, commerce, or both will need to be fundamental and long
ranging in its approach if it is to have any chance of success. While short-term initiatives
may spark the imagination of a few innovative companies, they cannot hope to increase
adoption in the majority of organisations.
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9. ASIC technology transfer schemes in the UK,
Europe and the rest of the world.
The earlier parts of this study attempted to identify the reasons for non-adoption of ASIC
technology and to identify models that might be used in order to more fully understand
those reasons. The later parts of the study aim to use that understanding and the models
identified in order to analyse how the situation might be improved, and to consider
whether the attempts made by governments to increase adoption are likely to be
successful.
Potential users of ASICs and the supply industry identified government intervention as one
of the most important elements in increasing adoption. This chapter aims to review the
level of intervention taking place in current UK and European initiatives and compare
them with initiatives in operation in other parts of the world.
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9.1 The UK: Microelectronics in Business.
9.1.1 Pre-history.
The Alvey programme, which started in 1983, represented probably the first major
initiative funded by the UK government which encouraged participation in research
between academic institutions and industry to the point of pre-competitive research and
development. Faced with a situation where the UK was significantly behind its competitor
nations (e.g. USA, Japan) in semiconductor technology the Alvey programme set out to
close the gap, not by encouraging high-volume product development (e.g. semiconductor
memory) but by encouraging the development of semi-custom technologies (cell and array-
based technologies). To take any other approach would have been at odds with the strategy
of the UK semiconductor manufacturers own strategies, and so unlikely to succeed
(Hobday, 1990).
Most of the Alvey budget (£350M over five years) was aimed at projects in semiconductor
process development. There was no post-competitive involvement, and none of the
emphasis on the development of the capabilities of SMEs that was to become a focus of
later initiatives. The focus of spending was very much in line with meeting the strategic
niche objectives of the then UK semiconductor producers (GEC, Plessey, Ferranti and
STC).
The Alvey programme can be considered to have been a success insofar as it encouraged
the development of the base technologies necessary to support the increased adoption of
microelectronics in UK businesses. It also sowed the seeds of industrial and academic
cooperation that was to be important in later national and international initiatives. It did
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nothing however to encourage adoption of the technology by end-user companies. This
was identified as a problem in the late 80s (Hobday, 1990) and addressed in subsequent
programmes. It can also be argued that in the longer term, the Alvey programme was not
successful in helping to meet the strategic aims of the major UK semiconductor
companies, as none of those identified (with the possible exception of the merged GEC-
Plessey Semiconductors) have succeeded in becoming a world class manufacturer of semi-
custom devices.
A number of small initiatives had been organised by the DTI in support of
microelectronics adoption in the UK (e.g. Custom Silicon Now). But, in the late 80s
surveys continued to show that adoption of the technology was still slow. One major
survey of this type was that performed by Shortland Associates (Shortland, 1991) and
discussed in Chapter 4. Government initiatives had traditionally focused on dissemination
of information via seminars, and some very limited financial support to industry and
academia (e.g. for the purchase of CAD equipment under the ECAD scheme). While
sufficient to act as a catalyst for entrepreneurial companies, these schemes were not far-
reaching enough to convince the majority of potential users to adopt ASIC technology. The
market for ASIC technology among electronics companies was reaching the 'early
adopters' stage (see Chapter 6), so the level of intervention required to induce adoption
was far greater than the government initiatives were providing. The supply industry was
also unable to provide sufficient support for the reasons discussed in Chapter 6. In
essence, the cost of marketing to potential users was not economic when compared with
the level of business that they represented. In consequence, a market-failure existed.
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Industry began to push the DTI for some initiative in this area. For example, the author
gained DTI support for a regional seminar on ASIC technology in 1992 (McArdle and
Woodley, 1992). This small-scale seminar and exhibition (50 delegates) was successful,
not only in its initial intent, but in helping to catalyse the DTI into adopting a similar set of
events, though on a much larger scale, to act as the promotional front to 'Microelectronics
in Business'
Following some years of planning, Microelectronics in Business (MiB) was launched to
address the market failure identified above. Its first promotional seminar took place in
Manchester in April 1994.
9.1.2 The Microelectronics in Business technology transfer model.
The model for technology transfer adopted by MiB was a relatively simple one, and is
shown graphically in Figure 9-1.
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Wider academic community
Wider industrial supply community
Figure 9-1 The Microelectronics in Business Programme.
Following initial promotional activity (e.g. by mail-shot), the 'Custom Circuits Seminar'
and later the 'Think Digital! Seminar', acted as a front-end to the programme. The seminar
(Figure 9-2) provided initial contact with potential users, an introduction to ASIC
technology, and a number of case studies showing how some UK companies had been
successful using ASIC technology in their products. This approach can be easily put into a
marketing context. Adopters from the 'early majority' stage onward can be shown to react
positively to suggestions that the path they are about to follow has been successfully
followed by their peers, while the entrepreneurs in some market segments could be
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catalyzed into wanting to find out more about the technologies to which they were
introduced.
Figure 9-2. The author presenting a MiB seminar
Following the seminar, potential users were introduced to a DTI Support Centre. The DTI
established first two, and later a total of six regional support centres based at higher
education establishments (see Figure 9-3). These centres were equipped with suitable
design tools and support staff, and were intended to act as learning centres where users
could learn to use the tools and the technology as well as gaining independent advice on
the adoption route most appropriate to them. Solutions were available in a number of
technologies from FPGA through gate-array to standard-cell.
Each centre also each appointed a 'Business Advisor', with considerable industrial
experience, who could guide potential users through the business decisions inherent in the
adoption of the new technology, and could if necessary suggest how the user might
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interface with the supply industry should they need the help of commercial designers or
ASIC supply companies.
o
\
.
Bolton
Stafford•
Hatfield.
Figure 9-3. MiB Regional Support Centres.
Region Location
•••
Institution
South West Bournemouth University of Bourne mouth
Kent Canterbury University of Kent
South East Hatfield University ofHerts
North Bolton Bolton Institute
Scotland Paisley Robert Gordon Institute
Midlands Stafford University of Stafford
Table 9-1MiB support centre locations
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It was not the intention of the DIl that these centres should become sub-contract design
centres. Indeed, considerable pressure was put on the DTI by the supply industry to ensure
that this did not happen (Merritt, 1994). It was the DTI intention that projects identified as
suitable for sub-contract design should be passed out from the support centres to the design
industry. However, as will be discussed later, this proved particularly difficult to achieve in
a visibly unbiased manner.
The approach of the MiB programme can be mapped onto the technology transfer model
proposed by Spence (Spence, 1994) and discussed in Chapter 8. This is shown in Figure 9-
4.
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Mail-shots
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Figure 9-4. MiB related to the Spence adoption model
The four stages of the evaluation process identified by Spence were supported by different
elements of the MiB programme. Initial awareness was addressed by mail-outs to potential
users, and by the sponsoring of stands at suitable trade exhibitions. When adopters entered
the 'interest' phase, they were invited to attend a seminar, and the subsequent
'investigation' and 'action' phases were supported through the activity of the regional
support centres, who were able to provide very specific support targeted to individual
companies, and also to help those companies to find suitable industrial suppliers.
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9.1.3 Programme introduction.
The scheme was launched amid significant mistrust on the part of the supply industry,
some members of which considered that the support centres would be competitive with
them, or that particular supply-companies would be favoured by the scheme. In order to
avoid charges of bias in favour of particular companies, the scheme interfaced to industry
via four trade-associations who were invited to exhibit alongside the regional support
centres at the afternoon exhibitions which accompanied the seminars. The trade-
associations invited are shown in Table 9-2.
Association Representing
Association for Distributors of Electronic Component distributors
Components (AFDEC)
Semiconductor Manufacturers Larger semiconductor suppliers.
Association (SMA)
Semiconductor Businesses Association Mainly design houses and some EDA
(SBA) companies.
VHDLUK User group of advanced EDA tools.
Table 9..2. Trade associations active within MiB.
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9.1.4 Early mistrust.
The early response of the supply industry was not all positive. The establishment of the
support centres at HEls was not a popular decision within industry, who claimed that such
institutions would not be able to provide industrial quality services, particularly with
respect to high-volume design and manufacture. The design houses were concerned that
the HEls would in some way become industrial design centres in competition with them,
and subsidised by the DTI. This real concern grew as, some months after the beginning of
the programme, the industry had not seen any of the promised new clients.
This distrust became evident in the UK electronics press in the latter part of 1994
(Flaherty, 1994. Wilson, 1994). However, the truth of the matter was that the support
centres were simply becoming overloaded with clients who in the main did not want
design support of the complexity offered by design houses as their applications were of a
type that could easily be supported through FPGA solutions that they could design for
themselves. The major semiconductor companies also began to become disillusioned with
the scheme, because they were not meeting any significant opportunities while they were
spending money sending staff to the seminar related displays. At one stage it looked as
though SMA might withdraw its support. (Whittaker, 1994)
9.1.5 Thefirst design.
The feeling of mistrust of the HEls was not helped when the press release of the first
completed design to pass through the programme was made in March 1995 (Joselyn,
1995). The design had been a relatively simple FPGA based product, but when design
assistance was requested, the client had been passed to a design support group within the
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HEI at which the support centre was located rather than out to industry (Wilson, 1995:2). It
later became obvious that this had been a correct decision, but its lack of transparency did
not help the design industry to accept that a correct route had been followed.
9.1.6 Building industrial links.
It quickly became apparent to the DTI that the support of the supply industry would be
crucial to the success of the scheme. The level of support and third-party design required
by some of the companies approaching the support centres was beyond what could be
realistically provided under the scheme. However, it was important that the DTI was seen
to be impartial. The support centres could not be seen to be biased toward a particular
design house. But, companies were asking, 'Where can I get my design done?'. It is at this
point that the role of the trade associations started to emerge as important in the
technology transfer process.
A method of recommendation was developed between the DTI business advisors and the
Semiconductor Businesses Association (SBA). Potential users of design services were
introduced to an assessment panel within the SBA who would then suggest a number of
potential suppliers. In this way, the impartiality of the support centres could be maintained,
and some level of pre-selection of suppliers 'achieved which would be more likely to result
in a successful project than having the user pick a design company without any help.
9.1. 7 Results of the first year.
The sales process for ASIC designs is long, with a year or more being typical. In August
1995, over a year after the start of the scheme, a press release from the DTI claimed some
18 design starts in various technologies (Wilson, 1995:1). Four SBA members (Array
Consultants, Plextek, Swindon Silicon Systems and Elex) publicised the fact that they had
received orders from clients introduced through the MiB initiative.
It is difficult to ascertain the full impact of the MiB programme in its early stages, but
some indications can be drawn from the results of a telephone survey conducted by Plextek
Ltd between June and October 1995 (McArdle and Ireland, 1996). Plextek attempted to
contact all of the companies that had attended the first round of seminars. Taking the
database of MiB seminar attendees as a starting point, the survey attempted to contact one
representative of each attending company. When the database was reduced to eliminate
non-industrial seminar delegates and multiple attendees from a single company, the result
was a list of 346 'relevant' companies. The sample is statistically large enough to draw
some interesting indications from the results.
The phase of adoption of the 346 companies who were considered 'relevant' at the time of
the survey is shown in Figure 9-5.
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34%
Current Project
16%
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Figure 9-5 Adoption status of contacted companies
In total, around two-thirds (66%) of the relevant companies were either engaged in the use
of technologies covered by Microelectronics in Business or were considering their use for
a current or future product development. This represented some 214 different companies,
and should be viewed as a success for the programme.
The applications ranged over a wide variety of markets, from simple domestic appliances
to a novel drug-delivery system. The participating companies also varied widely, from
small start-ups to established SMEs.
Clearly the scheme was having a positive effect. The supply industry, seeing real business
being generated became far more supportive of the initiative. At an SBA committee
meeting held in the summer of 1995, a show of hands indicated that most of the fifteen
companies present had seen some business generated directly as a result of MiB, and the
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survey detailed above revealed that some non-SBA design consultancies had also started
designs for seminar attendees.
While 4% (14 companies) may seem a small proportion of companies to have begun a
design in the technologies covered by MiB, this must be seen in relation to the type of
company entering the programme, and the amount of time for which they had been in the
programme. It should also be seen in the light of the very small market for ASIC designs
by 5MB companies that existed prior to the programme. Figures derived from the supplier
survey performed for this study suggest that around 20 masked-ASIC design starts can be
attributed to 5MBs each year along with an unknown number of design starts in other
microelectronic technologies.
These results also represented an increase in adoption over the rates found by surveys
performed prior to the MiB programme, although the technologies forming the basis of
those surveys are slightly different from those covered by the present MiB programme
(Shortland, 1991).
9.1.8 Types of companies involved in the programme.
The distribution of companies shown in Figure 9-5 can be mapped fairly closely onto the
adopter classifications suggested by a number of researchers who discuss the rate of
technology adoption by companies and individuals (Spence, 1994. McArdle, 1996:1.
McArdle, 1996:2 ). This adoption cycle is shown in Figure 9-6, and discussed more fully
in Chapter 6.
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Figure 9-6 The adoption cycle
If one makes the assumption that the few companies who have started microelectronic
projects fall into the 'Innovator' stage or the early phase of the 'Early Majority' phase, then
it follows that the vast majority of companies encountered fall into categories other than
'Innovator'. This has a number of implications on the way in which these companies should
be treated if adoption is to be encouraged.
Only 'innovators' will move forward at their own initiative. Members of the other groups
are known to require much more pro-active encouragement if they are to become adopters.
Classically such encouragement would include:
• Peer pressure - Knowledge that other companies have adopted the technology and may
be using it to compete against them.
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• Acceptance - Knowledge that other companies have successfully adopted the
technology without falling into any of the pits that they themselves fear.
As noted earlier, it is often the case that the early majority will act as legitimators to the
later groups, even more so than innovators who are often perceived as excessive risk
takers. The late majority companies are likely to be extremely ponderous in their approach,
and laggards are often openly hostile to change, and may currently be saying 'No' when
asked if they intend to adopt microelectronic technology.
9.1.9 Timing of companies in the adoption cycle
Some interesting trends can be ascertained regarding the timing of adoption of these
technologies. Using information supplied by one design-house that was successful in
securing deign business from companies introduced by MiB, it is possible to calculate the
time taken from the point that a client attended a seminar to the time that they requested a
proposal for design work, or following that proposal placed an order for design work.
Data regarding proposals are statistically more significant that those regarding sales, as at
the time of analysis proposals existed in much larger numbers than final sales. The
distribution of seminar to proposal times is shown in Figure 9-7.
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Figure 9-7 Time from seminar toproposal
It can be seen from Figure 9-7, that although some entrepreneurial companies do proceed
straight from seminar to proposal in a relatively short time, the majority do not. In fact, the
average time from seminar to proposal is over seven months (213 days). It must however
be remembered that this is the time to proposal. The time to order is significantly longer.
Although not yet statistically significant, the average time from seminar to order was well
over a year at the time of analysis. These timings are considered to be fairly typical of 'new
name' clients by the supply industry, and not specific to MiB related contacts.
9.1.10 Rate of entry to MiB
The rate of entry of new clients to the MiB programme is shown in Figure 9-8.
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Figure 9-8 Total contacts in MiB programme (seminar delegates)
Contacts up to November 1994 are those generated by the pilot series of the Custom
Circuits Seminar, so may to some extent be discounted because support centres were at an
early stage of developments, and links to industry were still being established.
The main phase of the programme began in November 1994, and the number of companies
entering the programme rose steadily thereafter. It began to rise steeply in early 1996 as
the Think Digital! Seminar series began. This series, which was free of charge (Custom
Circuits had a £50 seminar fee) attracted a higher number of seminar delegates, although
interestingly, these seminars also had a higher proportion of pre-booked attendees failing
to show at the seminar. Perhaps free seminars are viewed as having less value than those
for which a charge is made.
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9.1.11 Industrial categories in which contact companies operate.
The classification of the contacts in relevant companies within the MiB programme at the
time of the Plextek survey is shown in Table 9-3.
Indnstrial·.Categorisation .qty %
Unknown 12737%
Instrumentation 72 21%
Control Systems 29 8%
General Electronics 17 5%
Telecomms 17 5%
Process Machinery 13 4%
Security 13 4%
Medical Products 11 3%
Computer Equipment 9 3%
Components 8 2%
Domestic Products 8 2%
Vehicular 5 1%
Professional Audio 4 1%
Heavy Engineering 4 1%
Acoustic 2 1%
Aviation 2 1%
Broadcast Equipment 2 1%
Food Industry 2 1%
Leisure Products 1 0%
Table 9-3. Industrial categories of contacts
The companies have also been split into broader industrial categories. The result of this
categorisation is shown in Figure 9-9.
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Figure 9-9 Broad industrial classification oj contacts
As might have been expected, the majority of companies were involved in electronic
products, but a significant proportion came from non-electronic based companies where
the proposed technologies could bring significant product and competitive advantage.
9.1.12 Later results oj MiB
Further telephone surveys were not performed in later stages of the programme, but figures
available from the DTI summarising the overall results for the MiB programme up to
September 1996 are shown in Table 9-4. (DTI, 1996:1).
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Promotion contacts (e.g. by mailshot) 129,000
Initial inquires 2,835
Seminar delegates 1,209
Live enquiries 1,649
Completed feasibility studies 267
Project starts
At support centre 35
Client designing 23
Passed to supply industry 36
Completed projects 14
Table 9-4. MiB results to September 1996
It is interesting that the ratios that can be derived from these figures are similar to those
identified by the supply industry as expected returns from marketing activities (see
Chapter 6). MiB achieves a ratio of approximately 100:1 for mail-out to seminar attendee
compared with around 100: 1 mail-out to initial meeting (arguably requiring a higher level
of commitment) claimed by the supply industry.
The mix of technologies resulting from feasibility studies also gives an interesting view of
the most appropriate technologies for new users of ASICs. The split of proposed
technologies is shown in Figure 9- JO.
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Figure 9-10. Technology split among MiB clients.
It can be seen from this that although mask programmed technologies do have a significant
role to play, by far the majority of new users coming into the MiB scheme have
applications which are best served by user-programmable technologies such as FPGAs and
microcontrollers.
9.1.13 Reasons/or the success 0/MiB
Although not endowed with a particularly large budget (some £4 million) MiB was, and
continues to be, a successful programme. Some of the reasons for this can be suggested
from the Spence model discussing 'factors relating to innovation' discussed in Chapter 8.
That model suggests Cost, Complexity, Visibility, Divisibility, Compatibility, Utility and
Collective action as the major factors in the acceptance of new technology. This model, in
relation to MiB, is shown in Figure 9-11.
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Figure 9-11. MiB related to Spence's adoption/actors
Before taking these factors individually, it is important to consider that MiB made a
significant change in the definition of ASIC as a technology by considering that all of the
ASIC technologies defined in this study, ranging from masked ASIC through
programmable ASIC to microcontrollers could all be described as ASIC. Having
established this definition, a new message could be brought to potential users in the
fOllowing way:
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• Cost - The introduction of programmable and microcontroller technologies was used to
show adopters that ASIC technology could be realised at a low cost both in terms of
design costs and NREs. The seminars used realistic costing examples showing low-
volume break-even levels. The seminar presenters deliberately tried to break the, 'Real
men do it with masks' image of ASICs (McArdle, 1995).
• Complexity - Simple ideas are more likely to be adopted. The programme took the
approach that entrants had little prior knowledge of the technology. Seminars were
deliberately simplistic (though not condescending) and 'primer' documents were
produced. A number of case studies, showing first-time users succeeding, were used to
try to dispel some of the complexity myths that surrounded the technology.
• Visibility - An innovation needs to be seen to work. The seminars made extensive use
of case studies and had some simple products on display. Case material from a range of
'low-tech' products was used in addition to some high-tech ones to show that it was not
just complex products that could benefit.
• Divisibility - The ability to be able to put a toe in the water. Historically, masked ASIC
were an 'all or nothing' technology requiring large investments and significant
commitment before any reward was evident. By emphasising the role of programmable
technologies, the programme was able to give companies the opportunity of low-cost
trial designs which would get them onto the ASIC ladder. Use of the design tools at the
support centres made the necessary level of commitment even lower and so far more
easily justified.
• Compatibility - It was necessary for the programme to try to dispel some outdated
horror stories while still being realistic about the risks that still remain with more
advanced technologies. Case study material was used extensively to achieve this.
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• Utility - The ability of a technology to have an immediate use was addressed on a case-
by-case basis by having business advisors and support centres perform feasibility
studies relevant to the product needs of individual companies. The immediate benefits
of the technology to the clients own products could then be demonstrated
• Collective action - The bringing together of a group of people at seminars, and the
repeated use of successful case studies was key in adding peer pressure to the
persuasion methods used on prospective adopters. Other collective action included the
establishment of user-groups at support centres, and the encouragement of joint projects
were non-competing companies could be brought together.
So in terms of the factors identified by Spence, the MiB programme brought together a
powerful mix of positive factors that had not previously been brought to bear on the target
participants.
MiB can also be considered in a positive light when compared to the idealised model
proposed by Rothwell and Zegveld (see Chapter 8). They see the innovation process as
being a set of sequential steps which are facilitated by the development of formal and
informal communications networks and channels between innovative companies and
agencies that have knowledge of, or access to, the technology that they need to adopt.
Rothwell (Rothwell,1994) suggests that this process has evolved from the 'technology
push' and 'market pull' models that were assumed in the 1950s and 60s. He claims
therefore that the process is less deterministic than had been previously assumed.
This would suggest that a technology transfer scheme requires a multi-faceted approach
which encourages formal and informal linkages to be made. The MiB approach supports
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the establishment of such linkages at a number of levels. Innovative companies are
encouraged to meet others at seminars, support centres and exhibitions. They are given
access to both academic and industrial collaborators through introductions by Business
Advisors, and can make contacts with 'best-in-class' suppliers at all stages of the adoption
process from initial conception of a new product through to the manufacture and
marketing of the finished product through links to industry trade associations.
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9.1.14 Conclusions on the Microelectronics in Business programme.
A number of the conclusions reached in this analysis can be considered to have direct
relevance to the existing and continued activities of the Microelectronics in Business
programme. They include:
• Microelectronics in Business has made a significant impact on the adoption of ASIC
technologies by the UK manufacturing base. The number of design starts already
achieved is significant (McArdle, 1996:3) and the indications are that the majority of
design starts are yet to come.
• The long time-scales between introduction and adoption suggests that most of the
design starts that will be generated by the programme will come over a year from the
point at which a user enters the programme. As the typical client is of a category other
than 'innovator', it is likely that the interest in the technology will wane if it is not
supported by continued exposure, example and reassurance. The indication is that the
work of the support centres should be seen as a long-term activity (perhaps 4-5 years)
rather than a short term one. The support activity will need to operate for some time
after new entrants stop coming into the programme.
• The ability of the support centres to cope with the number of clients being introduced
to them is seen as a limiting factor by some clients. This might suggest that increased
activity is required, at least at the early stages of contact. From a DTI point of view this
should involve competent, impartial business and technology advice irrespective of
whether that is to be followed with the technical involvement of a university based
support centre or a commercial design service.
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• The continual exposure of potential users to a 'technology rich environment' is
important if adoption is to be encouraged in the less dynamic organisations. A number
of areas that might be used as vehicles for this exposure were identified both in the
telephone survey, and from seminar delegates. The major two were:
• Formal design methods
• EMC issues
Both of these areas could be considered for further seminar, publication or video
activity.
• From an industrial point of view, the potential clients being introduced by the
programme are ones that design companies and suppliers would not normally
encounter. Given limited marketing budgets, design houses will naturally concentrate
on larger companies where their chances of success are higher (This is discussed in
Chapter 6). The initial awareness raising and introduction provided by the MiB
programme would not be performed naturally by industry. In consequence, the likely
result of an end to the MiB programme would be that smaller companies would once
again be ignored, and so the spiral of ignorance, misinformation and non-adoption
would return.
• The European initiatives aimed at first users (e.g. Europractice and FUSE) are
complimentary to the MiB programme in providing funding for a small number of
companies to implement their products, but do not address the wider areas of
awareness raising and initial introduction performed by MiB. Without the initial
activities it is possible that FUSE would result in a few companies who are
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experienced at grant application being successful, rather than a more general increase
in awareness and adoption of ASIC technologies.
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9.2 Europe: EUROPRACTICE.
Shortly after the start of the main phase of Microelectronics in Business, the European
Commission launched the Fourth Framework. This is a multi-billion ECU scheme
covering all of the EU investment in research and development. Of interest to this study is
Europractice, and particularly the First User Action (FUSE) scheme. This is a scheme
aimed at increasing the uptake of microelectronics and replacing the Eurochip and
ChipS hop initiatives. The structure of the scheme is not dissimilar to that of MiB, but the
degree of funding (20M ECU over four years) meant that the degree of direct intervention
could potentially be greater (Anon, 1995:1). The basic structure of Europractice is shown
in Figure 9-12.
EU Grant aid
Figure 9-12 The structure of Europractice.
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The EU funded the establishment of a number of 'basic services', such as a multi-project
wafer service and semiconductor testing services, which could be called upon at subsidised
rates by users. In order to catalyze the technology transfer process, twenty Technology
Transfer Nodes (TTNs) were set up across Europe. In the UK, these were mainly located at
the MiB support centres mentioned earlier. In addition to this infrastructure, the EU
directly subsidised the cost of the adoption of new technology by grant-aid under the 'First
User Action' (FUSE) scheme.
Under the FUSE scheme, users making first use of a microelectronic technology such as
ASICs could apply for 100% funding of marginal costs involved in adopting the
technology for a specific product. It was assumed that some companies would need to use
external agencies to perform the design. Clearly this was seen as a positive approach by the
UK design industry, as their fees would be seen as a marginal cost and would therefore be
fully paid by EU grants to qualifying companies.
Applications for grants were to be competitive, and based on quarterly calls. The first call
closed on June 15th 1995, and it was reported that there had been a large over-
subscription. Many UK design consultancies were involved in applications, and the results
were eagerly awaited throughout the summer and past the second call which closed on
September 15th 1995 before the results of the first were known.
However, there was some unease in the design industry during that summer. By invitation
of the DTI, a representative of the EU department assessing the grant applications
addressed the UK design industry in June 1995 and disclosed some of the criteria under
which applications were being judged. It became apparent that companies who wished to
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perform design of ASICs internally were being given priority over those using third-party
design. There was an immediate response from the delegates at the meeting, who claimed:-
• Third part design was the most valid business model for many SMEs
• Internal design of all but the simplest ASIC was more likely to end in failure
• Direct intervention on that scale would unbalance a delicate market
There was a clear feeling that badly placed intervention which rewarded companies doing
internal design over those who used third-party design could be disastrous to the UK
design industry.
9.2.1 Results of the first calls.
The results of the first award review were announced in October 1995, some 4 months
after the closing date for applications. Actual grants were not to be awarded until mid 1996
following protracted negotiation between the EU and grant winners. The results of the
next two calls were also late in being published because the EU had badly underestimated
the high level of response to the calls. The results of the first three calls are shown in
Figure 9-13 (Eglin & Bloemendaal, 1996).
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Figure 9-13. FUSE. Results offirst three calls.
UK companies were particularly successful in gaining approval, with 9 of the 71 selected
projects in the first round being UK in origin. This success was put down, at least in part,
to the support in preparing proposals that had been provided to companies under the
Microelectronics in Business programme. Applicants were able to produce costed
proposals in association with the MiB support centres, and incorporate the information
directly into their FUSE applications. Over the first three calls some 58 of the 181 selected
projects were from UK companies.
Although not exclusively aimed at SMEs, some 93% of proposals came from the SME
base (using the European definition - companies of fewer than 500 employees). In
addition, 93% of selected projects were also SME based. The precise distribution of
company size is shown in Table 9-5. It should be noted that the figures given in Table 9-5,
although from the same source, differ slightly in total from those shown in Figure 9-13.
The reason for this is unknown.
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So in this respect, the FUSE programme could be shown to be supporting the SME base,
and the number of grants awarded to UK companies suggested that the programme was
also a success for the UK.
Number of
employees
Applications
received
Applications
selected
Percentage
selected in this
The technologies involved in the proposed and successful projects are shown in Figure 9-
14
category
..
<10 245 52 21%
10-99 333 83 25%
100-499 121 29 24%
>499 53 13 24%
Table 9-5. Distribution of FUSE grants by company size.
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Figure 9-14. FUSE. Technology spread addressed
It would appear from these results that although masked ASIC generated most proposals,
only 25% of them were successful. Companies proposing FPGA projects were more likely
to succeed (43% success rate). It must be assumed that this is due to the project assessors
judging this the most appropriate technologies for the 'first users' who applied. This is
very much in keeping with the results of MiB. However, there did seem to be some
evidence of massaging of figures to meet quotas. Some of the projects receiving funding
for masked ASIC development were clearly uneconomic (e.g. full mixed signal devices in
low added-value products with volumes of a few hundred per year).
It also became apparent at this stage that some of the fears of the design industry had been
justified. The assessors of potential projects had been given clear guidelines on acceptable
projects, and had applied these guidelines strictly. Specifically, sub-contracting more than
65% of the total grant led to disqualification, meaning that once manufacturers' NREs had
been paid, there was little left for sub-contract design work.
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The new TTNs were also becoming concerned. The level of funding received (around
50kECU per institution per year) was significantly less than that provided to MiB support
centres, and insufficient to take on any extra staff to prepare Europractice proposals. The
TTNs were to take a more ruthless approach, supporting only those applications which met
the Europractice (unwritten) guidelines, and thus inevitably reinforcing them.
At the time of writing, it is unclear whether the Europractice initiative will be successful.
Long delays in starting projects due to highly complex management procedures meant that
few finished projects were being publicised in early 1997. Indeed, some companies that
had been successful in obtaining early approval later abandoned projects as delays in
receiving grants increased. Other companies found that they were being encouraged to use
technologies that were no longer appropriate to their product needs due to the emergence
of new, more suitable devices than those which had been approved in grant applications.
9.2.2 Relating Europractice to the adoption models.
In terms of the adoption models identified in Chapter 8 and applied to MiB in this chapter
(Figure 9-4 and 9-11), Europractice cannot be considered to be a complete technology
transfer programme. It certainly addresses some phases of the adoption process to a high
degree by direct financial support of the later stages of adoption (the 'action' stage), but it
does little to support the earlier 'awareness', 'interest' or 'investigation' stages (McArdle,
1996:3).
It may be that some companies have found themselves skipping some of the earlier, and
very important, stages of the adoption process due to the lure of available grant-aid, only to
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find that they lack the commitment to carry the project through when problems appear
during implementation. It is also possible that in making the jump directly to
implementation, the companies have not had sufficient time to build the network of
communications channels and support systems implicit in the Rothwell & Zegveld model
(Figure 8-7) and so have nowhere to turn when implementation becomes difficult.
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9.3 Other schemes operating in the UK.
Although the two schemes discussed above are, at the time of writing, the most active in
direct intervention in ASIC adoption, a number of other schemes and sources of
development finance exist both in the UK and overseas. Such schemes are generally not
restricted to ASIC technologies.
9.3.1 Support/or Products Under Research (SPUR)
This scheme helps UK businesses with less than 250 employees by providing a grant of up
to 50% of the costs of new product or process development. The scheme is a competitive
one, and the maximum available grant is £150,000. Successful applications are expected to
show a high degree of technical innovation in addition to commercial viability.
9.3.2 Small firms merit award/or research and technology (SMAR1J
This UK based scheme is only open to companies of fewer than 50 employees. It is an
annual competition with a maximum individual award of £45,000. It is not unusual for
SMART winner to go on to develop a product using a SPUR award.
9.3.3 The Teaching Company Scheme (TCS)
This scheme is more squarely aimed at technology transfer, rather than simply sponsorship
of innovation. Recent graduates are made available to companies at a subsidised rate to
work on specifically approved projects on two year temporary contracts. The graduates are
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partially supervised by REI teaching staff, while working on a project which is considered
to be of benefit to the organisation. The cost of these graduates ranges from £9000 per
annum for small firms to £15,000 per annum for those employing more than 250 people.
At the time of writing, it is evident that all of the UK schemes are to be reviewed by the
new government, and that this may lead to significant delays in the award of grant-aid to
businesses with outstanding applications.
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9.4 Schemes in other parts of the world.
The schemes discussed above relate mainly to UK organisations. This section aims to
compare those UK schemes to ones used in other countries to encourage technology
transfer, and particularly increased adoption of microelectronics.
9.4.1 Methods of investigation
In order to investigate the assistance available to companies In other countries a
questionnaire was sent to the Trade Desks of 21 embassies located in the UK. The
questionnaire used is reproduced as Appendix D. Following reminders, the response was
still not great (8 embassies replied), so further investigation was made using the various
government pages published on the World Wide Web.
9.4.2 The 'tiger' economies of South East Asia
The economies of South East Asia are often considered to be the most progressive in
support of microelectronic enterprises, and the discussion of world ASIC markets in
Chapter 5 showed that the use of the technology in ASIA and the Pacific Rim is indeed
advanced.
Growth in gross domestic product (GDP) of some countries in the area are shown in Table
9~6 (OTS, 1997), and much of this growth is due to electronic and microelectronic
manufacturing industries.
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Country GDPgrowth in 1996
Laos 7%
Thailand 8.7%
Cambodia 5.5%
Singapore 7.9%
Malaysia 9%
Vietnam 9.5%
Indonesia 7.3%
Table 9-6. GDP growth in South East Asian countries
Examples of support for the microelectronics industry are discussed here in relation to two
neighboring and fast growing economies, Malaysia and Singapore.
Malaysia.
Over the last few years, Malaysia has maintained a growth in GDP of over 8%, with
around 30% of the GDP being produced by manufacturing industry. (DTI, 1996:2)
However, the country faces significant problems in its high-technology sector. Due. to a
shortage of labour, Malaysia, although low-cost by western standards, cannot compete
using labour rates when compared with some of the more populous Asian countries such as
China and India (Bacani and Hamilton, 1997), so instead opted for the introduction of
high levels of automation in its factories. However, the country has a shortage of skilled
labour and little capacity for research and development. It relies heavily on the
manufacture of products designed overseas.
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In order to try to overcome this deficiency, the Malaysian government has introduced a
number of schemes aimed at increasing technology transfer into its manufacturing base
and increasing the extent of local research and development.
The Pioneering Enterprise Scheme for example provides extensive tax-relief for new
companies, particularly those engaged in the transfer of technology. The country also
allows significant tax-relief (up to 200%) on research and development spending, and
exemption from taxation for a period of five years for companies set-up for the purposes
of research and development.
Double deduction (200% tax relief) is also available for the costs of staff training in
technology related areas, particularly for companies employing 50 or fewer employees.
Small companies also enjoy significant reinvestment allowances and total exemption from
the payment of customs duties on raw materials, components and machinery which cannot
be sourced locally.
The Malaysian Multimedia Supercorridor (MSC) scheme has been established. This
scheme uses a number of 'flagship projects' such as the introduction of smart-cards and
the building of a 'Cyber-City' in order to encourage the adoption of technology and the
growth of development skills. Companies taking part in this scheme enjoy significant tax
incentives and government grants.
Singapore.
In 1991, the Singapore government embarked on a five year National Technology Plan
with the following aims:
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• To promote the increase of R&D expenditure to 2% ofGDP
• To have at least 50% of the R&D budget sponsored by industry
• To have a ratio of research scientists and engineers of 40 per 10,000 of the total
workforce
This activity was supported by a government R&D fund of two billion Singapore Dollars
($US1.4billion).
Singapore supports a wide range of schemes to catalyse technology transfer and the
introduction of new technology. Many of these schemes are coordinated by the National
Science and Technology Board (NSTB, 1997:1).
Some of the schemes are outlined below:-
• Broadband R&D Grant Scheme. This grant scheme is aimed at companies involved in
the 'Singapore One' project to introduce broadband communications services
throughout Singapore (NCB, 1997).
• Patent Application Fund. This scheme exists to help meet the costs of securing
intellectual property protection through international patents.
• Innovation Development Scheme (IDS). This scheme provides grant aid of up to 50 %
of project costs. Eligible costs include manpower related costs, Materials/equipment
costs, professional services and Intellectual Property protection costs.
• Research and Development Assistance Scheme (RDAS). This scheme provides grant
aid of up to 50 % of project costs for projects with significant technological merit.
Eligible costs include manpower related costs, equipment costs, training costs,
consultancy costs.
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• Semiconductor Manpower Development Initiative. This $30M initiative alms to
increase the level of indigenous knowledge of semiconductor related skills. The
initiative sponsors a number of routes from post-graduate training to research exchange
programmes.
• Research Incentive Scheme for Companies (RISC). This is an investment scheme aimed
at helping companies to develop their R&D skills in strategic technologies.
• IT Cluster Development Fund
• Double Deduction for Expenditure on R&D For Services Project
• Investment Allowance Scheme
• Pioneer Status Incentive. Tax incentives for new companies
The government also sponsors four research institutes specialising in microelectronics,
systems science, information technology, and wireless communications. These institutes
are involved in joint R&D projects with industrial partners (NSTB, 1997:2).
As a result of the National Technology Plan, in five years, the country has achieved most
of its initial targets (Kian, 1996). R&D spending only reached 1.1% of GDP, but this was
against a high growth rate (up to 15% per annum). The ratio of scientists and engineers
reached 45 per 10,000 of the workforce, and the private sector contributed 65% of R&D
funding. Clearly, a well structured and adequately funded industrial policy can have
remarkable success in increasing the technological base of a country's industry.
In terms of the Spence model discussed in Chapter 8 Singapore has produced a technology
transfer infrastructure capable of supporting the needs of new adopters at every stage of the
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adoption process from early information to significant financial aid at the point of
implementation.
9.4.3 Hong Kong
One initiative identified in Hong Kong was the Applied Research and Development
Scheme. This scheme, sponsored by the Hong Kong government, provides loans of up to
75% of the development and marketing costs of innovative products. Loans are repayable
later in the product lifecycle. This is more of an example of a government initiative to
bring venture capital in contact with innovative companies than a scheme particularly
involved in technology transfer, but the loans have been used by companies in order to
introduce ASIC technology. It is presently unclear whether this initiative will survive the
political changes due in Hong Kong in 1997.
9.4.4 Israel
The support of industrial research and technology transfer in Israel is set in law. The law
For Encouragement Of Industrial Research And Development came onto the statue books
in 1984 and had three main objectives (MIT/OCS, 1996):-
• To foster the development of local technology-orientated industry through utilising and
expanding the country's existing technological infrastructure
• To improve Israel's balance of trade by increasing manufacture and export of high-
technology products
• To create employment opportunities in industry and exploit Israel's highly capable
scientific and technological labour force
9-46
In support of these objectives, a Research Committee made up of representatives of
government, industry and academia are able to award development grants of between 30%
and 60% of the R&D costs of a new product. Products that are successful must later repay
the grant through royalties on product sales. These royalties are then used to fund future
grants awarded under the same scheme.
Israel also operates a number of international research agreements and contributes to and
takes part in the EU's collaborative research programme (Framework IV)
More specific to microelectronics development is the Magnet Programme. This
programme aims specifically to disseminate new technologies (including microelectronics)
in addition to providing grants to aid in pre-competitive research. Since its introduction in
1992, Magnet has sponsored 14 collaborative research and dissemination projects.
In order to stimulate start-up industries, particularly among recent immigrants, the
government sponsors a number of 'Technological Incubators'. The companies based at
these incubator centres (which might to some extent be considered similar to science
parks) are able to apply for grants of up to 85% of approved budgets up to a maximum of
$US500,000 over a two year period. To date approximately 200 projects are being
supported at 27 technology incubator centres (MIT/OCS, 1995).
So it can be seen that in relation to the models discussed in Chapter 8, Israel is attempting
to encourage some new-user companies through all stages of adoption, although this
support is generally provided as part of its repatriation programme. Through its
establishment of technology incubators, it also aims to develop the type of formal and
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informal linkages inherent in the Rothwell & Zegveld model (see Figure 8-7).
Interestingly, and perhaps unique, is the approach to making the grant support system self-
funding through the payment of royalties on successful products.
9.4.5 Other replies to the embassy survey.
In addition to the detailed information provided either through direct responses or review
of web pages, the following responses were also received from the embassies surveyed.
Country Response
Morocco No specific support for microelectronic technology
New Zealand Although no specific schemes in support of microelectronics, the
country does run a 'Technology for Business Growth' scheme that pays
up to 50% of R&D cost of suitable projects.
Table 9-7. Other embassy responses
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9.5 Conclusions on technology transfer schemes
It is evident from the wide variety of technology transfer schemes discussed in this chapter
that different countries place significantly different emphasis on the importance of
technology transfer in their industrial strategy. The UK does not appear to have a
consistent 'industrial policy' preferring to leave industrial development largely to market
forces. In areas were specific market failures can be identified, small, specific intervention
schemes such as Microelectronics in Business are put in place, and given their relatively
small budgets are very successful and certainly good value for money.
The EU also follows a policy of minimum intervention. The Europractice initiative is a
good example of limited intervention, but it can only be considered to be an incomplete
approach due to it only supporting a few companies at a very limited point in the adoption
process.
Other countries, including the so called Tiger Economies, have wide-ranging industrial
development policies which are in some cases (e.g. Malaysia and Israel) enshrined in law.
These strategies are often supported with high levels of financial support, and have been
shown to be particularly successful in reaching their stated aims. Although not limited to
the adoption of microelectronics, these support scheme have been shown to have
encouraged significant increases in the microelectronics content of their countries
products.
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10. Comparison with another industry.
The major part of this study has addressed technology transfer with particular emphasis on
ASIC adoption. It is useful to consider whether the case of ASIC technology is a unique
one or whether there are similar characteristics in the adoption of other new technologies
in other industrial segments.
The industry chosen to perform comparisons with is the Biotechnology Industry. In
common with ASIC technology, the success of biotechnology requires that a new
technology be adopted across a wide range of traditional industries in order to enhance the
products of that industry. In addition, biotechnology contains examples of competence-
destroying discontinuities in technology which have caused a step-change in the
technology and methods available to companies operating within a range of industries in
much the same manner as the introduction of commercially available microelectronics has
influenced industries that have the ability to use electronics in their products.
10-1
10.1 Biotechnology
The so-called 'new' biotechnology is a technology that has emerged in the post-war period
based on the introduction into biology of a number of other scientific disciplines (e.g.
physics, mathematics). This has enabled the description of life processes at the cellular and
molecular level (Smith, 1996). The technology has found application across a wide range
of industries as diverse as brewing and pharmaceuticals. This is summarised in Figure 10-
1. Unlike single scientific disciplines, biotechnology can draw upon a wide range of
supporting sciences such as microbiology, immunology, and cell biology and supporting
engineering processes such as electronics. The technology might best be described as the
application of biological organisms, systems or processes to manufacturing and service
industries.
Figure 10-1. The interdisciplinary nature of biotechnology
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The history of biotechnology is a long one, originating in the biological production of food
and beverages. There is evidence of beer having been brewed as early as 6000BC.The
technology has evolved through the development of biological processes in non-sterile
conditions (e.g. the production of ethanol by open fermentation in the late nineteenth
century) and the introduction of sterility to biotechnological processes (e.g. the production
of antibiotics and monoclonal antibodies (MAbs) since the 1940s) to today's state of
applied genetics and recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (r-DNA) technologies, which
allow the biological properties of organisms to be 'programmed' (Smith, 1996). In
comparing biotechnology with ASIC technology we will concentrate on the adoption of the
so called 'new' biotechnologies (e.g. r-DNA and MAbs). These developments have
allowed products such as synthetic insulin and Interferon to be commercially produced
(Check, 1994)
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10.2 Industry Structure
A number of studies have shown that a networked industry has emerged comprising of
universities, research hospitals, large firms and start-up firms established specifically to
exploit biotechnology (the dedicated biotechnology firm (DBF)) (Dodgson, 1993). The
biotechnology industry is dominated by large companies. Although a number of
entrepreneurial start-up companies have emerged, they have not been able to replace the
large traditional companies in the way that fabless chip companies have in the
microelectronics industry. This is due largely to the existence of some particularly high
entry-barriers to the exploitation of a new product that exist for biotechnological products.
For example, in the pharmaceutical market, it is estimated that the development and
introduction of a new drug may cost in excess of $200 million due to some extent to the
regulatory framework that exists for new drugs (OTA, 1991). Clearly, a start-up company
would find such a sum difficult to raise. Large companies however, while having
significant funds, do not have the adaptiveness and flexibility inherent in the smaller
DBFs, or innovative internal research of the type undertaken in universities. (Arora &
Gambardella, 1990). Take-overs, mergers and failures do of course take place, but the
structure is far more one of a symbiotic network. This is illustrated in Figure 10-2.
Figure 10-2 Collaboration in Biotechnology
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It can be noted that this structure fits well with that proposed by Rothwell and Zegfeld (see
Chapter 8). They propose that the nature of innovation is that of the exploitation of a
network of differing skills and social needs in the production of a product to suit a
particular market need. This was discussed more fully in Chapter 8, and exemplified in the
case study described here.
10.2.1 Case Study - Ceiliech/American Cyanamid.
In his discussion of collaboration and innovation, Dodgson (Dodgson, 1993) relates the
case of Celltech and their collaboration with American Cyanamid.
Celltech are a DBF based in the UK who after entering into a research contract with
American Cyanamid in 1986, progressed to create a cooperation agreement in 1990.
Celltech had been formed in 1979, and although by 1991 its turnover had grown to
£17million, its research budget was over £10million. This high proportion is indicative of
the technology which requires a high degree of investment. As a result, Celltech had only
made an operating profit in one year of its history.
Celltech is a world leader in the development of MAbs and in particular in using them to
combat specific cancers. Cyanamid has a complementary skill in toxins, and in
collaboration they were able to use these technical skills along with the marketing skills of
Cyanamid. This resulted in the start of clinical trials of two anti-cancer drugs in 1992. In
addition to retaining some of the intellectual property rights (IPR) in specific product
developments, Celltech is able to retain all of the background IPR developed in the
projects (in this case all IPR relating to non-cancer applications) and so give themselves a
base for future product developments.
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10.2.2 Strategic approaches of emerging biotechnology firms.
In pursuing their wish for growth and commercial success, emerging biotechnology firms
have followed a number of strategies (Hamilton, Vila and Dibner, 1990). Those strategies
evolve over time and have been analysed in relation to:
• Innovation focus - The importance of upstream (research and development) and
downstream (manufacturing and marketing) innovation activities in the firm's strategy
• External orientation - The extent to which strategic alliances and other external
arrangements are considered key to the firm's strategy
• Timing - The way in which the balance of the two aspects discussed above changes
with time.
The study performed by Hamilton, Vila and Dibner reviewed the strategies of new
biotechnology companies over time. They reviewed the balance of innovation focus and
external orientation at the time of formation, the time of the study (an average of seven
years after formation) and that predicted for five years after the study. The results are
summarised in Figure 10-3.
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Figure 10-3. Emerging strategies of firms
The implication of the results of this study is that while a number of different strategies
exist, in most cases companies reduced their dependence on R&D as the firm became
more established, and instead concentrated on building downstream activities such as
manufacturing and marketing. This change may be performed either by the growth of
internal resources (as in group two of Figure 10-3) or by increasing reliance on external
collaborators (group one). The time at which companies make this transformation varied
from group to group, with some companies (group 3) handling much of their internal
development internally, but realising that an increase in external activity would be required
in their future. The fourth group of companies made and planned little change in strategic
focus, and were generally considered to be small, market-driven, niche-market companies
concentrating on single products. At the time of the survey, it was not evident whether any
one strategy was inherently more successful than another.
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10.2.3 Company Formations.
Mark Dibner (Dibner, 1991) suggests that the initial flurry of new company formations
caused by the emergence of biotechnology into the commercial arena has slowed. His
summary of the number of new company formations is shown in Figure 10-4.
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Figure 10-4. Formation of Biotechnology companies in the USA
This distribution fits well with the suggestion that an initial flurry of company activity
following the introduction of a 'disrupting' technology (i.e. one that challenges the core
competences of traditional industries) eventually tails off to be replaced by amalgamations,
joint ventures, mergers and company closures as the market stabilises. In the case of
biotechnology, this seems to have taken place over a relatively short period.
10.2.4 Government intervention in biotechnology
As with ASIC technology, the role of government has been important in increasing
adoption. Realising that the inter-disciplinary nature of the technology would cause
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difficulty in its adoption, a number of governments have initiated technology transfer
schemes (Dodgson, 1993).
• In Japan, the Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) sponsors the Japan
BioIndustry Association and the Research Association for Biotechnology.
• In the Netherlands, the government sponsors a number of university based
biotechnology centres and the Industrial Stimulation Scheme to promote technology
transfer (OTA, 1991)
• In the USA, organisations such as the Midwest Plant Biotechnology Consortium are
supported at the regional level to promote collaboration between academia and
industry.
In the UK, responsibility for government involvement in biotechnology lies with two main
bodies. These are the Biotechnology Unit of the DTI, and the Biotechnology and
Biological Sciences Research Council (formerly the Biotechnology Directorate of the
Science and Engineering Research Council (SERC)).
The Biotechnology unit was formed in 1982 and has encouraged a number of initiatives
under the DTI's LINK programme. No specific awareness raising activity comparable with
Microelectronics in Business has taken place, but a number of specific development
projects have been funded (e.g. the Eukaryotic Gene Manipulation Programme). This is
perhaps analogous to the FUSE programme of the EU in microelectronics. A number of
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'clubs' such as the Biosep Club, which concentrates on those interested in bioseparation
techniques, have been formed and supported.
The Biotechnology Directorate of SERC was formed in 1981, and has more recently
merged with part of the Agricultural and Food Research Council (AFRC) to form the
Biotechnology and Biological Sciences Research Council (BBSRC). The BBSRC
concentrates on the promotion of long-term research so as to generate a pool of technology
on which industry can draw. The council also promotes a number of 'clubs' in areas such
as Protein Engineering, Antibiotics and recombinant DNA. (Cabinet Office, 1994).
Although primarily aimed at the academic sector, the BBSRC does claim to be active in a
number of industrial projects, and claims to interact with over 200 companies including
Zeneca, Pharmaceutical Proteins Ltd, Rhone Merieux and Piman-Moore,
10-10
10.3 Adoption ofBiotechnology.
The adoption of biotechnology has much in common with that of ASIC technology for a
number of reasons including:
• The technology is applicable across a wide and disparate range of industries and
products. However, this range is not as wide as that of microelectronics, and is
consequently easier to identify and applymarketing efforts to.
• Knowledge of the technology would not be resident in many organisations that might
use it.
• A number of 'myths' about the high cost and risk of adopting the technology have
emerged. In the case of biotechnology this includes a high level of public concern over
genetic manipulation. Rumors concerning high costs of adoption appear to be founded
in fact.
There are however also some significant differences between biotechnology and ASIC
technology:
• Most advances in biotechnology have been made in university research establishments
rather than in industry, so the extent of technology transfer needs to be higher than in
microelectronics.
• The level of initial investment required to exploit biotechnology is often significantly
higher than that encountered in microelectronics and lower entry-level technologies are
rarely available at costs suitable for the adoption by SMEs alone.
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10.4 Conclusions on biotechnology.
The biotechnology industry may in some respects be considered to be younger than
microelectronics, but has progressed at a different rate through some stages of its
evolution. In some respects, some of the early traits of the microelectronics industry are
evident in biotechnology.
Entry costs are still very high, and pay-back periods long, so the availability of the
technology to SMEs is limited to those with large capital budgets or access to support from
or collaboration with major companies. However, there are many rumors of an imminent
'boom' so SMEs (DBFs) are being formed to exploit the work being performed in
universities. Venture capitalists are becoming interested in an attempt to mimic the large
profits that were made in the early years of the microelectronics industry.
At this stage, the technology does not exist in a form that is suitable for wide-scale
adoption, so specific government initiatives aimed at increasing such adoption would be
premature. Government initiatives aimed at developing core skills that can later be
exploited by industry are more in fitting with the current technological situation.
Having been born in the era of the 'networked company' many new DBFs may remain in
that state, choosing to concentrate on their core competences. As the technology matures,
it may be that a reduction in the numbers of DBFs takes place as larger companies develop
in-house capability if suitable low-cost technologies become available. This is analogous
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to the increase in in-house development of digital ASIC devices that has coincided with
the availability of FPGA technologies.
Comparisons can be drawn between the emergence of small entrepreneurial companies in
the two industries. In biotechnology, these start-up companies have quite quickly been
absorbed by large companies. This has occurred to some extent in microelectronics, but
the lower cost of entry has enabled a continual stream of new companies to continue to be
established and be successful in microelectronic related industries. As more sectors of
industry adopt microelectronics, and new microelectronic products emerge, there will
continue to be opportunities for success for small companies in niche markets. If the fall-
off in the rate of establishment of biotechnology companies suggested by Dibner (Dibner,
1991) is maintained, it would appear that opportunities for small companies to exploit
biotechnology are diminishing.
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11. Conclusions and implications.
There are a number of overall conclusions that can be drawn from the various aspects of
this study regarding the status of ASIC adoption in the UK. These conclusions relate
particularly to the SME manufacturing base although many of them also have significance
to larger companies. If these conclusions are accepted, there then appears to be a number
of routes that might be taken by industry, government and other stake-holders in order to
increase adoption of ASIC technology. The conclusions also have number of implications
for the generally accepted models of technology adoption.
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11.1 Conclusions.
The use of the term ASIC to describe a type of technology is in itself controversial.
Different elements of the design and supply industry apply the definition differently in
order to enhance the standing of their own products or to denigrate the qualities of others.
This vagueness of definition has not been helpful to the industry at large as it has increased
the level of confusion in potential users. In essence, the best definition of an Application
Specific Integrated Circuit is,
'An integrated circuit which is specifically designed and manufactured
to perform the requirements of one specific application or product'
This definition can then cover any type of technology which results in the production of a
chip for a particular product, irrespective of whether the customisation of the chip to the
application takes place at a silicon foundry or on the user's production line. This definition
is necessary due to the large and constantly changing range of ASIC base-technologies
(e.g. gate-array, FPGA) and the overlap between such technologies which make any other
definition difficult to apply.
New ASIC base-technologies (e.g. programmable analogue devices) have emerged during
the period of this study, and will inevitably continue to emerge in the future. However,
some constant rules do apply. All of the technologies studied, when taken in isolation, tend
to show classic experience curve, and product life-cycle effects. This allows the prediction
of likely future cost and sales volumes for emerging products.
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The emergence of ever newer, faster, cheaper base-technologies also means that there is an
increasing probability that a good match can be found between a potential users
application and an available technology. Key to the emergence of suitable new technology
has been the growth in the number of programmable technologies available to meet low-
volume requirements and reduce 'time to market' at a time when the life-cycle of products
is getting ever shorter. It is always worth remembering that the product life-time of some
products is now shorter than their development time (e.g. mobile phones or PC mother-
boards). This will bring increasing pressure on designers to adopt methodologies which
can reduce development timescales.
Some interesting conclusions can also be drawn regarding the nature of manufacturing
industry in the UK. in the mid-to-late 1990s. The 1970s and 80s saw a dramatic change in
the UK. manufacturing base. During the 80s the UK. industrial base suffered a severe
recession. Almost all manufacturing industry sectors experienced significant pressure to
cut costs and become more globally competitive. Many companies could not adapt and so
ceased to exist. Many large companies shed significant levels of staff in so called
'downsizing' initiatives. While one might argue with the prudence of these initiatives, and
of the UK. government in allowing and encouraging such action, it has had a number of
significant results.
Firstly, the UK. has moved further towards a manufacturing base made up largely of SMEs.
The proportion of SME companies in some industry sectors (e.g. electronics) is higher than
in many competitor nations. Many of these SMEs were formed during the industrial
recession or fought hard to survive it. As a result, much of the dead-wood traditionally
associated with UK. industry has disappeared, leaving an SME base which is more flexible,
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innovative and ready to adopt change. This was supported by the views of the ASIC design
industry, who see their 5MB clients as more flexible and adaptive than their large
industrial clients. However, such companies are also seen as being severely under-
capitalised, and so often unable to invest in the new technologies which might enable them
to compete in global markets.
The structure of UK companies is also changing. Due to the need to adapt quickly to
changing market needs, while minimising the cost of such changes, many companies are
adopting a 'networked company' structure and forming close relationships with supplier
companies rather than trying to maintain in-house expertise in all of the areas necessary for
their operation.
This transition to an 5MB based industrial economy, and the moves toward networked
organisations are not unique to the UK. Such transitions are occurring world-wide, and
governments are starting to recognise the importance of the 5MB sector in all areas of
industry. This is resulting in increased interest in supporting the growth of 5MBs which is
reflected in the emphasis of government industrial support initiatives (Cabinet Office,
1996).
In spite of the pressures of recession and changing markets, many small companies have
been successful in using ASIC technology to bring them sustainable competitive
advantage. A number of such companies are discussed as case studies in Chapter 3. A
number of similarities exist been these companies, including their readiness to use external
assistance in bringing innovative products to market. All of them are, or are becoming,
networked organisations in the way that they do business. With regard to ASIC technology,
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the successes shown by the companies in the case studies are not confined to one particular
type of ASIC, but show examples of all of the base-technologies discussed in this study.
Using systems-based techniques to analyse the ASIC market and its customers leads to the
conclusion that a complex and constantly changing environment exists. The suppliers,
users, and support agencies (e.g. government) are constantly shifting as changes in
technology change the importance of different players. For example, as tools for designing
digital technologies become more advanced, the need to use external experts to design
them diminishes in favour of internal design teams, and as the programmable devices
become more of a commodity, the use of distribution companies to sell them becomes
more realistic. This ever-changing system makes the analysis of adoption a difficult one,
and one which is unlikely to have clear-cut conclusions.
Some conclusions regarding the nature of the market may however be made. It is
undoubtedly true that the World, European and UK markets for all types of ASIC device
are growing at a remarkable rate. Occasional glitches in growth do occur as fluctuations in
supply and demand lead to the now recognised 'silicon cycle', but any fall off in demand
has traditionally led to a price led response from the semiconductor industry which has
often led to the next boom in a particular product area (e.g. PCs and perhaps digital TV in
the near future).
However, the study shows that the UK has not been keeping pace with the advances in
microelectronic technology when compared either to its European or World competitors.
In Chapter 5 it was shown that the UK SME base might account for perhaps 20 masked
ASIC design starts each year of 200 performed in the UK and 2000 performed in Europe at
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large. However, even Europe falls behind world trends when these figures are compared
with the 7000 design starts per year seen in the emerging economies of the Pacific Rim.
This usage rate in the Pacific Rim should be viewed alongside GDP growth rates of around
6-8% fueled largely by manufacturing industry, and a perceived importance of the growth
of SMEs within many of these countries.
Increasing the adoption of ASIC technology within the UK SME sector provides a difficult
problem for the UK supply industry. It should also be noted that much of the supply
industry is itself embryonic and faces a constantly shifting and dynamic market. The role
of semiconductor manufacturers, design houses and distributors is constantly changing as
new technologies emerge, but one constant pressure comes from the need to apply
marketing budgets in areas in which they are most likely to succeed.
Unfortunately, these areas do not include the SME sector. The disparate nature of the
market, the spread of industries, and the vast range of potential applications when coupled
with a lack of investment capital means that suppliers will inevitably move their attention
away from the SME base towards more lucrative contracts with large companies where the
chances of repeat business are also higher. Opportunities to do business in the SME sector
certainly do exist, but the business development plans of most UK suppliers (particularly
design houses) tend to favour addressing large customers in export markets rather than
addressing the UK SME base.
Before adoption of ASIC technology can be encouraged in the SME base, there are a
number of obstacles to be overcome. The surveys performed for this study, and the review
11-6
of earlier studies show that perceptions about ASICs held by the 5MB base have not
altered significantly in recent years. In essence, large numbers of potential users still
believe that ASICs have the following characteristics:"
• High cost of entry and use
• High risk of failure
• Problems of single-sourcing
• Problems of insufficiently trained staff
• A requirement for high production-volumes
When each of these perceptions is taken in isolation, it can be shown that they are either
wrong or at least of no greater importance than concerns that exist in many areas of a
company's day to day operation. Chapter 7 discusses these areas in detail, but the
conclusion is that there is not any single all-important reason preventing an 5MB from
adopting ASIC technology. The reasons must then be a wide range of small problems and
perceptions which when added together prevent adoption. However, the power of
perception should not be underestimated, and neither should the effort involved in
changing such perceptions.
In order to evaluate the situation in some detail, Chapter 8 reviews a number of models.
Earlier analysis had suggested that a 'soft' or 'messy' situation exists so systems models
are used to clarify the situation. Important in the conclusions to be drawn from these
models are:-
• The situation is a complex one with no single answer
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• Different phases of adoption require different support structures
• Organisations exist as political systems and organisms
• Communication between parties is key to adoption
• Methods of easing the step-change associated with ASIC adoption might increase
uptake
Clearly, a 'market failure' exists. Consequently, if UK government believes that
manufacturing industry is important to the future prosperity of the country, then there is a
role for it to play in supporting increased adoption of new technologies by the
manufacturing base. Two major questions are:
• To what extent should intervention be taken?
• To what extent should market forces be allowed to prevail?
Chapter 9 reviews a number of UK, European and overseas government initiatives in the
light of these questions.
There is a wide spectrum of government intervention strategies at work in the world-wide
ASIC market ranging from the minimalist intervention seen in the UK and Europe with
initiatives such as Microelectronics in Business and Europractice, through to the full-
blown industrial strategies enshrined in law that are evident in South East Asia. The level
of financial subsidy also ranges from the thinly-spread, wide-area approach of MiB,
through the limited-participant capital support of schemes such as FUSE, to wide reaching
support such as the $2 billion available to companies in Singapore (a country the size of
the Isle of Wight) through just one of its intervention schemes.
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To a large extent, the scope of these schemes is defined by the availability of resources in
the various countries (Singapore has a $15 billion trade surplus), but in addition,
developing countries with clear national industrial development plans such as Malaysia are
being successful in stimulating industry, and this has resulted not only in significant
growth rates in GDP from a low initial base, but in high GDPs in absolute terms. Much of
this growth is based in industry, and a high proportion of that is in the electronic
manufacturing sector.
While schemes such as Microelectronics in Business and Europractice may be considered
to be very successful when considered in relation to the limited budgets that they have
available, they cannot be considered to form any part of a consistent industrial policy with
clear objectives, reflecting instead the laisez-faire attitude to industry and the emphasis on
a market-led economy evident in most UK government policy since the 1980s. The result
of this is the inevitable loss of world market share to the more dynamic members of the
'Tiger Economies' of South East Asia. To some extent this inevitability has been accepted
by UK government in its recently launched 'South East Asia Campaign' which aims to
increase UK exports to what it sees as the worlds fastest growing economies. The
campaign also promotes ways in which UK companies can become involved in overseas
government sponsored technology transfer initiatives such as the Malaysian Multimedia
Supercorridor and its supporting technology development programmes (ArifNun, 1997).
The situation in microelectronics could be considered to be unique, so In order to
investigate its uniqueness, a short study was made of a technology which is often
considered analogous to microelectronics. Biotechnology is often cited as the 'the next
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technological revolution' and appears on the face of it to be similar to microelectronics in
that its applicability spans a wide range of industry, and that it requires a high degree of
technical ability to implement. However, the structure of the biotechnology industry has
been significantly affected by the environment in which it operates. The high level of
government intervention and regulation involved for example in the approval of a new
drug has imposed massive entry barriers to biotechnology products, so while small
companies have emerged to develop technology, they are inevitably swallowed up or
amalgamated with larger entities as products get nearer to the market. Low-cost methods
of exploiting biotechnology are yet to be developed.
There are few technologies that can claim to have the far reaching effects of
microelectronics. Microelectronics are now used in many products that we use daily, from
motor-vehicles to alarm clocks; from PCs to toasters. This study has shown that this all-
pervasive nature of the technology can only increase in the future. While some of UK
industry has embraced the technology and used it to its advantage, much of the industrial
base has not, and is falling behind its overseas competitors. While government has
recognised this failure for some years, it has done little to encourage higher levels of
adoption due to limitations of resource and lack of political will to intervene in the market.
The supply industry is successful in its own right, but gains much of that success in
working with overseas users and large manufacturers rather than the UK 5MB base. This is
a matter of business expedience and is unlikely to change. Change, if it is to come about,
must either be organic, originating in perceived need from individual companies, or should
be encouraged by government, trade associations, and other non-profit organisations. Time
however is running out. While UK industry vacillates, the emerging economies of other
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areas of the world are seizing the opportunities presented by microelectronics and creating
successful economies predicated on technology adoption.
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11.2 Implications for stake-holders in the ASIC market
The conclusions above may seem somewhat disheartening from the view of UK industry,
but a number of routes to increasing adoption of ASIC technology are evident which could
significantly improve the prospects of adoption in companies within the UK who could
benefit from the use of the technology. These routes to increased adoption involve activity
from a number of the stake-holders that have been identified in the course of this study.
While it is unlikely that any single initiative by a single group could be assumed to bring
the market to a position where a 'critical mass' of adoption would result in a self
sustaining system, a combination of activities by a number of groups might be sufficient to
bring the group of potential users to such a state. Initiatives that might be taken by
individual groups are discussed below.
11.2.1 Implications/or industry
In reviewing these implications it should be remembered that the UK ASIC design and
supply industry is a successful industrial sector in its own right. UK design companies
perform a significant proportion of their work for overseas companies and so represent a
source of export revenue. Some are also forming joint-venture partnerships with overseas
manufacturing organisations which will also indirectly bring revenue to the UK.
However, many UK design and supply companies see the UK SME base as a fruitless
market which is unlikely to lead to significant business. This has been shown not to be the
case by some companies who have been able to target specific segments of the market and
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who have been able to amortise the high cost of sale over longer term repeat business or in
the provision of further added-value services. Examples of this are the design companies
who are offering' design and supply' services for new users of electronics.
The UK design and supply sector would do well to reconsider their marketing approaches
to the SME base in the light of this and consider ways of flexibly tapping into what
remains a large and untapped market. Useful marketing approaches might include
commitment to and participation in government initiatives, user-groups and professional-
institution based promotion schemes, and the review of alternative first-stage marketing
initiatives such as the use of the Internet.
11.2.2 Implications/or government
The degree to which government is prepared to intervene in a market is clearly key to the
extent to which they will be prepared to try to encourage the adoption of microelectronics
in the UK SME base. At the time of writing, shortly after a General Election, it is unclear
to what extent the political will to intervene might change in the future. However, the work
of this study has shown that a market failure exists which is unlikely to cure itself in the
short term. It may be that, given time, UK industry will realise that it has no alternative but
to adopt microelectronics in its products. But time is short. Overseas competitors are
already reaping the rewards of increased adoption and will continue to build a market
presence that may become unimpeachable. This market failure can be addressed through
government intervention, and by an increase in support to SMEs wishing to adopt ASIC
technologies.
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In the recent past, UK government has had little clear policy with respect to manufacturing
industry. At one point it appeared that such industry had been abandoned in favour of a
service-industry economy. However, recent trends suggest a slight change of heart in
favour of support of manufacturing industry. If this industrial sector is to survive and
flourish, it must adopt new technology and use it to its advantage. Microelectronics is a
key technology for many industrial sectors, so support of its adoption should be key in any
industrial policy. This is certainly the case in the successful industrial economies of the Far
East, and the UK ignores it at its peril. While budgetary constraints may prevent the high
levels of support evident in other nations, failure to provide sufficient support can only
result in a lower level of technology adoption and a less successful manufacturing base.
However, even with a limited budget, intervention of the type performed under the MiB
programme could continue. The establishment of support centres, business advisors and
user-groups that has already taken place under this programme has been key in increasing
adoption, and could continue to be key in the future.
11.2.3 Implications for Educational Establishments and Professional Bodies.
The study of the content of engineering degree courses identified a shortfall in these
courses in relation to the development of the business and commercial skills necessary to
successfully introduce ASIC technology into a company. While graduates will have
sufficient technical skills to begin ASIC designs, they are not able to become Technology
Champions. This would suggest that an increase in the level of commercial training given
in degree courses would be useful. However the normal three or four year first-degree
course already has difficulty in including all of the technical subjects necessary, and any
increase in business subjects would have to be at the expense of some other content. So,
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while an increase in business training at first-degree level is desirable, it may be that the
most appropriate place for such training is at the post-graduate level.
Currently, only a small proportion of UK electronic engineers pursue higher degrees, so
while increased business training could usefully be included in such degree courses, it is
likely that a different approach to post-graduate training would be necessary to meet the
needs of the majority of UK engineers. The Continual Professional Development scheme
of the lEE provides one such route. The scheme is fairly young, and adoption by the
engineering fraternity has not been high. Itmay be necessary to find ways of making such
schemes more attractive to engineers, perhaps by making them lead to a formal post-
graduate qualification.
Professional institutions might also play a greater role in the initial promotion of new
technologies. The special-interest groups and user-groups which have been shown to be
useful in building awareness and supporting initial adoption could fit well within the
framework of a professional institution, and would be unlikely to be influenced by
commercial bias. Such commercial independence has been seen as key to the success of
support centres operating within the MiB scheme discussed in the study.
11.2.4 Implications for SME companies.
While the supply industry and other stake-holders must take some blame for failing to
promote ASIC technology to the SME base, they cannot be held solely responsible. Some
blame for not adopting new technologies appropriate to future success must be attributed
to the manufacturing companies themselves. When compared, for example, to the
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companies of the tiger economies of the Far East, UK companies are slow to change and
very conservative in their approach to risk. In relation to ASIC technology, companies
should be increasing the attention that they pay to emerging technologies, and particularly
those being adopted by their competitors. Eventually, an industry will get to the stage
where adoption of a new technology is unavoidable, but in delaying adoption until this
time, companies will have missed significant opportunities and may even find that their
competitors have built an unassailable lead.
In order to avoid this situation, it is necessary for SMEs to find ways of building their
internal competences in the use of technologies that will be useful to their products. There
are a number of approaches to this which do not need to include bringing advanced design
or manufacturing capabilities in-house. This study gives examples of a number of
companies that are building external networks which allow adoption of new technologies.
The main new competences that these companies need to develop are in the management
of external relationships. Having established such skills, the companies can progress to
using any number of advanced technologies through changing relationships with 'best in
class' suppliers.
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11.3 Development ofmodels
The study uses two main types of model in assessing the nature of technology adoption.
The first set are marketing based and relate to the needs of companies to produce
competitive products. These models can be applied to both the adopting companies and
their suppliers. The second set are more concerned with the mechanics of technology
adoption and in general consider the needs of the adopting organisation. While both sets
contribute to the understanding of the situation, both also have weaknesses which might
usefully be addressed. These weaknesses become evident when trying to apply the models
to the adoption of a complex technology such as ASICs, and to complex and ever-changing
markets such as those encountered in electronic products ..
The marketing based models, such as those of Porter discussed in Chapter 3 can usefully
describe how products using ASIC technology might be successful, but to some extent fail
to address the complexity of real markets and real products. It is often difficult to define a
single, analyzable market for a product, and also virtually impossible to define the features
that might be possible in a new product without an understanding of new technologies that
might be used to achieve them. The marketing models lead one towards a 'marketing pull'
rather than 'technology push' approach to new product definition, when in reality some
degree of both is necessary.
Some weaknesses also became evident when attempting to apply the adoption models to a
real-life market. One comprehensive model of the technology adoption process is that of
Spence described in Chapter 8 (Figure 8-6). While this model clearly describes the
process of adoption, it assumes that support for the various stages will be readily available
if a market for the technology exists. In the case of ASICs, such a hypothesis falls down
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because although a large potential market does clearly exist, exploitation of the market is
unlikely to take place until it becomes economically viable for suppliers. This requires a
'critical mass' of adoption to be reached so that suppliers no longer need to be involved in
activity which is best described as 'missionary'. Until this point is reached, the adoption
process must be supported by organisations which do not need to profit from the market in
order to survive. These may either be non-profit making organisations such as trade-
associations or government departments, or, perhaps less likely, could be organisations
taking a much longer-term view of potential returns. If such organisations do not intervene,
the adoption process may fail, in spite of the existence of a large potential market.
An amalgamation of market and adoption models applied to a complete group of adopters
is shown in Figure 11-1.
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Figure 11-1. Amalgamation of market and adoption models
The critical-mass point can be defined as the point at which the adoption of the technology
by a particular group is sufficient to make it viable for suppliers to market to them. The
situation is then self-sustainable. Up to the point at which a critical mass of adoption is
reached, it must be assumed that the predominant advocates of the new technology to the
potential adopters will be non-profit organisations such as government departments and
trade associations. Once a critical mass of adoption is reached, the role of such
organisations can reduce, as normal market forces come to bear on the adopting group and
its suppliers. The point at which a critical mass will be reached will vary according to the
proposed technology and the nature of the adopting group. It will be influenced by a
number of factors including:-
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• The size of the adopting group (small groups are easier to identify and market to)
• The complexity of the new technology (complex technology will require greater initial
explanation than less complex technologies)
• The length of the sales cycle (suppliers are unlikely to become involved in lengthy, non-
productive sales initiatives)
• The availability of alternate, easier new markets to the technology suppliers (suppliers
will of necessity address the easy markets first)
• The extent of intervention performed by the non-profit organisations
So while some technologies and markets may reach critical mass without any intervention,
it remains that many more complex technologies such as ASICs will require a 'kick-start'
from non-profit making organisations. This need should be considered in the generation of
representative models of the adoption process.
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11.4 Areas for future study
In the course of this study a number of interesting areas arose which, though not
immediately relevant to the subject and scope of this study, raised some interesting
questions that might fruitfully be explored in the future. These areas include:-
• A more accurate estimation of the size and nature of the UK SME manufacturing base
than is available through government statistics and inference
• A more detailed study of the progression of UK company structure from its traditional
form to a more networked structure
• A more detailed study of individual SME companies in S.E.Asia in relation to their
perceptions and adoption of microelectronics
• A more detailed study of the success or otherwise of the extensively interventionist
industrial policies evident in the Far East.
While not immediately relevant to the adoption of ASICs in the UK, these studies might be
key to a better understanding of the general state of the UK manufacturing base, and of the
apparent success of the 'Tiger Economies' .
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